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ABSTRACT 
 
 
NANDAN KUMAR JHA. Roles of school district competition and political institutions 
in public school spending and student achievement. (Under the direction of DR. 
STEPHANIE MOLLER) 
 
 
 Equity in school district spending, and equity and productive efficiency in 
educational outcomes are of paramount importance in the literature on K-12 public 
education in the US. The research on the effects of school choice (operationalized as 
inter-school district competition) and local political institutions on unequal school district 
spending and equity and productive efficiency in educational outcomes is not adequate. 
This dissertation fills several gaps in the literature by 1) extending the literature on the 
Public Choice, the Leviathan, the Consolidated Local Government, and the Reformism 
models that examines the interactive roles of local political institutions and school choice 
on equity in spending, productive efficiency and equity in student achievement in public 
schools in metropolitan areas; and 2) modeling the equity effects of school choice and 
political institutions on school district spending and student achievement. Fixed effects, 
instrumental variable fixed effects, Hausman-Taylor regression, and Multilevel Linear 
regression models are utilized on a uniquely compiled longitudinal dataset from several 
sources, including the Popularly Elected Officials Survey from the US Census Bureau, 
the Local Education Agency (School District) Longitudinal Finance Survey, the National 
Education Longitudinal Study (NELS: 1988-92), and the School District Demographics 
System from the National Center for Education Statistics.  
 Results from fixed effects models lend support for interactive effects of political 
institutions and inter-school district competition on school district spending. Additive and 
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interactive models do not robustly support the equity effects of inter-school district 
competition on school district spending. However, results from fixed effects and 
instrumental variable fixed effects models support the equity effects of political 
institutions on school district spending in some cases. School districts with more 
professional political institutions are also more equitable in public education spending. 
Results show that whereas inter-school district competition has productive 
efficiency effects on student achievement the political institutions do not. In terms of 
equity, the inter-school district competition and political institutions have differential 
effects on student achievement. In regard to the former, results imply that the increased 
inter-school district competition leads to inequity in students' 10th grade reading scores 
and 12th grade reading and math scores. In regard to the latter, results suggest that 
differences in political institutions across school districts lead to inequity in students' 10th 
and 12th grade reading and math scores. School districts with more professional political 
institutions also have more equitable student achievement. Student's reading and math 
scores are generally higher in comparatively higher income quintile school districts than 
those in comparatively lower income quintile school districts. These findings assume 
significance as they inform the policymakers in regard to why and how organizational 
and political contexts matter in bringing desirable educational outcomes. The 
policymakers can bring organizational and political changes in school districts for 
achieving the goal of more effective public education. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  
 
 1.1. Overview 
 Governments are responsible for providing collective goods and services and 
fiscal policy is mainly concerned with raising money to pay for the cost of public 
programs that deliver these collective goods and services (Kraft and Furlong, 2010; 
Lowry, 2008). In the United States, there is a three tier government system for providing 
public goods: federal, state and local governments. Local governments provide a range of 
collective goods and services. In fact, local school districts provide K-12 public education 
which enrolls approximately 8/9 of students in the US (Levin, 2008). Equity in school 
district spending and equity and productive efficiency in student learning outcomes are of 
paramount importance because K-12 public education constitutes about 34% of total state 
spending in the US (US Census of Governments, 2007). Furthermore, although the US is 
one of the highest spenders on public education both in terms of real per pupil dollars and 
as a proportion of GDP, the relative international ranking of the US in student learning 
falls below the median (Hanushek and Lindseth, 2009). This outcome suggests that the 
K-12 public education in the US is comparatively inefficient.  
 This dissertation focuses on the roles of school choice and political institutions on 
equity in school district spending and productive efficiency and equity in educational 
outcomes.  There is limited research on the role of school choice, defined as inter-school 
district competition, on unequal school district spending and productive efficiencies and 
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equity in educational outcomes. The few studies on the effects of inter-school district 
competition on both student achievement and school district spending offer inconclusive 
empirical evidence (Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 2007). Furthermore, existing research has 
ignored the role of local political institutions.  This empirical investigation will offer 
theoretical insights and inform the larger policy debate on the roles of school choice and 
political institutions in equity in school district spending and on equity and productive 
efficiency in student achievement.  
 1.2. Equity and Efficiency in Public Education 
There are several ways to approach and study educational effectiveness (Odden 
and Picus, 2000). Two measures of effectiveness are efficiency and equity. Efficiency has 
two subcomponents: allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. Allocative 
efficiency focuses on consumers’ satisfaction with the level of public goods, individually 
and collectively (Hoxby, 2000; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010).  Productive efficiency is 
defined in terms of the level of outcome at the lowest possible input (Rice and Schwartz, 
2008).  This dissertation focuses solely on productive efficiency, where the inputs are 
inter-school district competition and political institutions. The outcome is student 
achievement. 
A second approach to measuring educational effectiveness is through equity.  
Equity is distinct from productive efficiency because productive efficiency focuses on the 
level of inputs in relation to the outcome.  In contrast, equity focuses on the variability in 
inputs and outcomes, without a necessary linkage between the two.  In this dissertation, 
equity is operationalized in terms of regional equity/inequity in school district spending, 
assessing whether spending varies based on within state groupings of school districts' 
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median household incomes.  Furthermore, it examines whether student achievement is 
predicted by the school district’s income levels as measured through household median 
income. Therefore, consistent with Harris et al. (2001) and Hoxby (1996a), equity is 
defined as the distribution of school district spending and student achievement across 
school districts based on within state groupings of school districts' median  household 
incomes. 
 Productive efficiency in public education is estimated by a production function 
that links inputs and outputs (Rice and Schwartz, 2008). This is accomplished, in many 
applications, by assuming a linear relationship between the inputs and outputs and using 
regression analysis for estimation and hypothesis testing. The estimated coefficients 
corresponding to respective inputs reflect productive efficiency (Rice and Schwartz, 
2008). Moreover, the regression analysis also handles situations of special needs for 
inputs in addressing inequitable educational outcomes while simultaneously controlling 
for productive efficiency in the use of inputs (Rice and Schwartz, 2008). These special 
needs may include, for example, the proportion of students with English as their second 
language. In essence, the regression analysis provides answers to questions about both 
efficiency and equity. This dissertation conforms to this research tradition in investigating 
the role of inter-school district competition and political institutions in equity in school 
district spending and productive efficiency and equity in student achievement.  
 1.3. Overview of the Literature, Critical Gaps and Study Significance 
Several scholars have suggested that the educational outcomes in the US are not 
commensurate with the levels of financial resources put into the public education system. 
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In the last fifty years spending on public schools has tripled in real terms (Peterson, 2010, 
p. 131), and it has grown five folds in real dollars over the last century (Godwin and 
Kemerer, 2002). Educational outcomes along racial and socioeconomic status have not 
kept pace with rising funding levels and with various school reforms. These policy 
problems also appear to be resistant to school choice, standards and accountability-based 
reforms developed over the last two decades. In contextualizing these problems and 
proposing policy-relevant solutions, researchers have taken different positions on the 
questions of equity and productive efficiency in public education.   
Three broad categories of the empirical literature have studied the productive 
efficiency of public education by relying on the production function approach (Belfield 
and Levin, 2005b; Odden and Picus, 2000; Rice and Schwartz, 2008). The studies in the 
first group evaluate the impact of public education spending and school inputs on student 
achievement after controlling for student, family, class and other school characteristics. 
These inputs include resources such as class-size and teachers. This research stream 
follows the tradition of estimating straightforward input-output relationships in public 
education (Rice and Schwartz, 2008). The second strand of literature examines the 
relationship between the inner workings of school systems and student learning 
outcomes. These studies identify various school processes, such as organizational 
conditions, educational resources, and instructional strategies that influence student 
achievement (Rice and Schwartz, 2008). The third strand includes studies that evaluate 
the effect of standards-based accountability and school choice on student achievement.  
Within this third strand, the broader view in the literature on school choice is that 
market-like competition for students would nudge public schools toward productive 
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efficiency in resource use and better educational outcomes (Belfield and Levin, 2005b; 
Chubb and Moe, 1990; Gill and Booker, 2008; Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). Critics of 
school choice find such policies inequitable and inefficient. The critics argue that less 
educated and lower SES parents face difficulty in exercising choice due to a lack of 
timely information, networks, and transportation (Levin, 2008). On the productive 
efficiency ground, opponents of school choice further argue that competition will benefit 
White, higher SES students because choice is associated with segregated school 
environments (Epple and Romano, 2000; Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Levin, 2008; Orfield and 
Yun, 1999; Schneider et al., 1997; Wells, 1993). Opponents also argue that private 
schools would undermine the social purpose of schooling in their pursuit of making 
profits in the market (Gill and Booker, 2008; Levin, 2008; Wolfe, 2003). The effect of 
school choice on other public purposes of education, such as student integration and civic 
socialization are negative (Gill and Booker, 2008; Mickelson et al., 2011).  
In light of such unintended consequences, some moderate proponents of school 
choice suggest designing choice options so that minority and urban inner-city children are 
not disadvantaged (Godwin and Kemerer, 2002; Levin, 2008). Some moderate critics of 
school choice suggest that policymakers should “renew and expand regional area-wide 
choice options that transcend school district boundaries” (Mickelson et al., 2011, p.31). 
This would promote diverse student composition in schools that would in turn facilitate 
better learning opportunity to students. This region-wide school choice should include: 1) 
more transportation for students and information about diversity and choice options to 
parents; 2) increasing and ensuring accountability in choice schools; and 3) redesigning 
public / private sector relationships to ensure diversity (Mickelson et al., 2011). 
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In recent decades, the availability of market-like schools in the form of charter 
schools, vouchers, and magnet schools has expanded. The empirical evidence on the 
beneficial effect of school competition, through the development of market-like schools, 
on school district spending and student achievement, however, is inconclusive (Belfield 
and Levin, 2005b; Gill and Booker, 2008; Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 2007). In fact, 
empirical evidence suggests that these policies have led to resegregation (Levin, 2008; 
Orfield and Yun, 1999; Schneider et al., 1997; Wells, 1993). Also, the theoretical and 
empirical literatures have not conclusively established the supremacy of school choice 
policies over the traditional public education system.  
The literature on school choice includes studies on a range of choice and 
competition options including homeschooling, private schools, magnet schools, vouchers, 
charters and existence of multiple school districts in a Metropolitan Area. School choice 
in the form of market-type competition can take both intra-district and inter-district 
dimensions. For example, alternative forms of schools including charter schools, magnet 
schools, vouchers and private schools create competitive market conditions for traditional 
public schools within a school district.  
While there are several studies on school choice, operationalized through the 
presence of private schools, charter schools and vouchers, researchers have not 
adequately studied school choice in the form of inter-school district competition (Belfield 
and Levin, 2005b; Gill and Booker, 2008). The existence of more school districts within 
a Metropolitan Area is one dimension of school choice as school districts compete for 
students. The few studies on the role of inter-school district competition in school district 
spending and efficiency of public education narrowly focus on propositions of a single 
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theoretical tradition of public choice pioneered by Tiebout (1956) and further developed 
by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961) (Hoxby, 2000; Marlow, 1997 & 2000; Zanzig, 
1997). The proponents of this market-type competition argue that having more school 
districts to compete for students in a Metropolitan Area produces greater productive 
efficiency in terms of student learning outcomes.  
This argument parallels the general theoretical arguments about spending and 
productive efficiency of local governments. Proponents of greater inter-local government 
competition argue for the existence of more local governments in the metropolitan area to 
accommodate heterogeneity in individual preferences (or public choice) for an optimal 
tax-expenditure bundle of public goods (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961; Tiebout, 
1956). This decentralization also works against the natural tendency of local governments 
to extract higher taxes from residents (Craw, 2008; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; 
Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010).  
Existing studies ignore the theoretical propositions regarding spending and 
productive efficiency advanced by the proponents of more consolidated forms of local 
governments. These theorists argue that greater inter-local government competition cause 
spillovers, urban sprawl, and racial and economic segregation. Therefore, having greater 
inter-local government competition in a Metropolitan Area is allocatively and 
productively inefficient (Altshuler et al., 1999; Burns, 1994; DeHoog, Lowery and 
Lyons, 1990; Lyons and Lowery, 1989; Morgan and Morescal, 1999; Rusk, 1993; 
Weiher, 1991). These scholars argue that a metropolitan wide local government is both 
more equitable and efficient. 
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This study also investigates the role of political institutions in spending and 
student learning respectively. This is important because existing studies ignore the role of 
political institutions in the equity of school district spending and in the productive 
efficiency of educational outcomes.  Political institutions are important to consider while 
investigating equity in spending and equity and productive efficiency in student learning 
because the local political institutions influence efficiencies in local taxation and 
spending (Craw, 2008; Feiock, Jeong, and Kim, 2003). Political institutions also match 
citizen demand with school district spending (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005). Following 
Berkman and Plutzer (2005), Berry and Gersen (2009), and Craw (2008), this dissertation 
defines and operationalizes local political institutions as electoral structures of school 
districts’ governing boards and superintendents’ offices. Additionally, school districts’ 
autonomy in raising revenue through the imposition of property taxes is subsumed under 
the concept of political institutions. 
A limited number of studies have examined the role of local political institutions 
on local government spending, though not particularly in the context of school districts 
(Berry and Gersen, 2009; Craw, 2008; MacDonald, 2008). However, researchers have not 
considered the effects of inter-school district competition and local political institutions 
together on school district spending and student achievement and have ignored equity. 
This lack of cross fertilization in the literature warrants a fresh investigation of the role of 
political institutions and inter-school district competition on equity in school district 
spending and student achievement. Furthermore, the empirical literature in the context of 
both public school finance and general local governments report opposing findings (see 
Andrews et al., 2002; Belfield and Levin, 2005b; Craw, 2008; Gordon and Knight, 2008; 
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Hoxby, 2000; Howell-Moroney, 2008; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010; Rothstein, 2007). 
This warrants investigation and integration of additional and consistent theoretical 
propositions for further empirical study.  
The research presented in this dissertation is important because it clarifies why 
and how organizational, political and socioeconomic contexts matter in bringing 
desirable educational outcomes including equity in spending and equity and productive 
efficiency in student achievement. Policymakers can reform the organizational and 
political set-up of school districts to achieve the goal of more effective public education. 
From a public policy perspective, findings of this research can inform the formulation of 
appropriate policies for better educational outcomes through reorganization of school 
finance. 
 1.4. Organization and Goals 
This dissertation proceeds by developing and testing a conceptual model that 
combines the key propositions of multiple theoretical perspectives. This conceptual 
model argues that local political institutions moderate the effects of inter-jurisdictional 
competition on local government’s spending, efficiency and outcomes. This conceptual 
model handles the key propositions of both the proponents of greater inter-jurisdictional 
competition and the proponents of more consolidated school districts. Chapter 3 presents 
the data used to test this model and the fourth chapter empirically estimates the 
interactive effects of political institutions with inter-school district competition on 
inequity in school district spending in the US.  
While the second, the third and the fourth chapters make a novel contribution 
through the development and empirical testing of the conceptual model in the context of 
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public education funding, the fifth chapter applies the conceptual model to equity and 
productive efficiency in student learning outcomes. Specifically, the fifth chapter 
empirically estimates the interactive effects of political institutions with inter-school 
district competition on inequity and productive efficiency in student achievement. In 
general, this chapter makes a contribution to the wider literature that studies factors 
behind student learning outcomes. This chapter also expands the scope of the literature on 
the impact of school choice in the form of inter-school district competition on student 
achievement. In doing so, the chapter moves beyond the narrow theoretical focus of the 
literature on school choice to also include the important factor of political institutions.  
 1.5. Contributions to the Literature 
 This dissertation makes several contributions to the literature. One, the theoretical 
literature is extended to model the interactions of political institutions with inter-school 
district competition in influencing equity in spending and efficiency and equity in 
educational outcomes. Two, for addressing endogeneity of inter-school district 
competition, instrumental variable regression models are utilized. This methodological 
approach allows empirical studies to go beyond associations and into the issue of 
causality (Hoxby, 2000). Finally, the approach in Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001) has 
been followed to study the effects of political institutions and inter-school district 
competition on equity in school district spending and student achievement. Similar to 
their approach, school districts have been categorized into quintiles of within-state 
rankings of school districts' median household income to study the differential effects of 
political institutions and inter-school district competition on spending and student 
achievement for districts in each quintile. Previous studies have not taken this particular 
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approach. This approach is innovative because it facilitates investigation of the role of 
income inequality among school districts in school district spending and student 
achievement. Overall, this study provides a methodologically rigorous test of theories 
that will help advance the empirical and theoretical literature on equity in school district 
spending and equity and productive efficiency in student learning outcomes. Multiple 
datasets are used including the Popularly Elected Officials Survey data from the US 
Census Bureau, the Local Education Agency (School District) Longitudinal Finance 
Survey data and the School District Demographics System data from the National Center 
for Education Statistics to examine this dissertation’s research questions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: FUNDING INEQUITY AND PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY IN PUBLIC 
EDUCATION: ROLES OF INTER-SCHOOL DISTRICT COMPETITION AND 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
  
 
 2.1. Overview of Funding for Public Education 
The US public education system has evolved over time. The US Constitution did 
not provide explicitly any federal jurisdiction over education. The Tenth Amendment 
reserved all residual rights for the states. Therefore, in the context of the federal system 
of governments in the US, the authority and responsibility for public education rests with 
state governments (Gordon, 2008; Springer et al., 2008). Since the beginning of the 
progressive era in the 1850s, the role of the state in public education has gradually 
expanded with the objective of providing standardized, efficient, equitable and common 
education to each child (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Howell, 2005; Springer et al., 2008). 
Indeed, most state constitutions explicitly pledge free school education (Berkman and 
Plutzer, 2005) and many state constitutions also require equitable provision for all its 
children (Mickelson, 2003). State constitutions and statutes, with the exception of 
Hawaii, have delegated major responsibility and political authority for operating and 
financing public schools to local school districts (Belfield and Levin, 2005a; Gordon, 
2008; Peterson, 1981; Springer et al., 2008). In most cases, school districts have the 
political authority to raise local resources for providing K-12 education within their 
jurisdictions. However, a significant number of school districts have no fiscal authority 
and must rely on the state or other local governments for funding (Berkman and Plutzer,
13 
 
2005). In most cases, the parent governments of these fiscally dependent school districts 
raise revenue from property taxes (Picus, Goertz, and Odden, 2008). 
 State governments have shouldered increased burden of funding public education 
mainly to address twin challenges of inequitable provisioning and inequitable outcomes. 
However, overcoming these challenges seems intractable. In spite of state governments’ 
efforts at funding equalization, the variation in per-pupil funding across school districts 
remains (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; Hertert, Busch, and Odden, 1994; Hoxby, 1998; 
Odden and Picus, 2004; Wong, 1999). From a comparative international perspective, the 
US has a fairly decentralized public education system (Gordon, 2008). The aggregate 
fiscal burden of public education is shared between local, state and federal governments. 
This sharing of fiscal burden has undergone substantial changes over decades. At the 
beginning of 1930s, more than 80 percent of public school finance came from local 
sources (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; Hanushek and Lindseth, 2009; McGuire and Papke, 
2008; Springer et al., 2008). Since early 1980s, states have stepped up their funding and 
have exceeded local funding. Currently, state governments spend about 50 percent, local 
governments spend 40 percent and the federal government spends about nine percent 
(Hanushek and Lindseth, 2009; and Springer et al., 2008).  
 The federal share has increased from about two percent in 1940 to 8.5 percent in 
2002 (Gordon, 2008). The passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 
1965 (Title I) has increased federal funding significantly (Hanushek and Lindseth, 2009). 
The rich suburban districts spend more money than poor urban school districts because 
the former enjoy higher per-pupil property wealth. Rich districts can raise more revenue 
at a lower tax rate, whereas a poor district cannot raise enough revenue even with a 
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higher property tax rate. This double disadvantage is a major roadblock to ensuring 
equitable and adequate educational opportunities (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; Odden and 
Picus, 2000; Springer et al., 2008). Poor urban school districts also have 
disproportionately high proportions of minority and other disadvantaged and difficult to 
teach students (Moe, 2001). The existence of school funding disparities, although 
explained by place, economics, politics, and demographic factors challenges the principle 
of providing equitable educational opportunities to children. (see Berry and Gersen, 
2009; Harris et al., 2001; Hoxby, 2000; Marlow, 2000; Poterba, 1994, 1996 & 1997 for 
school districts and  (Craw, 2008; Feiock, Jeong, and Kim, 2003; Frant, 1996; Merrifield, 
1991 & 2000; Nelson, 1986; and Oates, 1985 for other local governments). 
 2.1.1. Equity in School District Spending 
Since the landmark California Supreme Court decision in Serrano v. Priest in 
1971 and the famous US Supreme Court’s judgment in Rodriguez v. San Antonio in 1973, 
there has been a great deal of activism from judiciary, state and civil society actors in 
promoting equity in school districts’ spending in the US. However, in spite of at least a 
four decade long effort at addressing inequity in public education finance, the problem 
persists (Corcoran and Evans, 2008; Evans, Murray and Schwab, 1997; Murray, Evans 
and Schwab, 1998). Public school finance is an important topic because it constitutes 
about 34% of total state spending in the US (US Census of Governments, 2007). From a 
public policy perspective, it is important to clarify which factors explain inequity in 
school district spending. Important factors include: prevailing socio-economic structure 
of school districts; various court judgments on equity and adequacy in public education 
finance; differences in local political institutions; and interest groups. To this end, there 
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are several studies that explain the predictors of inequity in school district spending 
(Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; Berry and Gersen, 2009; Corcoran and Evans, 2008; Evans, 
Murray and Schwab, 1997; Harris, Evans and Schwab, 2001; Murray, Evans and 
Schwab, 1998; Poterba, 1997; Wilson, Lambright and Smeeding, 2006). Yet although 
few studies have examined the effects of inter-school district competition (Hoxby, 2000; 
Hoxby, 2007; Marlow 2000; Rothstein, 2007) on school district spending, none has 
considered the role of local political institutions. 
 2.1.2. Equity in Spending, School District Competition and Political Institutions 
In general, levels of per-pupil spending in school districts purportedly ensure 
equitable provision of public education to all children. This notion has been the basis of 
legal arguments in support of ensuring equality of educational opportunities. In 
combination with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, scholars voiced 
the constitutional argument that property dependent school spending disparities within 
states was an injustice (Coons, Clune and Sugarman, 1970; Wise, 1968). Indeed, Wise 
(1968) argued that money spent on a child should not depend on geographic accident and 
socioeconomic status of parents. Coons, Clune and Sugarman (1970) also suggested that 
money spent on a child should be independent of local community’s wealth. Wise (1968) 
advocated for equal per-pupil spending across school districts, i.e., horizontal equity. This 
principle of “one scholar, one dollar” did not take into account place-specific cost 
differentials in providing education (Koski and Hahnel, 2008). The fiscal neutrality 
principle (Coons, Clune and Sugarman, 1970), on the other hand, implies that local 
district’s wealth should not be a decisive factor in the quality of schooling a child 
receives, over and above the wealth of the state as a whole (Ericson, 1984; Odden and 
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Picus, 2000; Springer et al., 2008). This equality principle did not emphasize equal per-
pupil spending across school districts, thereby making room for variation in the cost of 
providing education. The two equity principles also did not require documenting the 
relationship between education spending and educational outcomes (Koski and Hahnel, 
2008). Consistent with the fiscal neutrality principle, the fourth chapter studies equity in 
school district spending by examining  how local political institutions and inter-school 
district competition explain variation in per pupil spending by urban school districts that 
fall in different median household income quintiles. 
Local political institutions are conceptualized as electoral structures of school 
districts’ governing boards and superintendents’ offices following Berkman and Plutzer 
(2005), Berry and Gersen (2009), and Craw (2008). Additionally, school districts’ 
autonomy in raising revenue through the imposition of property taxes is subsumed under 
the concept of political institutions. Following Hoxby (2000) and others (Craw, 2008; 
Marlow, 2000; Millimet and Collier, 2008; Millimet and Rangaprasad, 2007), inter-
school district competition is conceptualized as a MA level weighted index of the shares 
of each school district’s student enrollment and student enrollment weighted count of 
school districts in a MA. This chapter uses terms such as decentralization and 
competition interchangeably to convey higher levels of inter-school district competition 
in a MA. Similarly, the use of consolidated school districts conveys lower levels of inter-
school district competition. 
 2.2. Review of the Theoretical Literature 
 The theoretical literature that examines factors behind levels of local governments 
spending in general and school districts in particular falls within five traditions, namely 
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1) The Public Choice Model; 2) The Leviathan Model; 3) The Reformism Model; 4) The 
Consolidated Local Governments Model; and 5) The Policy Responsiveness Model. The 
major debate in the literature concerns the appropriateness of more decentralized 
(Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren, 1961) versus more consolidated forms of local 
governments (DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons, 1990; Gordon and Knight, 2008; Lowery, 
2000; Lyons and Lowery, 1989) and the role of different types of political institutions 
(Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; Berry and Gersen, 2009; Craw, 2008) in spending levels 
and equity.  
 2.2.1. The Public Choice Model 
 The basic argument in the public choice model is that higher levels of competition 
between local governments for residents bring economy in local service provision. Local 
service provision may not be efficient if there are fewer options for residents to realize 
their choice for most preferred bundle of taxation and local public goods. Proponents of 
decentralization (or higher levels of inter-local government competition) argue that more 
local governments in a metropolitan area accommodate heterogeneity in individual 
preferences for optimal taxes and expenditures on public goods (Ostrom, Tiebout and 
Warren, 1961). Pioneered by Tiebout (1956), this argument forms the basis for the public 
choice model. This model is concerned with the choice of efficient levels of goods and 
services made by the residents within a local jurisdiction. In essence, the public choice 
model posits that residential choice of individuals to live in communities with tax-
expenditure bundles that match their preferences and budgets brings allocative efficiency 
(Harris et al., 2001; Hoxby, 1994 &1999; Poterba, 1997).  
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 The basic logic in the public choice model is as follows. The communities at the 
local level seek to attain optimum size
1
 for the efficient delivery of public goods and 
services by local governments. The pursuit of optimum size is essential in order to lower 
the average cost of public goods and services. The residents reveal their preferences by 
choosing a package of public goods and services offered by local governments. If the 
public goods and services are not offered efficiently at some optimum size, the migration 
of residents will occur until that optimum size has been reached. By choosing to reside in 
a community with a given package of public goods and services, the residents reveal their 
preferences or willingness to pay. Consequently, the local government can appropriately 
tax the community in order to sustain the level of public goods. This simultaneous 
occurrence of the matching of residents’ preferences and attainment of optimum size of 
the local community ensures both allocative and productive efficiency in the delivery of 
public goods at the local level (Howell-Moroney, 2008; Hoxby, 1994, 1999 & 2000; 
Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961; Tiebout, 1956). The 
majority of studies on local governments have interpreted these efficiency gains to 
translate into lower levels of per capita revenue or expenditure (Howell-Moroney, 2008; 
Gordon and Knight, 2008; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010; MacDonald, 2008). 
 The public choice model is a demand side perspective in which residents match 
their preferences with the supply of different tax-expenditure bundles from local 
governments in a region. Hence, the proponents of public choice argue for the existence 
of numerous or decentralized local governments in a metropolitan area to capture 
heterogeneity in citizen demand (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 1961). Lyons and 
                                                          
1 Size here refers to “the fixed resource of land and the demand conditions of current residents” for public goods in a 
local political jurisdiction (Dowding, John, and Biggs, 1994, p. 767). 
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Lowery (1989, p. 533) note that the decentralized or polycentric model of local 
government “focuses on the need to maintain numerous units of local governments in 
each urban area in order to maximize opportunities for individual citizens to choose a tax-
service package that best suits their needs.”  
 Subsumed within the public choice model is the median voter hypothesis, which 
provides a practical approach to aggregate citizen preferences for local public goods and 
services. The median voter hypothesis permits the use of local jurisdiction data for 
empirical estimation of the public choice model (Rubinfield, Shapiro and Roberts, 1987). 
In particular, income level and tax price of the local median voter drives local 
government spending on public goods (Ahmed and Greene, 2000; Bergstrom and 
Goodman, 1973; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972). However, such an estimation suffers 
from selection bias (also termed as "Tiebout Bias") because residents may self select into 
local communities based on the quantity and quality of public goods provided (Hoxby, 
2000; Marlow, 2000; Millimet and Collier, 2008; Millimet and Rangaprasad, 2007; 
Rubinfield, Shapiro and Roberts, 1987). Additionally, a set of common variables may 
explain matching of residents to communities with their preferred public expenditures 
and residents’ demand for public goods (Rubinfield, Shapiro and Roberts, 1987). As will 
be explained in the third chapter, this endogeneity problem has been addressed 
statistically. 
 2.2.2. The Leviathan Model 
 The Leviathan Model proposes that the existence of more decentralized and 
fragmented local governments in a region constrains governments’ abilities to impose 
higher taxation on residents. Such local governments spend less. However, if residents 
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have fewer options for relocation then they may be taxed at higher rates for a given level 
of public good. Consequently, local governments spend more.  Scholars have argued that 
greater decentralization of local governments in a MA works against the natural tendency 
of centralized local governments to extract higher taxes from residents (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010). This tendency of governments is also 
termed “Leviathan behavior” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Craw, 2008). The Leviathan 
model seeks to explain the determinants of government size in terms of the magnitude of 
tax revenue collection and the size of expenditure (Craw, 2008; Merrifield, 1991 & 2000; 
Nelson, 1986; Oates, 1985; Poterba, 1994 & 1996). The central concern of the Leviathan 
model lies in estimating the relationship between levels of inter-jurisdictional competition 
and levels of taxation and spending. This correspondence is termed the monopoly power 
of local governments (Craw, 2000). This central concern also makes it consistent with the 
public choice model. 
 The Leviathan model is a supply side view of the organization of local 
governments in a metropolitan area. Proponents argue that lower levels of inter-
jurisdictional competition in a metropolitan area lead to higher local spending on public 
goods because local public officials have the opportunity to raise disproportionately more 
revenue for satisfying bureaucratic slack and high remuneration (or rent-seeking in 
Niskanen's terms) as taxpayers have fewer options to relocate to similar jurisdictions in 
vicinity (Craw, 2008; Niskanen 1971; Yeung, 2009). 
 2.2.3. The Consolidated Local Governments Model 
 Although the public choice model takes up a demand side perspective and the 
Leviathan model takes up a supply side perspective, the two models reach the same 
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conclusion that higher levels of inter-jurisdictional competition within a metropolitan 
area are associated with lower levels of spending by local governments. In contrast, 
opponents contend that decentralized local governments cause spillover, such as urban 
sprawl, and racial and economic segregation. These spillovers bring inefficiency and 
inequity in local service provision. Consolidated local governments that have 
jurisdictions over inner-city and suburban regions enjoy economies of scale and can also 
efficiently and equitably internalize spillovers from inter-dependent localities. Therefore, 
they are more efficient and equitable. Howell-Moroney (2008, p. 100) has challenged the 
central assumptions in the public-choice model of decentralized local governments vis-a-
vis the actual environment in which such polycentric governments work. He cites recent 
studies (Downs, 1994; Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom, 2001; Rusk 1993; Squires, 
2002) and notes that “the residential segregation of people by race and class and the 
many costs of sprawl are magnified and augmented by arrangements that defer to 
multiple local jurisdictions.” These spillovers lead to price distortions and people do not 
pay true costs associated with a polycentric institutional arrangement. In this way, the 
preferences of the residents are incorrectly aggregated by the local governments for 
optimum tax-service package. In regions with higher levels of inter-jurisdictional 
competition, the affluent communities in the suburban regions may not be responsive to 
the demands of potential low-income residents in spite of the latter's willingness to pay 
within their limited income. For example, low income citizens have greater demand for 
social services and affordable housing. But using fiscal zoning and other means as a 
deterrent, some local governments in the suburbs may not offer social services and 
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affordable housing. Residential mobility of low-income residents is restricted even 
though they have willingness to reside in such jurisdictions (Howell-Moroney, 2008).  
 Some scholars have therefore argued against the decentralized model of local 
governments on equity grounds (Lowery, 2000; Lyons and Lowery, 1989). For example, 
Lyons and Lowery (1989) argue that any inequity in spending on public goods among the 
local governments is acceptable on the efficiency criteria under the public choice model 
because the residents made a conscious decision to live in communities with suitable tax-
expenditure offerings. Subsequently, according to Howell-Moroney (2008, p. 98), the 
problems of sprawl and concentrated poverty are largely due to the existence of 
municipal boundaries that “circumscribe notions of collective responsibility.” 
Consolidated local governments can overcome these inequalities by internalizing the 
costs of providing public services (Howell-Moroney, 2008). Consequently, decentralized 
local governments are allocatively and productively inefficient (Altshuler et al., 1999; 
Burns, 1994; DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons, 1990; Lowery, 2000; Lyons and Lowery, 
1989; Morgan and Morescal, 1999; Rusk, 1993; Weiher, 1991). Proponents argue that 
more consolidated local governments in a metropolitan area are more equitable and 
efficient because these local governments enjoy economies of scale and are better able to 
internalize the external costs associated with urban sprawl and segregation (Gordon and 
Knight, 2008; Howell-Moroney, 2008; Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010). In contrast to the 
fragmented local governments, the consolidated local governments provide public goods 
and services at lower average per unit price (Jimenez and Hendrick, 2010).  
 However, in response to these criticisms proponents of public choice model argue 
that with suitable policy designs the effects of fragmented local governments on spending 
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and outcomes are both productively efficient and equitable. For example, in the context 
of school districts Hoxby (1996a) argues that greater inter-school district competition is 
productively efficient and distributionally equitable if it is complimented with means-
tested vouchers. Godwin and Kemerer (2002) also make similar arguments in regard to 
the effects of vouchers on educational outcomes. The consolidation of school finance on 
the other hand results in a situation where loss in productive efficiency outweighs any 
gains in equity (Hoxby, 1996a). Public choice scholars also argue that the rent-seeking 
goals of public officials and interest groups will reduce allocative efficiency and will 
reduce the likelihood that funding will go to where it is most needed. To the extent that 
interest groups are active and represent producers and to the extent that politicians 
attempt to capture some portion of the rents they produce, allocative efficiency will be 
reduced. 
 2.2.4. The Reformism Model 
 The reformism model is distinctive from the previous models because it focuses 
on how the structure of political institutions influences local government spending. The 
key argument in the reformism model is that if elected officials of a local government 
exercise less direct control over budgets then that local government would spend less in 
comparison to a local government where local elected officials have more direct control 
over budgets. This direct control over budgets permits elected officials to cater to narrow 
constituency demands. Under the scenario of limited direct budget control, elected 
officials adopt residents’ preferred level of spending on public education. Whereas the 
public choice and the consolidated local government models do not formally hypothesize 
the role of local political institutions, the Leviathan model simply uses the logic of the 
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role of bureaucratic slack and high remuneration in explaining higher levels of local 
government spending. The latter also offers little guidance on the appropriate type of 
local government for controlling budget maximizing tendencies of the bureaucracy 
(Craw, 2008). Concerned with bureaucratic slack and other inefficiencies, reformists 
argue that the type of local government also matters in controlling inflated public budgets 
and inefficiencies in local taxation and spending (Craw, 2008; Feiock, Jeong, and Kim, 
2003; Frant, 1996).  
 In particular, reformists argue that the council-manager form of local government 
and at-large council elections are better than the mayor-council form of local government 
and ward-based council elections in allocating public services. The elected officials in the 
mayor-council form of government have more direct control over the local government 
budget. Elected officials have the incentive to reward their supporters for gaining votes 
and hence stay in office. For rewarding more constituents, elected officials may inflate 
local taxes and spending (Craw, 2008). The council-manager form of government on the 
other hand relies on bureaucratic expertise and consensual decision-making where the 
bureaucrats have increased control over the local government budgets and policymaking. 
The elected officials' lack of direct control over budgets limits their revenue inflating (or 
rent-seeking) behavior (Craw, 2008). However, council members' lack of expertise may 
constrain their ability to monitor the performance of bureaucrats. This absence of 
effective monitoring may induce bureaucrats to engage in rent-seeking behavior (Craw, 
2008; Frant, 1996; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood, 2004). 
 2.2.5. The Policy Responsiveness Model 
25 
 
 Local political institutions constantly make policy choices differentially from 
among several, and often competing, policy options that match with citizen preferences 
for desired policy outcomes. However, forms of political institutions that cannot 
objectively evaluate broader constituency needs (e.g., ward-based v. at-large elected 
school boards) will poorly translate citizens’ demands into policy outcomes. Similar to 
the reformism model, the policy responsiveness model explicitly hypothesizes the role of 
political institutions in local government spending. However, the two models make 
different hypotheses regarding the role of political institutions in local government 
spending. Whereas political institutions moderate the effect of inter-local government 
competition on local spending in the reformism model, they moderate the effect of citizen 
demand on local spending and other policy outcomes in the policy responsiveness model 
(Berkman and Plutzer, 2005). By policy responsiveness, the authors imply 
correspondence between public taste for education spending and actual budgetary 
allocation of the local school district. Berkman and Plutzer (2005) argue that different 
types of local political institutions play differential roles in translating citizen preferences 
for desired policy outcomes because local political institutions constantly make policy 
choices from among several, and often competing, policy options. For example, at-large 
elected or appointed school boards are better suited to bring in policy responsiveness in 
comparison to seemingly more democratic forms of school boards such as districts with 
ward-based members or districts that allow annual budgets to be passed at annual town 
hall meetings (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005). School districts with at-large school boards 
objectively assess the broader constituency preferences, while the latter category of local 
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political institutions either cater to narrower constituency preferences or the turnouts in 
the meetings are not representative of local residents (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005). 
 2.3. The Empirical Literature  
 The empirical literature on local government in general and school districts in 
particular offers divergent findings on local government spending and student 
achievement (see Andrews et al., 2002; Belfield and Levin, 2005a; Craw, 2008; Gordon 
and Knight, 2008; Hoxby, 2000; Howell-Moroney, 2008; Rothstein, 2007). Since the 
focus of the public choice, the Leviathan, and the Consolidated Local Government 
models is on levels of decentralization versus consolidation of local governments in a 
MA in explaining local government spending, the section below includes the review of 
empirical studies on the topic.  
 2.3.1. Public Choice, Consolidated Local Government and Leviathan Models 
Empirical studies on the virtues of decentralized versus consolidated forms of 
local governments are inconclusive (Howell-Moroney, 2008; Jimenez and Hendrick, 
2010). Some studies have found evidence that higher levels of inter-jurisdictional 
competition lead to lower spending (Boyne 1992; Oakerson 1999). Citizens of smaller 
jurisdictions show greater satisfaction with law enforcement compared to residents of 
bigger communities (Ostrom, 1976; Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker, 1978; Ostrom and 
Smith, 1976). In contrast, overall citizen satisfaction did not vary systematically between 
the two governmental structures (DeHoog, Lowery, and Lyons, 1990). Also, 
decentralization of local governments leads to racial segregation (Altshuler et al., 1999; 
Burns, 1994; Morgan and Morescal, 1999; Rusk, 1993; Weiher, 1991).  
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 The concern regarding urban sprawl has also been empirically evaluated. 
Analyzing a sample of 822 metropolitan counties, Caruthers (2003) finds that 
decentralization of municipal and special district governments increased growth outside 
of incorporated areas. Other studies report similar findings (Carruthers and Ulfarsson, 
2002; Fulton et al., 2001; Rusk, 1993). The empirical literature on the Leviathan model is 
mixed (Campbell, 2004; Craw, 2008; Yeung, 2009). Eberts and Gronberg (1990) and Zax 
(1989) support the Leviathan model, while Dolan (1990) and Oates (1985) find no 
evidence. Campbell (2004) offers mixed findings. Greater inter-local government 
competition was associated with higher city expenditures and government size (Dolan, 
1990; Santerre, 1991). Higher level of decentralization is associated with lower level of 
government spending (Lalvani, 2002; Rodden, 2003; Zax, 1989).  
Clearly, these studies do not offer indisputable evidence in favor of either of the 
arguments that more competition between local jurisdictions or consolidated local 
governments spends less and is more equitable. This lack of consensus in the empirical 
literature warrants further empirical studies with new contexts and new data. Analyses of 
school district expenditures provide an opportunity to conduct such studies.   
 2.3.2. The Reformism Model 
The empirical evidence that tests the reformism model also mixed results (Craw, 
2008). Lyons (1978) and Stumm and Corrigan (1998) present supporting evidence, while 
Farnham (1990) and Hayes and Chang (1990) find no evidence. For example, Stumm and 
Corrigan (1998) report that per capita government expenditure is higher in mayor-council 
cities than in council-manager cities. Examining five public expenditure categories on 
U.S. city-level data, Saha (2011) reports that the mayor-council form of government 
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spends more than the council-manager form of government for only police and highways. 
The form of local government, however, did not matter in explaining fire expenditure, 
sewerage expenditure, and parks and recreational expenditure. Farnham (1990) reported 
that the council-manager form of local government has no significant effect on public 
spending. More recently, empirical results in Jung (2006) and MacDonald (2008) confirm 
Farnham’s findings and indicate that the form of local government has no effect on 
governments’ expenditure decisions. It is evident that in the context of municipal and 
county governments, empirical studies on the reformism model offer contradictory 
findings. Moreover, there is an absence of a similar empirical study in the context of 
school districts in the US. This study fills this gap. 
 2.3.3. The Policy Responsiveness Model 
Utilizing public opinion survey data, Berkman and Plutzer (2005) have studied 
policy responsiveness in school district spending by estimating the moderating effects of 
citizen preferences by political institutions. While Berkman and Plutzer (2005) have 
attempted a complex approach to estimate citizen demand for testing their policy 
responsiveness hypotheses, there are no other studies following a similar approach in the 
context of public education. Direct estimation of residents’ demand for public education 
through the use of cumulative national representative sample of General Social Survey 
and the multilevel modeling technique is indeed a major contribution. However, Berkman 
and Plutzer (2005) have argued in favor of the validity of their measure of public opinion 
by showing a strong correlation with median housing values. The latter is an indirect 
measure of residents’ demand for public education spending often used by economists 
(Ahmed and Green, 2000; Rubinfield, Shapiro and Roberts, 1987). This implies that both 
29 
 
direct and indirect measures are not substantively different. Also, the use of a national 
sample for estimating local constituent units is not without problems. Cnudde (2006) 
notes: “Because of the stratifying and clustering factors in a national sample, the 
conclusion that a sample – no matter how large – is representative of a component unit 
smaller than the nation, such as a state, or a congressional or school, is problematic” 
(2006: p. 588). Moreover, the data on proxy measures of citizen demand, such as median 
housing values and median income, are readily available for estimating the policy 
responsiveness of school districts.  
 2.4. Synthesizing the Five Models 
In light of the multiplicity of theoretical models and corresponding inconclusive 
empirical literature on each of them, it is pertinent to bring together consistent elements 
of the theoretical and empirical literature for understanding equity in local governments' 
spending. In this regard, Craw (2008) has synthesized the public choice, the Leviathan 
and the reformism models of public spending at the local level recently and proposed the 
“Tamed Leviathan Hypothesis” for explaining local government spending. However, 
Craw (2008) applied the “Tamed Leviathan Hypothesis” to municipal governments 
spending and not school districts. His general approach, however, is applicable to the 
study of spending behavior of all types of local governments including school districts. 
Craw (2008) argues that the Leviathan and the reformism models are not 
inconsistent and that a comprehensive model of local public finance would have to 
incorporate consistent elements of both models. Higher public spending with lower levels 
of inter-jurisdictional competition occurs because residents and businesses in such 
communities do not have a choice to “vote with their feet.” These local governments face 
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less competition and have greater economic capacity to inflate public budgets and hence 
squeeze higher levels of taxation from residents. However, the Leviathan model is silent 
on the question as to why and how the local governments would extract higher taxes from 
residents, given the democratic political setup (Craw, 2008).  
Similarly, studies on the reformism model seek to explain relatively inflated 
public budgets and higher levels of taxation by the mayor-council form of local 
government in comparison to the council-manager form because of incentives and 
opportunities created by different types of political institutions for economic exploitation. 
However, the literature review suggests that the evidence for this relationship is weak. 
There is a parallel to this argument while comparing elected officials of ward-based local 
boards to at-large elected members or elected or appointed school superintendents. This 
type of behavior of the local elected officials is simply explained in terms of greater and 
direct control over the distribution of funds from the local government budget. Craw 
(2008) argues that the reformism hypothesis does not explicitly explain how local 
governments assume economic capacity to act in their self-interest. There is an implicit 
assumption that local governments tend to behave as monopolies under certain types of 
political institutions. 
Craw’s Tamed Leviathan Hypothesis has attempted to answer the theoretical 
shortcomings of the Leviathan and Reformism models by synthesizing and integrating 
them (Craw, 2008). Furthermore, Craw’s Tamed Leviathan Hypothesis includes control 
variables that measure local citizen demand for public services or what Berkman and 
Plutzer (2005) term as citizen preferences. Craw posits that political institutions moderate 
the effect of inter-local government competition in a MA on local government spending.
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In the context of municipal governments, Craw hypothesizes that higher levels of 
decentralization / fragmentation of local governments lead to lower spending, but this 
spending depends on the type of political institution. Higher levels of decentralization 
restrict the capacity of elected officials with more direct control over budgets from 
spending more than elected officials with less direct control over budgets. With lower 
levels of centralization, residents have fewer options to relocate to other local 
jurisdictions and hence they can be taxed at higher rates for a given level of public good. 
However, some forms of political institutions can objectively take broader constituency 
perspectives and spend fewer dollars even when there is less decentralization. 
Craw’s Tamed Leviathan model seemingly encompasses the public choice model 
(and its byproduct of the median voter hypothesis), the Leviathan model, and the 
Reformism model. Additionally, Craw’s approach is consistent with the policy 
responsiveness theory developed by Berkman and Plutzer (2005). Both Craw (2008) and 
Berkman and Plutzer (2005) emphasize the important role of local demand and political 
institutions in provisioning of collective goods. However, there are five notable 
differences between the two. First, the unit of analysis in Craw (2008) is municipal 
governments, while the school district is the unit of analysis in Berkman and Plutzer 
(2005). This difference is minor because school districts and municipalities are both local 
government institutions. However, intergovernmental revenues from federal and state 
sources constituted 3.75% and 29% respectively for all local governments in 2007
2
 in 
contrast to 9% and 40% respectively for the school districts. Second, Berkman and 
Plutzer (2005) have directly estimated the public preferences by deriving public opinion 
                                                          
2
 Please see the US Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finance at: 
http://www.census.gov/govs/local/historical_data_2007.html#state_local. 
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from the national sample of General Social Survey. Craw (2008) has indirectly measured 
public preferences for public services by including measures for poverty, non-White 
population, population of foreign-born residents, non-White council members, population 
over 65, and homeownership. Craw (2008) treats median housing value as an indicator of 
the supplying capacity of local governments, whereas Berkman and Plutzer (2005) treat it 
as an indicator of resident demand. Third, the policy responsiveness model does not 
include a measure of the level of inter-local government competition in a MA, which is 
one of the central variables of concern in the Tamed Leviathan Hypothesis. This 
difference would disappear if the policy responsiveness model included explanations for 
differences in local government spending. It would then be possible to include the level 
of inter-local government competition in a MA as an explanatory factor in local 
government spending. Such a possibility exists because Berkman and Plutzer (2005, p.6) 
recognize the importance of controlling for “the effects of economics and resources” in 
empirical estimation of the policy responsiveness model. Fourth, political institutions 
interact with public preferences in the policy responsiveness model, while in the Tamed 
Leviathan Hypothesis they interact with the inter-local government competition in a MA. 
Finally, out of the two measures of interest group strength in the policy responsiveness 
model, the Tamed Leviathan Hypothesis includes the elderly population, but ignores 
employee unions. The policy responsiveness model hypothesizes that interest groups 
moderate the effects of public opinion on local spending. 
 2.5. The Proposed Conceptual Model 
Barring the last two, the other differences between the Tamed Leviathan 
Hypothesis and the policy responsiveness model are not difficult to reconcile. For 
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example, as noted above, a study of spending levels of local governments in urban 
regions can include measures of inter-local government competition in a MA without 
contradicting the basic hypotheses of the policy responsiveness model. The difference 
concerning the empirical testing of interactions between political institutions and 
residents’ demands for public services is challenging and cumbersome in the absence of a 
single measure for residents’ demand.  
This practical challenge is also applicable to the empirical estimation of 
hypothesized interactions between measures of interest groups and public opinion (i.e., 
the measure of resident's demand). There are several reasons for not including the two 
interactions in an empirical model for estimating equity in local government spending. 
First, estimation of local public opinion with data on higher levels of political units may 
be  inaccurate (Cnudde, 2006); this paper instead uses several conventional demographic 
and economic variables, such as poverty, non-White population, population of foreign 
born residents, log of district population, non-White council members, education levels of 
the population, and homeownership (Harris, Evans and Schwab, 2001; Craw, 2008). 
These variables capture some of the heterogeneity among districts which may explain 
preferences for school spending (Harris, Evans and Schwab, 2001). Interactions of 
several measures for political institutions and interest groups with each of the 
demographic and economic variables would be empirically unmanageable and would not 
be parsimonious. Second, inclusion of some of the important covariates in Berkman and 
Plutzer (2005), such as interest groups as control variables maintains the focus of this 
paper on estimating the equity implications of political institutions and inter-local 
government competition in a MA for school district spending. Third, the direct estimation 
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of public opinion (or resident demand) does not address the "Tiebout Bias" in inter-local 
government sorting of residents. According to Bayer and Timmins (2007, p. 353), "the 
central problem in an empirical application is simply that of distinguishing the aggregate 
behavioral effect of local spillovers from that of fixed natural advantages that are tied to 
locations, particularly when the latter are not observed by the researcher." As will be 
explained in the methodology section, this paper tackles this empirical problem by 
utilizing fixed effects and instrumental variable fixed effects panel data models. 
This study extends the "Tamed Leviathan Hypothesis" in Craw (2008) by 
considering the intersection of within-state rankings of school districts’ median 
household income, political institutions and inter-school district competition. I term this 
model as "Extended Tamed Leviathan Model." This model integrates the Consolidation 
model in formulating hypotheses in opposite direction to the key arguments in the Tamed 
Leviathan Model above. This is so because the Leviathan and the Consolidation models 
predict opposing effects of inter-local competition / decentralization on local government 
spending. The mechanism in the Tamed Leviathan Model also applies here, albeit in 
opposite direction. Consolidation of suburban regions with inner-city provides economies 
of scale. Such local governments can also efficiently and equitably manage spillovers 
from inter-dependent localities. However, some forms of political institutions may cater 
to narrower constituency needs and hence may spend higher dollars even when there is 
less decentralization. Table 4.1 and figure 4.1 in the appendix summarize the key 
argument, sources of inefficiency and mechanisms through which each of the models 
discussed above affect equity in local government spending and productive efficiency in 
educational outcomes.  
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 2.6. Hypotheses: School District Spending 
The Extended Tamed Leviathan model provides hypotheses that propose equity 
effects of political institutions and inter-school district competition in a MA on school 
district spending. Moreover, since the proponents of local government consolidation 
formulate hypotheses contrary to the public choice and Leviathan models, the empirical 
estimation of the Extended Tamed Leviathan model presents the necessary evidence to 
compare and contrast the competing perspectives. This is possible by formulating 
hypotheses in opposite direction corresponding to each of the relevant hypothesis of the 
Tamed Leviathan model. The latter correspond to the interactive effect of inter-
jurisdictional competition and political institutions on equity in school district spending. 
Therefore, the Extended Leviathan model leads to hypotheses and sub-hypotheses in 
pairs. For each pair, the first hypothesis/sub-hypothesis is consistent with the Tamed 
Leviathan model and the second is consistent with the Consolidated Local Governments 
Model. The hypotheses / sub-hypotheses are as below: 
The Tamed Leviathan Model (I). Overall, with an increase in inter-school district 
competition the school districts spend less but political institutions moderate this 
relationship.  
The Consolidation Model: Overall, with an increase in inter-school district 
competition the school districts spend more but political institutions moderate this 
relationship. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).a. Fiscally dependent school districts spend less on 
public education in comparison to fiscally independent school districts as the level 
of inter-school district competition increases.  
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The Consolidation Model (a): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but fiscally dependent school districts 
spend less than fiscally independent school districts. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).b. Appointed superintendents spend less on public 
education in comparison to elected superintendents as the level of inter-school 
district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (b): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but school districts with appointed 
superintendents spend less than school districts with elected superintendents. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).c. School districts with appointed boards spend less in 
comparison to school districts with at large boards as the level of inter-school 
district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (c): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but school districts with appointed 
boards spend less than school districts with at large boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).d. School districts with at large boards spend less in 
comparison to school districts with ward-based elected boards as the level of 
inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (d): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but school districts with at large elected 
boards spend less than school districts with ward-based elected boards. 
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The Tamed Leviathan (I).e. School districts with appointed boards spend less in 
comparison to school districts with ward-based elected boards as the level of 
inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (e): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but school districts with appointed 
boards spend less than school districts with ward-based elected boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).f. School districts with appointed boards spend less in 
comparison to school districts with mixed boards as the level of inter-school 
district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (f): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but school districts with appointed 
boards spend less than school districts with mixed boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).g. School districts with at large boards spend less in 
comparison to school districts with mixed boards as the level of inter-school 
district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (g): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but school districts with at large elected 
boards spend less than school districts with mixed boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).h. School districts with mixed boards spend less in 
comparison to school districts with ward-based elected boards as the level of 
inter-school district competition increases. 
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The Consolidation Model (h): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, the school districts spend more but school districts with mixed boards 
spend less than school districts with ward-based elected boards. 
For estimating equity implications of inter-school district competition and 
political institutions, two hypotheses are proposed. These hypotheses are 
consistent with the Consolidated Local Governments Model and the Reformism 
Model. First, it is expected that the negative effect of inter-school district 
competition on per-pupil spending of school districts will be more negative for 
low income school districts than high income school districts. Second, it is 
expected that the relative negative effects of types of political institutions on per-
pupil spending of school districts will be more negative for low income school 
districts than high income school districts. 
 2.7. Equity and Productive Efficiency in Educational Outcomes 
Studies evaluating the productive efficiency of school resources and school choice 
have relied on the production function approach (Odden and Picus, 2000; Rice and 
Schwartz, 2008). Scholarship on the role of school resources, magnitude of spending, 
various types of school reforms and school processes in influencing student achievement 
dates back to the Equality of Educational Opportunity study by Coleman and his 
colleagues (Coleman et al., 1966). Coleman et al. (1966) concluded that school resources 
had negligible effects on student achievement. The often cited finding of the study is that 
students’ family background is far more influential in explaining achievement gap than 
both within and between school factors. Using the data collected by Coleman et al. 
(1966) and contemporary HLM models, Borman and Dowling (2010) however show that 
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conclusions in Coleman et al. were wrong on this key point. The methodology adopted by 
Coleman et al. was inadequate because it did not properly employ the correct error term.  
In the tradition of straightforward input-output relationships, the subsequent 
studies on productive efficiency of school resources fall under one of the two broader 
policy positions. One position holds that money does not matter in educational outcomes 
because of inefficiencies in resource use, i.e., various school inputs on which money is 
allocated are not producing gains in educational achievement. This argument does not 
mean that money does not matter at all. It only suggests that additional resources are 
being wasteful (Hanushek, 1989a, 1989b, 1991, 1994, 1996a, 1996b). The other position 
posits that money matters for gains in educational outcomes and that a high level of 
funding is crucial in providing smaller classrooms, schools, more qualified teachers and 
various other school resources (Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine 1996; Hedges and 
Greenwald 1996; Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald, 1994). Questioning Hanushek’s 
methodology as mere “vote-counting,” Krueger (2002) finds that other approaches to 
weighting effect sizes lead to more consistent and positive effects of school resources on 
student achievement. Burtless (1996) and Elliot (1998) have critically summarized the 
two opposing arguments. Elliot (1998: 223) finds that "per-pupil expenditures indirectly 
increase student achievement by giving students access to educated teachers who use 
effective pedagogies in the classroom.” Per-pupil expenditures for instruction and the 
administration of school districts affect students’ achievement (Wenglinsky, 1997).  
Class size is an important school resource that money can influence. But there is 
no agreement among researchers that smaller class size is better for student learning 
(Rice and Schwartz, 2008). However, smaller class size may benefit specific group of 
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students, subject matters, and teachers in special circumstances (Aaronson, Barrow, and 
Sander, 2007; Hanushek, 2002). The Tennessee STAR class size experiment also could 
not resolve the general disagreement. Finn and Achilles (1999) and Nye, Hedges, and 
Konstantopolous (1999) reported positive effect of reduction in class size. Hanushek 
(1999), however, argued that the experiment was contaminated. Specifically, the 
contamination produced unmeasured differences between the students in small and large 
classes leading to unreliable results. Another important school resource is teacher quality. 
Research shows that quality of teachers is positively related to student achievement 
(Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 1998; Sanders, 1998). There is, however, lack of 
agreement on specific teacher qualifications that raise student achievement the most 
(Hansuhek and Rivkin, 2010; Nye, Konstantopoulos, and Hedges, 2004; Wayne and 
Youngs, 2003).   
Researchers have also evaluated the equity and productive efficiency of public 
education by estimating the effects of different market-type school choice options on 
student achievement using production function approach. The issue of school choice is 
important in school finance because it not only involves public funding of private schools 
but also because school choice and the resultant competition affects productive use of 
school resources (Gill and Booker, 2008). There are key arguments on both sides of the 
school choice debate (Belfield and Levin 2005a & 2005b; Betts and Loveless, 2005; 
Godwin and Kemerer, 2002; Levin, 2008; Moe, 2001; Peterson, 2010). Godwin and 
Kemerer (2002) have critically summarized the theoretical debates and testable empirical 
statements on both sides of the argument. The impact of school choice on urban inner-
city children is also a key issue in the debate (Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). 
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There are two most prevalent forms of school choice in the US (Belfield and 
Levin, 2005b; Betts and Loveless, 2005; Peterson, 2010). First, parents have the right to 
choose private school or home schooling for their children. Second, the residential choice 
of parents also reflects school choice. The latter is in-egalitarian because it has resulted in 
residential segregation in terms of SES and race (Peterson, 2010). However, the 
proponents of residential choice or “Tiebout sorting” argue that existence of several 
jurisdictions for similar public goods, such as public education is both equitable and 
efficient (Godwin and Kemerer, 2002; Hoxby, 1996a & 2000). On the other hand, the 
proponents of the consolidated provision of local public goods view residential choice for 
school districts as both inequitable and inefficient (Howell-Moroney, 2008; Lowery, 
2000; Lyons and Lowery, 1989). These scholars argue for a more consolidated form of 
local governments in Metropolitan Areas for reducing spillovers and ensuring equity. 
This argument is also consistent with the policy suggestion to “renew and expand 
regional area-wide choice options that transcend school district boundaries” (Mickelson 
et al., 2011, p.31). This is required for promoting diverse student composition in schools 
that would in turn facilitate better learning opportunity to students (Mickelson et al., 
2011).  
In light of these divergent views, the fifth chapter investigates the effect of 
residential choice - measured in terms of inter-school district competition among school 
districts in a Metropolitan Area - on student achievement. The conceptual model 
developed in this chapter facilitates testing of hypotheses consistent with the theoretical 
expectations of both the proponents of more school-choice in the form of higher levels of 
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inter-school district competition on the one hand and the theoretical expectations of the 
proponents of the consolidated form of local governments on the other.   
 2.8. Public Education Production and the School Choice Debate 
The literature on school choice beyond the realm of inter-school district 
competition is quite vast and it includes studies on various choice options, including 
magnet schools, charter schools, private schools and vouchers (Betts and Loveless, 2005; 
Peterson, 2010). This literature is briefly summarized before turning to the school choice 
literature that operationalizes school choice as inter-school district competition.  
The debate on school choice began in earnest with the work of Milton Friedman 
on government’s role in public education production and provision (Friedman, 1955 & 
1962). Friedman suggested that the government should fund public education through 
vouchers, giving them directly to the parents and leaving the provision of education to 
private schools. However, consistent with the social goals of education, the government 
should formulate and enforce minimum standards for private schools. This policy 
suggestion was designed to enhance efficiency through competition in a private market of 
education; while also fulfilling the social goals of education including social cohesion, 
civic education, and racial and socioeconomic equity. Advocates of this perspective 
expected that competition between schools in attracting and retaining students would 
result in cost reductions, less bureaucracy and efficiency. This policy moves control of 
education from the state to parents and private schools. The market mechanism is 
expected to ensure consumer sovereignty. The proponents also argue that this idea is 
consistent with the advancement of individual liberty because parents could choose from 
among schools that matched their values.  
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In recent decades, Chubb and Moe (1990) have reinvigorated the debate on school 
choice. Proponents of school choice and competition argue that 1) schools would operate 
more efficiently if their survival hinged on increased competition among schools for 
students. 2) With a menu of different types of schools to choose from, the less affluent 
parents and their children will no longer be at a disadvantage (Betts and Loveless, 2005; 
Chubb and Moe, 1990; Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). The loosening of democratic 
control is also beneficial to less affluent and minority students who disproportionately 
reside in inner-city urban areas (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). 
However, there should be special safeguards in the design of school choice programs 
with regard to the inner-city schools and choice programs in general (Betts and Loveless, 
2005; Godwin and Kemerer, 2002; Levin, 2008). The design issue is an important public 
policy issue in school finance (Belfield and Levin, 2005b; Levin, 2008; Moe, 2005) 
because school choice should not alienate students with greater needs and exacerbate 
their isolation in segregated environments (Levin, 2008). 3) Proponents of school choice 
also argue that democratic control is a wasteful barrier to school productivity. 
Bureaucratic structure and democratic control in public schools are inherently inefficient 
and slow down student performance (Chubb and Moe, 1988 & 1990). 4) Democratic 
control breeds unclear missions and goals, reduces coordination and teamwork among 
administrators, faculty, and staff. There is reduction in teacher autonomy and satisfaction 
under the democratically controlled public schools. 5) Finally, the proponents of school 
choice argue that mimicking private market conditions in public schools handles diverse 
needs of students more efficiently than the current centralized system of public schools.  
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The critics of school choice have raised questions about freedom of choice, 
productive efficiency, equity, social cohesion and organizational grounds (Levin, 2008; 
Meier, Polinard and Wrinkle, 2000). Less educated and lower SES parents face difficulty 
in exercising choice due to lack of timely information, networks, and transportation 
(Levin, 2008). In terms of productive efficiency, opponents argue that competition will 
benefit just the “best” students. Students with greater needs will find themselves in racial 
and socioeconomically segregated school environments (Epple and Romano, 2000; Fiske 
and Ladd, 2000; Levin, 2008; Orfield and Yun, 1999; Schneider et al., 1997; Wells, 
1993). On social cohesion grounds, opponents argue that private schools would 
undermine the common purpose of schooling in their pursuit of making narrow gains in 
the market (Gill and Booker, 2008; Levin, 2008; Wolfe, 2003). In a response to Chubb 
and Moe, Meier et al. (2000) argued that bureaucracy increases as schools take actions 
that are linked to improved performance. This implies that bureaucracy is a consequence 
of lower academic performance and not a causal factor. 
 2.9. Empirical Evidence on School Choice Policies 
The empirical evidence on the beneficial effects of school choice competition on 
student achievement is inconclusive (Belfield and Levin, 2005b; Gill and Booker, 2008). 
Moreover, the studies on the effect of school competition on other public purposes of 
education, such as student integration and civic socialization provide more reasons for 
concern (Gill and Booker, 2008; Mickelson et al., 2011). School choice programs, in 
some cases, increase stratification by race and SES.  
Using school level data and school fixed effects, and measuring the existence of 
competition in a school district if more than 6 percent students attended charter schools, 
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Hoxby (2002) found a positive impact of competition on 4
th
 grade standardized math 
scores, but she did not find any effect on 7
th
 grade math scores in Arizona. Measuring 
charter school competition in Michigan as the number of charter schools in a well defined 
area, Bettinger (2005) found a small positive effect of competition on student learning. 
The author suggested that this small positive effect could be because of population 
growth. In all of these studies the data were measured at the aggregate school level. 
Using student level longitudinal data in Texas and school-student fixed effects, Booker et 
al. (2006) report a positive effect of charter school competition on student achievement. 
However, Buddin and Zimmer (2004) find no relationship in California while using 
similar data and methodology as Booker et al. In North Carolina, using similar data and 
methodologies as the previous two studies, Bifulco and Ladd (2005) also did not find any 
relationship between charter school competition and student achievement. In their review 
of the literature on charter schools and student achievement, Betts and Hill (2006) 
conclude that a strong, robust association has not yet emerged. In a comprehensive study 
spanning 16 states of the US, Raymond (2009) reported that students in poverty and 
English language learner students - two traditionally disadvantaged subgroups - fare 
better in charter schools than in the traditional public schools. Furthermore, this positive 
story does not, however, extend to other students who on average have lower 
performance than the same students who remain in the traditional public school system 
(Raymond, 2009). 
The relationship between the effect of voucher programs and student achievement 
is also mixed (Gill and Booker, 2008). Using school-level data from the Milwaukee 
voucher program experiment, Hoxby (2002) and Chakravarti (2005) find a positive 
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relationship between school competition and student achievement. On the other hand, 
Witte (2000) found no differences in test scores of the Milwaukee’s voucher program 
students and all other students in the Milwaukee school system. Moreover, the findings 
could reflect population change rather than gains in student achievement (Ladd, 2002). In 
the Florida voucher program, some studies found a positive relationship between 
competition and student achievement in schools faced with high-stake voucher threat 
(Chakravarti, 2005; Figlio and Rouse, 2004; Greene and Winters, 2003; West and 
Peterson, 2005). However, West and Peterson (2005) and Figlio and Rouse (2004) did 
not find any relationship in case of low-stake test. 
The empirical studies on the effects of school competition and choice on student 
sorting are also relevant in the context of testing empirical statements of school choice 
theory. Using student-level data from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools in North 
Carolina, Godwin et al. (2006, abstract) find that school choice “was neither neutral in 
the opportunity it provided students to attend their school of choice nor in its academic 
outcomes.” In particular, white students were more likely than African American students 
to receive their first choice of schools. Also, while white students improved their test 
scores, African American students’ scores declined. In another study of Charlotte 
Mecklenburg Schools, Mickelson and Southworth (2007) also find increased 
resegregation in some suburban public schools as a result of school choice. In the 1999 
Civil Rights Project study of the Harvard University, Orfield and Yun (1999) also 
reported that school choice has increased resegregation across public schools. Similarly, 
Bifulco and Ladd (2006) reported increased racial stratification due to competition and 
sorting from charter schools in North Carolina. Ross (2005) reports increase in racial 
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stratification in Michigan public schools due to charter school competition. These studies 
underscore negative effects of school choice in terms of increased racial segregation and 
widening achievement gaps between white and African American students. 
Few studies have empirically evaluated the impact of school choice 
operationalized as inter-school district competition in a Metropolitan Area on student 
achievement. This is a very under-researched area (Gill and Booker, 2008). Borland and 
Howsen (1992 & 1993) found that increases in the level of inter-school district 
competition lead to higher student achievement, but they did not control for endogeneity 
of school choice. This is important because controlling for endogeneity produces the 
unbiased estimated coefficient.  Controlling for endogeneity, Hoxby (2000) finds a 
positive relationship between more competition and student achievement. However, 
Rothstein (2007) finds that Hoxby’s results did not hold across various specifications. 
Additionally, Rothstein (2007) reports that having more inter-school district competition 
in a Metropolitan Area is not statistically linked to student achievement. In the case of 
California school districts, Zanzig (1997) reports that competition among school districts 
positively affects student achievement, but only up to a specific threshold. Marlow (1997 
& 2000) reports that greater numbers of school districts promote higher student 
achievement and lower high school drop-out rates, but are associated with higher public 
education spending.  
 2.10. Gaps in the School Choice Literature  
In light of conflicting evidence and unintended consequences, the debate over 
school choice reforms between its proponents and opponents is poised to continue in 
future. The extant literature does not establish that school choice policies lead to better 
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educational outcomes in comparison to the traditional public education system. 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that there are several important gaps in the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the productivity effects of different types of school 
choice. Notably, the literature has paid scant attention to the role of inter-school district 
competition among school districts in influencing productive efficiency. Inter-school 
district competition is an important source of school choice for students because 
residential choice of parents in most cases also decides the school system where their 
children will study.  
Furthermore, the literature has completely ignored the role of political institutions 
of school districts in influencing productive efficiency. School districts are governed 
through different types of political institutions. These political institutions are the 
ultimate decision making bodies in regard to raising resources, allocating resources and 
overseeing the day-to-day management of public school systems. Third, empirical studies 
on different types of school choice in general and the few studies on inter-school district 
competition in particular are inconclusive thereby warranting further research on the 
issue. The fifth chapter fills these gaps by evaluating the interactive impact of inter-
school district competition and political institutions on productive efficiency and equity 
in student achievement. These research questions are studied within the conceptual 
framework developed in this chapter.  
 2.11. Hypotheses: Equity and Productive Efficiency of Educational Outcomes 
The Tamed Leviathan Model (I). Overall, with an increase in inter-school district 
competition student achievement increases but political institutions moderate this 
relationship.  
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The Consolidation Model: Overall, with an increase in inter-school district 
competition student achievement declines but political institutions moderate this 
relationship. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).a. Student achievement in fiscally dependent school 
districts is higher in comparison to fiscally independent school districts as the 
level of inter-school district competition increases.  
The Consolidation Model (a): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievement in fiscally 
dependent school districts is higher in comparison to fiscally independent school 
districts. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).b. Student achievement in school districts with 
appointed superintendents is higher in comparison to those with elected 
superintendents as the level of inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (b): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievement in school 
districts with appointed superintendents is higher than those with elected 
superintendents. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).c. Student achievement in school districts with 
appointed boards is higher in comparison to school districts with at large boards 
as the level of inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (c): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievements in school 
districts with appointed boards is higher than those with at large boards. 
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The Tamed Leviathan (I).d. Student achievement in school districts with at large 
boards is higher in comparison to school districts with ward-based elected boards 
as the level of inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (d): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievement in school 
districts with at large elected boards is higher than those with ward-based elected 
boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).e. Student achievement in school districts with 
appointed boards is higher in comparison to those with ward-based elected boards 
as the level of inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (e): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievement in school 
districts with appointed boards is higher than those with ward-based elected 
boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).f. Student achievement in school districts with 
appointed boards is higher in comparison to those with mixed boards as the level 
of inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (f): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievement in school 
districts with appointed boards is higher than those with mixed boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).g. Student achievement in school districts with at large 
boards is higher in comparison to those with mixed boards as the level of inter-
school district competition increases. 
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The Consolidation Model (g): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievement in school 
districts with at large elected boards is higher than those with mixed boards. 
The Tamed Leviathan (I).h. Student achievement in school districts with mixed 
boards is higher in comparison to those with ward-based elected boards as the 
level of inter-school district competition increases. 
The Consolidation Model (h): Overall, as inter-school district competition 
increases, student achievement declines but student achievements in school 
districts with mixed boards is higher than those with ward-based elected boards. 
For estimating equity implications of inter-school district competition and 
political institutions, two hypotheses are proposed. These hypotheses are 
consistent with the Consolidated Local Governments Model and the Reformism 
Model. First, the positive effect of inter-school district competition on student 
achievement will be more positive for low income school districts than high 
income school districts. Second, the relative positive effects of types of political 
institutions on student achievement will be more positive for low income school 
districts than high income school districts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
 3.1. Competition, Political Institutions, and School District Spending 
 3.1.1. Data 
For measuring different fiscal variables including the fourth chapter's dependent 
variable - the log of per-pupil total expenditure by school districts for fiscal years 1990 to 
1995 - the Longitudinal Unified School District Fiscal-Nonfiscal Detail Datafile 
(UFNFD) that spans fiscal years 1990 to 2002 has been utilized. This data was released 
by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in 2006 by condensing the Fiscal-
Nonfiscal Detail Datafile (FNFD). The NCES provides longitudinal FNFD & UFNFD 
data for researchers interested in studying changes in the school district level fiscal or 
nonfiscal variables over time. The FNFD data for the 15,144 regular school districts has 
been generated by combining the Local Education Agency (LEA) Universe Survey 
Longitudinal File for Common Core's nonfiscal data and the school district fiscal (F-33) 
data for the school years 1989-90 through 1999-2002 (fiscal years 1990 to 2002). These 
regular districts serve the vast majority of the nation’s public school students (Williams et 
al., 2006). For example, about 90% of total enrolled students were in public schools in 
the US in 2009 (U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center of Education Statistics, 2012). 
The UFNFD file combines data from separate but interdependent elementary districts 
(typically grades K-12) and the secondary districts (typically grades 9-12). These two 
types of school districts constitute ''regular districts" in the FNFD file. This natural 
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combination results in records that contain data for each of the unified K-12 ‘pseudo-
district.’ Therefore, the unified K-12 ‘pseudo-district’ is the one where a secondary 
school district has captive students from an elementary school districts. The folding of the 
elementary districts (present in the primary longitudinal Fiscal-Nonfiscal Detail file 
(FNFD) for regular school districts, see Williams et al., 2006 for details) into the K-12 
pseudo-districts (in the UFNFD) neither lost nor created any students or dollars. 
Therefore, the UFNFD file has the same aggregate numbers of students and various 
dollar amounts each year (Williams et al., 2006). The UFNFD
3
 file contains one record 
for each of 11,518 unified and pseudo-unified K-12 districts. 
 This study's sample includes only those K-12 pseudo-unified districts that were 
geographically located in any of the Metropolitan Areas as defined in the UFNFD data 
(Williams et al., 2006). For measuring the inter-school district competition substantively, 
other studies have selected sample school districts similarly (Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 
2007). Selection of urban school districts in this manner resulted in a panel of 5,017 K-12 
                                                          
3 The UFNFD data has been utilized over the FNFD data because of three reasons. First, the majority of school districts 
in the US are unified. And the unified K-12 'pseudo-district' in the UFNFD data addresses the methodological 
challenge in analyzing school districts in different grade spans separately. Many measures, such as mean per pupil 
expenditures, are different for districts with different grade spans (Williams et al., 2006). The school districts in the 
secondary grade span typically spend higher dollars than school districts with elementary grade spans (Hussar and 
Sonnenberg, 2000, p. 7). Williams et al. (2006, p. 8) note that "analyses that attempt to estimate the relation between 
expenditures and other school characteristics will be distorted when they compare school districts, ignoring the 
elementary/secondary differential." The authors further add that for avoiding these biases, "such comparisons should be 
carried out using the UFNFD file of unified K–12 pseudo-districts" because the creation of unified K-12 "pseudo-
districts" results in fiscal and non-fiscal measures that are comparable to those for the majority unified regular districts 
in the US. Williams et al. (2006, p. 8) suggest that "studies that aim to compare school districts in a randomly selected 
sample will benefit from the availability of the unified K-12 pseudo-district UFNFD file as a sampling frame: per pupil 
revenues and expenditures, student characteristics, and outcomes can be compared across similarly situated districts or 
district clusters (i.e., pseudo-districts)." Second, keeping elementary districts separate from secondary school districts to 
which students from the former transfer after leaving elementary grades would result in upward bias in measuring inter-
school district competition. This is so because the separate secondary district is dependent on the former for students 
rather than competing for students with them. Finally, although similar to the FNFD data, the UFNFD data flags outlier 
values for closer scrutiny of by researchers because not all outlier values are necessarily wrong (Williams et al., 2006). 
In this study's sample, 16 school districts were flagged as outliers for just a single year each on per-pupil expenditure 
and other fiscal variables. I replaced such values with values from most adjacent year (within the study period) that 
were not considered outliers for each school district. Such replacement values were not themselves outliers because 
they were either not more than 3 standard deviations from the mean of the other years for any given LEA or not 
different by a factor of 1.5 in either direction from a preceding year for any given LEA (Williams et al., 2006). 
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pseudo-unified districts for fiscal years 1990 to 1995.
4
 Based on the Common Core of 
Data, these urban pseudo-unified districts enrolled 74.1% of nation's public school 
students in 1990 which rose to 77.5% in 1995. The UFNFD data is the source for per-
pupil spending, local per-pupil revenue, total per-pupil revenue, total per-pupil revenue 
from state, student enrollment, region, and FIPS codes for metropolitan area, counties and 
states. Since the UFNFD data does not include information on local revenues from 
property tax sources, the relevant information on the variable from the Common Core of 
Data, School District Finance Survey (F-33) for each of the sample years have been 
utilized. Measures for local political institutions have been derived from the Popularly 
Elected Officials Surveys for years 1987 and 1992 by the Census of Governments of the 
US Census Bureau. This survey has since been discontinued and therefore similar 
analysis on a national scale for more recent time periods is ruled out. Due to this data 
limitation, the study period is confined to fiscal years between 1990 and 1995. The 
Census data for school districts from School District Demographics System of the NCES 
are utilized for demographic and economic variables including school district population, 
poverty, median household income, homeownership, and median housing value. The 
Census data for years 1990 and 2000 have been linearly interpolated to derive data for 
years between 1991 and 1995 (Millimet and Collier, 2008; Millimet and Rangaprasad, 
2007). Following Hirsch and Schumacher (2004), the data on unionization of public 
sector employees in states was compiled from Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) as a proxy 
for teachers' unionization. The data on court rulings against state funding system came 
from Corcoran and Evans (2008). 
                                                          
4 In the regression models the sample size reduces by about 15% for the pooled OLS and fixed effects models and by 
about 21% for the instrumental variable fixed effects models because of missing observations for variables in 
estimation models. 
55 
 
 The 10-year lagged inter-school district competition measures have been 
calculated from the Common Core of Data, School District Finance Survey (F-33) for 
years 1980, 1981 and 1982 (U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center of Education 
Statistics, 1999). These measures are used as instrumental variables for inter-school 
district competition measures. These instruments are appropriate since some of the 
extensions of the fixed effects model, such as Hausman-Taylor and Arellano-Bond 
models use lags of the endogenous variables as their instruments (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). Since the codes and boundaries for the metropolitan areas were changed in 1983 
and in 1993, the matching of metropolitan area level measures for inter-school district 
competition for the 10 year lagged years with those for the years 1990 to 1995 was not 
straightforward. The county FIPS have been used to the extent possible to match the 
lagged competition measures with those for the study years for those metropolitan areas 
whose codes changed.  
 3.1.2. Variables and Measurements 
Following the standard practice in the literature, the dependent variable in the 
fourth chapter is the log of per pupil total expenditure by school districts (Harris et al., 
2001; Hoxby, 2000; Craw, 2008). Political institutions are measured in three ways 
following Berkman and Plutzer (2005) and Craw (2008). The first measure indicates 
whether a school district is fiscally dependent on other local governments. The second 
political institution measure indicates whether a school district has an elected 
superintendent. The third variable measures whether the school district's governing board 
is comprised of all appointed members, all elected at-large members, all ward-based 
elected members or some members elected at large while others ward-based elected. For 
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maintaining logical time sequence between independent and dependent variables, the data 
on political institutions for years 1987 and 1992 have been used with the log of per pupil 
total expenditure for years 1990 to 1992 and for years 1993 to 1995 respectively. 
Consistent with Craw (2008) and others (Belfield and Levin, 2005b; Hoxby, 
2000; Marlow, 1997; and Rothstein, 2007), inter-school district competition is measured 
with two variables. The first measure is one minus the Herfindahl Index of student 
enrollment shares of school districts and is bounded between 0 - 1. The second measure is 
the number of school districts per 1000 students in a MA. A higher value on these MA 
level measures indicates a higher level of inter-school district competition. The 10-year 
lagged instruments for inter-school district competition are measured similarly. 
Consistent with Harris et al. (2001) equity is defined as the distribution of school 
district spending across school districts based on within state groupings of school 
districts' median  household incomes. Equity is operationalized in terms of regional 
equity/inequity in school district spending, assessing whether spending varies based on 
within state groupings of school districts' median household incomes. School districts are 
grouped into quintiles according to their within state median household income rankings.  
 The empirical literature has relied on several control variables to measure 
heterogeneity in residents' demand for public education (Berkman and Plutzer, 2005; 
Craw, 2008; Harris et al., 2001; Hoxby, 2000; MacDonald, 2008; Poterba, 1997). These 
variables include the log of the school district population, the log of the MA population, 
the proportion of school age population (5-17 years), percent of 25 years and above 
population with at least high school diploma, percent of foreign born population, percent 
of non-white population, racial diversity index in a MA, log of median household 
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income, poverty, percent owner-occupied housing units, median housing value, percent 
of total revenue from local sources, percent of local revenue from property taxes, log of 
per pupil revenue from state sources, percent of  65 years and above population, percent 
of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining agreements (Hoxby, 
1996b), percent of non-Whites in school district board, and year dummies. The pooled 
cross-section models additionally control for state dummies, region and state court 
rulings against state education funding system. Table 4.2 presents yearly means and 
standard deviations for the variables of the fourth chapter. 
 3.1.3. Methodology: School District Spending 
Given the panel nature of the data, the estimation strategy follows that in Harris et 
al. (2001) and MacDonald (2008). Similar to these studies, variables vary across districts 
and over time. Each observation on the dependent and independent variables represents 
district i in state j at time t. For deriving equity implications, the within-state median 
household income rankings of the school districts have been interacted with local 
political institutions and inter-local government competition. Harris et al. (2001) used a 
similar strategy in evaluating the equity implications of court rulings on state fiscal 
system on public education. Future studies may include other strategies in evaluating 
equity in school district spending, such as school district rankings on percent of 
minorities or percent of students with English as their second language. 
 Pooled OLS models are utilized as the base for both additive and interactive 
models. For drawing substantive conclusions however, the results from the fixed effects 
and instrumental variable fixed effects regressions for both additive and interactive 
models are used. Additionally, post-estimation marginal analyses of the results from the 
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fixed effects and instrumental variable fixed effects regressions for interactive models are 
performed to test hypotheses. The following fixed effects interactive model has been 
estimated. 
log (total per pupil expenditureijt) = β1× inter-school district competitionijt + β2× 
political institutionsijt + β3× (inter-school district competitionijt × political 
institutionsijt) + β4× (inter-school district competitionijt × median household 
income quintileijt) + β5 × (political institutionsijt × median household income 
quintileijt) + π Xijt + δij + Sjt + ϵijt; where π is the vector of coefficients for control 
variables Xijt
 
including the intercept and time dummies; δij are district fixed 
effects that capture those factors that vary across districts but do not change over 
time; Sjt is the state effects to capture the effects of public sector employees 
covered under collective bargaining agreements; and ϵijt is the error term.  
The instrumental variable fixed effects models utilize 10-year lags for the inter-
school district competition measures in the fixed effects model described above. The 
panel data instrumental variable fixed effects model appropriately transforms the 
corresponding fixed effects model to control for district fixed effects and then applies 
instrumental variable estimation procedure to the transformed model (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009, p. 282). 
 While estimating the effect of inter-school district competition, there are two key 
methodological problems (Belfield and Levin, 2005b). First, competition measures are 
multidimensional and difficult to measure simultaneously. This challenge has been 
addressed in the context of inter-school district competition in public education by 
including two measures. Second, there is identification problem. The level of competition 
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may be endogenous (Belfield and Levin, 2005b; Bettinger, 2005; Harris et al., 2001; 
Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 2007). This means that some unobservable factors are part of the 
random error term and they may be related to both the dependent variable and one or 
more independent variable (s).  
 In case of inter-school district competition in a MA, some unobservable factors 
may influence both supply of per-pupil spending and demand for school districts. For 
example, according to Hoxby (2000), there may be a situation where one district has a 
highly productive administration for some peculiar reason. This may result in lower 
funding levels for the district. Additionally, some of the adjoining school districts might 
want to consolidate with the district to secure gains for their students from the expertise 
of highly productive administration. But this implies that the number of school districts in 
the education market would decline thereby reducing the degree of observed choice. In 
this situation, the unobservable productive administration is simultaneously correlated 
with the dependent and independent variables. This results in unpredictable bias in the 
coefficient of the independent variable (Hoxby, 2000). The cross-section data requires the 
use of appropriate instrumental variable (IV) and the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation approach (Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 2007). The selected IV should be highly 
correlated with the endogenous independent variable, but not with the random error in the 
regression equation (Gujarati, 1995; Wooldridge, 2006). But finding such an exogenous 
IV is not an easy task (Gujarati, 1995).  
In the context of panel data used for this chapter, the employed fixed effects 
models effectively address the issue of endogeneity which arises from omission of unit-
level unmeasured and unobserved time-invariant variables and which may be correlated 
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with both the dependent and independent variables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; 
MacDonald, 2008). However, there may still remain some time-variant omitted variables 
that may potentially cause endogeneity and hence the estimated coefficients of the key 
independent variables may still be biased.
5
 This problem is addressed through the use of 
the instrumental variable fixed effects model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Harris et al., 
2001). Following Harris et al. (2001), one measure each for the two inter-school district 
competition variables have been considered that can arguably serve as valid instruments. 
Harris et al. (2001) instrument the share of 65 year plus population in their study period 
with the 10 year lagged share of 54-64 years population. The fourth chapter similarly 
uses the 10 year lagged inter-school district competition measures as instruments 
corresponding to the two inter-school district competition measures.   
Studies also argue that the endogeneity problem may bias the effect of political 
institutions on fiscal outcomes of local governments (Berry and Gergen, 2009; Persson 
and Tabellini, 2003). However, Berry and Gersen (2009, p. 482) argue that concerns 
about the endogeneity of political institutions "should be allayed by the fact that electoral 
institutions are enshrined in longstanding provisions of state constitutions and city 
charters." The authors therefore suggest that at least in the short run the political 
institutions should be considered exogenous. Berry and Gersen's arguments apply to this 
study because political institutions are measured at two points in time that are apart by 
only five years, a very short time period to change local political institutions through 
                                                          
5 For avoiding estimation bias, Hoxby (2000) and Rothstein (2007) utilize the number of larger and smaller streams in a 
Metropolitan Area as instruments for inter-school district competition in linear models on cross-section data. This 
chapter does not use these instruments for inter-school district competition measures because they are time-invariant 
and therefore they are collinear with unobserved time-invariant school district level factors. Consequently, they will fail 
to identify an unbiased coefficient for the latter in the fixed effects model setting. 
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making commensurate changes in the applicable provisions of the state constitutions and 
city charters.  
 3.2. Competition, Political Institutions, and Student Achievement 
 3.2.1. Data 
The analytical sample of student achievement data was compiled as follows. The 
data compiled for the fourth chapter for years 1990 and 1992 was merged with data on 
student achievement and other relevant variables from first three waves of the National 
Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS:88) survey of the NCES. The school 
district' LEA IDs for the NELS data was derived using Rothstein' STATA programs.
6
 
These programs were used to compile analytical sample in Rothstein (2007). However, in 
merging the school district level data in the fourth chapter with the NELS data LEA IDs 
were used instead of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) codes that were used by 
Rothstein (2007). This approach was taken because the UFNFD data provided more 
accurate measures for inter-school district competition. Also, the correspondence 
between the MSA codes and the LEA codes is more robust in the UFNFD data than the 
data used by Hoxby (2000) and Rothstein (2007) from School District Data Book 1990.  
The NELS:88 is a large nationally representative sample of students containing 
data on student achievement, student, family and school characteristics. The dataset for 
the base year, first follow up year and second follow up year (1988-92) has 27,390 cases 
for a sample of 1030 schools. These observations include information on drop-out and no 
response in subsequent follow-ups. The panel for the base year (8th grade), first follow-
up (10th grade) and the third follow-up (12th grade) comprise 16,490 students. The 
                                                          
6
 Jesse Rothstein has generously made available his STATA programs that he used in his 2007 paper at: 
http://gsppi.berkeley.edu/faculty/jrothstein/hoxby/documentation-for-hoxby-comment. 
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merging of NELS:88 with school district level datasets does not lead to significant 
number of missing observation on school districts in regard to various measures of 
dependent variables (Hoxby, 2000). The final analytical sample of students in the urban 
school districts (i.e., those school districts that are in MAs) is about 9,000. 
 3.2.2. Variables and Measurements 
 Following production function studies (for example, Hoxby, 2000; Marlow, 2000; 
Roscigno et al., 2006; Zanzig, 1997), the public education productivity is measured in 
terms of student achievement. The longitudinal nature of the data for the first follow up 
year 1990 (10th grade) and the second follow up year 1992 (12th grade) has been utilized 
along with the cross-sections of these years. The dependent variables for the fifth chapter 
include standardized math and reading scores for 10th-grade and 12th-grade. These 
student achievement measures for two years have been selected to match with the 
corresponding measures for inter-school district competition and political institutions for 
those years. 
 The measures for inter-school district competition and political institutions mirror 
those in the fourth chapter. Consistent with Hoxby (1996a), equity is defined as the 
distribution of student achievement across school districts based on within state 
groupings of school districts' median  household incomes. Groupings of school districts' 
median household incomes calculated in the fourth chapter are included in the fifth 
chapter. Other school district and MA-level control variables in the fourth chapter are 
also included in the fifth chapter. Additionally, various student/family and school 
characteristics consistent with Goldhaber and Brewer (2000), Hoxby (2000), and 
Rothstein (2007) are also include as control variables. These variables include student's 
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8th grade scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES and at the school level, the 
variables include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of minority students, percent 
of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether 
the school is private or public.  
 3.2.3. Methodology: Student Achievement 
 Given the panel and hierarchical nature of the data, two modeling strategies are 
followed. For applying the panel data model in a situation in which some of the variables 
are time-invariant and the competition measures are potentially correlated with the time- 
invariant unit-level errors, Hausman-Taylor regression model is utilized (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). This modeling approach thus handles a limited form of endogeneity. 
Additionally, the contemporary Hierarchical Linear Modeling (multi-level modeling) 
approach has been employed in estimating the key hypotheses of the fifth chapter.
7
 The 
nature of NELS:88-92 is such that sample students cluster within schools. Sample 
schools may cluster within school districts which in turn may cluster within MAs and 
states. However, given that the NELS has 1030 schools in its sample, it is unlikely to find 
more than five schools within a school district. This is well below the threshold level of 5 
observations per school district for HLM to be efficient (Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 247; 
Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Renzulli, Macpherson, and Beattie, 2011). Since inter-
school district measure is at the MSA level, it is also likely that schools may cluster at 
that level. However, given that there are more than 300 MSAs in the US, it is unlikely 
that the NELS:88 sample will have, on an average, more than 5 schools in each MSA. 
Similarly, given that there are about 200 MSAs in the final analytical sample, the 
                                                          
7
 However, it must be noted that the multi-level linear modeling approach assumes away any correlation 
between independent variables and error terms including the unit level time-invariant heterogeneity. 
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clustering of MSAs at the state level also does not meet the threshold criteria. Therefore, 
the final analytic sample for the fifth chapter has a two-level data structure. Indeed, the 
model diagnostic tests (the Likelihood Ratio test, the AIC and the BIC – not shown here) 
show that three level models do not fit the data any better than two level models. The 
student/family characteristics are measured at the individual level. School, district and 
MSA level variables coincide with the MSA level measures.  
Clustering of cases around higher level of units produces inefficient coefficients 
because errors are correlated and there may be group-specific error variances (DiPrete 
and Forristal, 1994; Kaufman, 1995; Roscigno et al., 2006). The multi-level regression 
model addresses the error in estimation and also produces accurate standard errors for 
making inferences. The empirical studies on the relationship between inter-school district 
competition and educational outcomes have not used multi-level modeling technique. 
Additionally, post-estimation marginal analyses of the results from the linear multi-level 
regressions for interactive models are performed to test hypotheses. Following, 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, p. 231-233), the basic framework of the two-level HLM is 
as follows. 
The general conditional level-1 model is: 
Yij = π0j + π1j a1ij + π2j a2ij + …. + πPj aPij + eij ; where: 
Yij is student achievement of child i in MA j. 
π0j is the intercept of MA j. 
apij are p = 1, ……, P child/family characteristics that predict achievement. 
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πpj is the level-1 coefficients corresponding to apij. This indicates the direction and 
strength of association between any given child characteristic and outcome in MA 
j. 
eij is the level-1 random error estimated using student-level model. Random 
effects are normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance σ
2
. 
The general level-2 model now predicts the level-1 coefficient indicating MA 
effect: 
πpj = βp0 + Σ (q=1 to Qp)  βpq Xqj + interaction between political institution & inter-
school district competition + interaction between political institution & quintile 
income group of school districts in state + interaction between inter-school district 
competition & quintile income group of school districts in state +  rpj ; where: 
βp0 is the intercept in modeling the MA effect πpj. 
Xqj is a school / MA characteristic and predictor of MA effect  πpj. 
βpq is the corresponding coefficient that reflects the direction and strength of 
association between school / MA characteristic Xqj and πpj. 
rpj is a level-2 random error term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION - SCHOOL DISTRICT SPENDING 
 
 
 This chapter tests hypotheses that predict general and equity effects of inter-
school district competition and local political institutions on school district spending. 
 4.1. Results and Discussion 
 The descriptive statistics and the results for the pooled OLS, fixed effects and 
instrumental variable fixed effects models are presented in the appendix of this 
dissertation. Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables included in 
different regression models. Table 4.3 presents the main results for models that include 
types of electoral composition of school district boards as the measure for local political 
institutions respectively. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present similar results for models including 
districts with elected or appointed superintendents and fiscal dependence as the measures 
for local political institutions. These tables present results for only key independent 
variables and their interaction terms along with aggregate model-specific statistics. The 
list of the control variables included in each of the models is listed in notes below each of 
the three tables. For the main regression results in each of the tables concerning the panel 
data models (fixed and random effects models) with significant interactions, several 
additional tables present results for marginal analyses to facilitate their substantive 
interpretations. 
The results of the Hausman tests (not shown here) for comparing the fit of fixed 
effects models against random effects models show that the former models are more 
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appropriate for each of the three measures of political institutions. However, for 
identifying the coefficient for fiscal dependence of school districts (one of the measures 
for political institutions), a random effects model is utilized. The fixed effects model did 
not identify the said coefficient because the fiscal dependence measure is collinear with 
time-invariant unobservable factors. When the fixed effects model is more appropriate 
than the random effects model, the results from the latter are biased (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). Therefore, the results in this chapter for fiscal dependence of school 
districts should be interpreted cautiously and as indicative. 
 4.2. Aggregate Model Specific Results and Discussion 
 Tables 4.3 and 4.4 in the appendix present regression results from the pooled 
OLS, fixed effects, and instrumental variable fixed effects models that include the type of 
school district board and type of superintendent's office as measures for political 
institutions. Table 4.5 in the appendix presents regression results for the pooled OLS and 
random effects models that include fiscal dependence of school districts as a measure for 
political institution. The regression models are weighted by the number of students in 
school districts.
8
 For the fixed effects models, within mean number of students are used 
as weight. The instrumental variable fixed effects models that include the hypothesized 
interaction terms in Table 4.3 are not reported because none of the interactions were 
significant.  
 The pooled OLS models in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 explain about 77-79% of the 
variance in the log of per-pupil total expenditure. The fixed effects and the instrumental 
variable fixed effects models on the other hand explain about 18-28% of overall variance 
                                                          
8
 The instrumental variable fixed effects command in STATA does not permit the use of weights; therefore 
fixed effects IV models are not weighted. 
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in the log of per-pupil total expenditure. The random effects models in Table 4.5 explain 
about 62-63% of variance in the log of per-pupil total expenditure. The standard errors 
reported in the three tables for the pooled OLS, the fixed effects, and the random effects 
models have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering of school districts within 
a MA. For the instrumental variable fixed effects models, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report 
bootstrap standard errors.  
 The first-stage results (not shown here) for the additive instrumental variable 
fixed effects models in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 and interactive instrumental variable fixed 
effects model in Table 4.4 show that the 10-year lagged Herfindahl index based measure 
of inter-school district competition is significantly related to the Herfindahl index based 
measure of inter-school district competition for the study period. The F-statistics (in 
Tables 4.3 & 4.4) on the joint significance of the excluded instrument are 182.67, 196.03, 
and 148.14 (the associated p-values are less than 0.001) for the instrumental variable 
fixed effects models with the type of school district board and the type of 
superintendent's office as measures for political institutions respectively. These two 
results imply that the said instrument is not weak (Harris et al., 2001; Hoxby, 2000).  
 The first-stage results (not shown here) for the additive instrumental variable 
fixed effects models that include the 10-year lagged enrollment weighted count of school 
districts in a MA however, show that the instrument is not significantly related to the 
enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA for the study period. The F-
statistics (reported in Tables 4.3 & 4.4) on the joint significance of the excluded 
instruments are 923.95 and 1002.09 (the p-value are less than 0.001). Although the 
correlation between the 10-year lagged enrollment weighted count of school districts in a 
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MA and enrollment weighted count of school districts for the study period is quite high at 
0.66, the t-statistics (not shown here) for the variable in question drops substantially. The 
latter is quite evident because the bootstrap standard errors are magnified by more than 
200 times in Table 4.3 and more than 1000 times in Table 4.4 in comparison to the 
standard errors for respective fixed effects models. Together these results suggest that the 
10-year lagged enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA is a weak 
instrument for enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA for the study period 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p. 175). However, since the respective coefficients 
estimated by instrumental variable fixed effects models for the enrollment weighted 
count of school districts in a MA do not substantively differ from that estimated by the 
corresponding fixed effects models, it would serve no appreciable purpose to obtain 
better instruments. Moreover, the corresponding fixed effects models have partially 
addressed the endogeneity problem that arises from omitting unobserved time-invariant 
school district level factors. 
 4.3. Additive Models: Key Results and Discussion  
 Results for additive models in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 in the appendix show that 
the inter-school district competition has no effect on the log of total per pupil expenditure 
except for the fixed effects models in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 that use Herfindahl index as the 
measure for inter-school district competition. The fixed effects model in question in 
Table 4.3 shows that raising inter-school district competition in a MA from 0 (no 
competition) to 1 (perfect competition) results in about 81% increase in per-pupil total 
spending by school districts.
9
 The corresponding increase for the fixed effects model that 
uses the type of superintendent office as a measure for political institution in Table 4.4 is 
                                                          
9
 The corresponding interactive model shows similar results. 
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75%. However, the corresponding instrumental variable fixed effects models in Tables 
4.3 and 4.4 estimate positive coefficients for the Herfindahl index that are not statistically 
different from zero. Additionally, the additive random effects model in Table 4.5 also 
reports a coefficient for the Herfindahl index which is statistically not different from zero.  
 The type of school district board in Table 4.3 does not have a significant effect on 
the log of per-pupil total expenditures in both the fixed effects and instrumental variable 
fixed effects models. However, the results from corresponding models in Table 4.4 show 
that school districts with elected superintendents significantly spend about 6-7% more 
per-pupil total dollars than those with appointed superintendents. The results from the 
corresponding random effects models in Table 4.5 similarly show that fiscally dependent 
school districts spend about 14% less per-pupil total dollars than fiscally independent 
school districts.  
Overall, the additive models offer mixed findings. The two measures for the inter-
school district competition in a MA have no effect on per-pupil total expenditure by 
school districts in fixed effects instrumental variable models. However, the Herfindahl 
index of inter-school district competition has a positive effect in the fixed effects model 
(without the instrument). This result is consistent with similar empirical studies. Using 
instrumental variable regression model on cross-section data, Rothstein (2007) report that 
inter-school district competition has no effect on student achievement. On the other hand, 
the study by Hoxby (2000) found positive effect of inter-school district competition on 
student achievement and a small but negative effect on per-pupil spending by school 
districts. Few earlier studies in the context of different type of local governments, such as 
Dolan (1990) and Forbes and Zampelli (1989) also report similar findings. These results 
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do not robustly support the hypothesis pertaining to the public choice, the Leviathan 
models and the consolidated local government model. Substantively, these results suggest 
that inter-school district competition does not robustly affect school district spending. 
The additive models also offer mixed results in regard to the effects of political 
institutions on per-pupil spending by school districts. Whereas the type of school board 
does not influence school district spending, the other two measures of political 
institutions have significant effects on per-pupil spending by school districts.  Using fixed 
effects models, a similar study by MacDonald (2008) reports no effects of political 
institutions on log of per-capita total municipal government expenditure. However, 
consistent with Craw (2008), results in respect of the type of school superintendent’s 
office and the type of fiscal autonomy of school districts support the reformism 
hypothesis. The reformism hypothesis is supported because accountability to parent local 
government and efficiency from appointed school superintendent restrict the ability of 
these school districts in inflating budgets for rent-seeking. The finding in regard to the 
type of fiscal autonomy of school districts lends support to the hypothesis in the 
consolidated local governments model. This implies that the consolidation of school 
districts with their respective parent local governments results in overall economies of 
scale (Howell-Moroney, 2008) and therefore fiscally dependent school districts spend 
less than fiscally independent school districts. Overall, the additive models imply that 
fiscally dependent school districts and those with appointed superintendent spend less.  
 4.4. Interactive Models: Key Results and Discussion  
 The interactive models show the joint effects of inter-school district competition 
and local political institutions on school district spending. These models also show the 
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equity effects of inter-school district competition and political institutions. Concerning 
the pooled OLS models with Herfindahl index as the measure for inter-school district 
competition, the interactions between school district competition and political 
institutions, between school district competition and median household income rankings, 
and between political institutions and median household income rankings are significant 
in Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. For the pooled OLS models with student enrollment weighted 
count of school districts in a MA, however, the interactions between school district 
competition and median household income rankings are not significant in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 
and 4.5. Additionally, the interactions between political institutions and median 
household income rankings are not significant in Table 4.5. Among the fixed effects 
models with Herfindahl index as the measure for inter-school district competition in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4, only the interactions between political institutions and median 
household income rankings are significant. Among the fixed effects models with student 
enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA as the measure for inter-school 
district competition, additionally the interactions between school district competition and 
political institutions are significant in Table 4.3 when the political institution is measured 
by the type of school district board. The interactive random effects model with student 
enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA as the measure for inter-school 
district competition in Table 4.5 reports that only the interaction between fiscal 
dependence and inter-school district competition is significant. 
 In regard to the joint effects of inter-school district competition and local political 
institutions on school district spending, Tables 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 in the appendix present 
results for marginal analyses of interactions in the two fixed effects models in Table 4.3. 
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This is done to separate marginal effects of the interacting variables from each other 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006; Craw, 2008; Dawson and Richter, 2006). This 
separation also facilitates testing of various interactive hypotheses: whether differences in 
marginal effects and marginal predictions reported at different combinations of specific 
values of the moderating variables are different from zero. Bonferroni adjusted standard 
errors are applied in this regard (Dawson and Richter, 2006).  
 Results from marginal analyses for interactions in the fixed effects model that 
uses the Herfindahl index as the measure for inter-school district competition are not 
presented because none of the comparisons for marginal predictions of log of per pupil 
spending across school districts, which are grouped by type of local political institutions 
and median household income rankings, are significant when P-Values are Bonferroni 
adjusted, except for those in the main results in Table 4.3.  
 Results in Tables 4.3, 4.3.1, and 4.3.2  in the appendix show that school districts 
with ward based and mixed district boards spend more than those with appointed boards 
as inter-school district competition increases. Similarly, school districts with ward based 
district boards spend more than those with at-large boards. These results are consistent 
with the reformism perspective.  
 Table 4.3.2 presents differences in marginal effects of student enrollment 
weighted count of school districts in a MA for all possible comparisons across different 
types of school boards. The results are presented only for either significant or marginally 
significant comparisons. As is evident from the relevant fixed effects model in Table 4.3, 
school districts with ward based and mixed boards spend significantly more than those 
with appointed boards with an increase in inter-school district competition. Table 4.3.2 
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additionally demonstrates that school districts with ward-based boards spend more than 
those with at-large boards as inter-school district competition increases. However, the 
student enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA is statistically significant 
for school districts with appointed boards only. 
 Table 4.3.2 in the appendix presents statistically significant results for differences 
in marginal predictions of log of per-pupil total expenditure for all the possible 
comparisons between school districts that are grouped by different types of school district 
boards and different levels of inter-school district competition. The levels of inter-school 
district competition has been defined as low if the value of the competition measure is 
about one standard deviation below its weighted mean. The weighted mean for the 
measure defines the average competition. School district competition is designated as 
high if the value for the measure is about one standard deviation above its weighted 
mean. The statistical significance of the sole comparison reveals that in the fixed effects 
interactive model with student enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA as 
the measure for inter-school district competition, among school districts with low 
competition those with ward-based boards significantly spend less than those with at-
large boards.  
 Tables 4.3 and 4.3.3 in the appendix also present the equity effects of inter-school 
district competition and the type of school district board. It is apparent from looking first 
at school districts in third and fourth (second highest) income quintile groups in Table 4.3 
that districts with at-large and mixed boards spend less than those with appointed boards. 
In the second income quintile group, school districts with ward-based boards spend 
significantly less than those with appointed boards. Table 4.3 shows similar results for 
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the fixed effects model that uses student enrollment weighted count of school districts in 
a MA as a measure for inter-school district competition, except for school districts with 
mixed boards. The mixed school district boards in all income quintiles do not 
significantly spend any different dollars than their counterparts with appointed boards in 
comparable income quintile groups. Additionally, Table 4.3.3 shows that school districts 
with appointed boards in the second income quintile group spend more than school 
districts with appointed boards in the lowest income quintile group. All other possible 
comparisons are not statistically different from zero, and therefore they are not presented 
in Table 4.3.3 for parsimony.  
 Tables 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.3 in the appendix present results for the marginal 
analyses of the interactions in the two fixed effects and one instrumental variable fixed 
effects models in Table 4.4. The results for interactions in the two fixed effects models in 
Table 4.4 show that school districts with elected superintendents spend significantly more 
in comparison to those with appointed superintendents for all income quintile groups. 
Results for the instrumental variable fixed effects model that uses the Herfindahl index as 
a measure for inter-school district competition are similar except that there is no 
significant difference in spending by school districts with elected and those with 
appointed superintendents in the second lowest income quintiles.  
 Table 4.4.1 reports some additional differences in marginal predictions of log of 
per-pupil total expenditure across school districts that are grouped by the type of 
superintendent's office and median household income ranking quintiles for one of the 
fixed effects models in Table 4.4. The fixed effects model in question uses Herfindahl 
index as a measure for inter-school district competition. The results are presented only for 
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either significant or marginally significant comparisons from among all possible 
comparisons. Results in Table 4.4.1 show that school districts with elected 
superintendents in the top two income quintiles spend significantly more than those with 
appointed superintendents in the two lower income quintiles. 
 Table 4.4.2 reports additional differences in marginal predictions of log of per-
pupil total expenditure across school districts that are formed by the type of 
superintendent's office and median household income ranking quintiles for the other fixed 
effects model in Table 4.4. The fixed effects model in question uses student enrollment 
weighted count of school districts in a MA as a measure for inter-school district 
competition. The results are presented only for either significant or marginally significant 
comparisons from among all possible comparisons.  
 The results in table 4.4.2 provide partial support for the reformism perspective in 
terms of school district spending because school districts with elected superintendents in 
the top income quintile group spend more than school districts with appointed 
superintendents in the same quintile. 
 Table 4.4.3 reports additional differences in marginal predictions of log of per-
pupil total expenditure across school districts that are grouped by the type of 
superintendent's office and median household income ranking quintiles for the 
instrumental variable fixed effects model in Table 4.4. The model in question uses 
Herfindahl index as a measure for inter-school district competition. The results are 
presented only for either significant or marginally significant comparisons from among 
all possible comparisons.  
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These results illustrate that the extent of inequity in school district spending is 
slightly higher in school districts with elected superintendents than those with appointed 
superintendents.  This is evident because school districts with elected superintendents in 
all income quintiles demonstrate inequity in school district spending, whereas the school 
districts with appointed superintendents in all income quintiles except those in the second 
income quintile show similar patterns. Appointed superintendents help with equity when 
the focus is on poorer school districts. The school districts with appointed 
superintendents are more equitable perhaps because they are better able to manage 
cooperation with other school districts in providing public education. Frederickson 
(1999) and LeRoux, Brendenburger, and Pandey (2010) argue that that professional 
managers are more adept in brokering and maintaining cooperative service arrangements 
across local government boundaries than elected officials, who have a shorter time 
horizon and may be averse to the electoral consequences of cooperation. 
 Table 4.4.3 also provides partial support for the reformism perspective in terms of 
school district spending because school districts with elected superintendents in the 
fourth income quintile group spend more than school districts with appointed 
superintendents in the same quintile. 
 Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 in the appendix present results for the marginal analyses of 
the interactions in the random effects model in Table 4.5 that uses student enrollment 
weighted count of school districts in a MA as the measure for inter-school district 
competition. Results in Tables 4.5 and 4.5.1 show that the gap in spending between 
fiscally dependent and fiscally independent school districts for increasing inter-school 
district competition from 0 (no competition) to 1 (perfect competition) is about 46% 
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lower for the former type of school districts. However, as shown in the notes below Table 
4.5.1, the inter-school district competition has a significantly negative effect for the 
fiscally dependent school districts spending only. 
 Table 4.5.2 additionally breaks down this interaction by presenting statistically 
significant results for differences in marginal predictions of log of per-pupil total 
expenditure for all the possible comparisons between school districts that are grouped by 
different types of fiscal autonomy and different levels of inter-school district competition. 
The statistically significant comparisons reveal that in the random effects interactive 
model with student enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA as the measure 
for inter-school district competition, fiscally dependent school districts in the average and 
high competition groups spend less than fiscally independent school districts in average 
and high competition groups respectively. This finding confirms the Extended Tamed 
Leviathan hypothesis (I).a in section 2.2.6.  
 4.4.1. Discussion of the Key Findings 
Marginal analyses of the significant interaction effects show that the increase in 
inter-school district competition leads to lower school district spending. This result is 
consistent with hypotheses under the public choice and the Leviathan Models. However, 
the non-significance of interaction terms and the significance of main effects in other 
relevant fixed effects models imply that the increase in inter-school district competition 
leads to higher school district spending. Substantively, this result is consistent with the 
consolidated local governments model. Similar to the corresponding results in the 
additive models, these results together suggest that inter-school district competition does 
not robustly affect school district spending.  
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Similar to the variation in marginal effects of inter-school district competition 
with different types of local political institutions, results of the variation in the marginal 
effects of local political institutions at different levels of inter-school district competition 
are presented. Unlike the additive models, marginal analyses of these interactions show 
that local political institutions do not conclusively affect school district spending. Among 
school districts with low competition in the fixed effects interactive model with student 
enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA as the measure for inter-school 
district competition, those with ward-based boards spend significantly less than those 
with at-large boards. This finding fails to support the efficiency argument in the 
reformism model concerning the presence of fewer incentives for at-large elected local 
representatives than ward-based elected local representatives for inflating public budgets 
to win votes and allies. Additionally, in the random effects interactive model where 
student enrollment weighted count of school districts in a MA is the measure of inter-
school district competition, fiscally dependent school districts in the average and high 
competition groups spend less than fiscally independent school districts in these groups. 
This result implies that if school districts are either an arm of other local governments or 
fully dependent on state governments, they reap the benefits from economies of scale and 
hence spend less than independent school districts. This finding supports the extended 
Tamed Leviathan Model and the consolidated local governments models. 
The interactive models also show the effects of inter-school district competition 
and local political institutions on equity in school district spending. The non-significance 
of the interactions between inter-school district competition and within-state median 
household income rankings of school districts shows that inter-school district competition 
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does not influence equity in school district spending. This finding does not support the 
relevant hypothesis in the consolidated local governments model. This absence of equity 
implications may partly stem from the fact that court-ordered school finance reform has 
more than proportionately increased spending in lower income school districts in 
comparison to those in higher income groups (Harris et al., 2001; Murray et al., 1998). 
However, the type of local political institutions does have equity implications for 
school district spending. For example, with few exceptions school districts with 
appointed boards spend more than their counterparts in similar income quintile groups. 
The results in regard to the type of school district superintendent suggest that the extent 
of inequity in school district spending is slightly higher in school districts with elected 
superintendents than those with appointed superintendents. School districts with 
professional officials are more equitable perhaps because they are better able to manage 
cooperation with other school districts in providing public education. Frederickson 
(1999) and LeRoux, Brendenburger, and Pandey (2010) argue that professional managers 
are more adept in brokering and maintaining cooperative service arrangements across 
local government boundaries than elected officials, who have a shorter time horizon and 
may be averse to the electoral consequences of cooperation. These results partially 
support  the reformism perspective in terms of school district spending.   
 Overall, the findings robustly support the equity effects of the type of local 
political institutions. School districts with relatively more professional political 
institutions are also more equitable. The additive models, the interactive models, and the 
marginal analyses support the reformism model, the extended Tamed Leviathan Model 
and the consolidated local governments models to some extent. With an increase in 
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competition school districts with relatively more professional political institutions spend 
less. Dependent school districts reap the benefits from economies of scale and hence 
spend less than independent school districts. Inter-school district competition does not 
lead to inequity in spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION - STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 
 
 
 This chapter tests hypotheses that predict equity and productive efficiency effects 
of inter-school district competition and local political institutions on student achievement. 
 5.1. Presentation of Results  
 The descriptive statistics and the results for the Hausman-Taylor and multi-level 
linear models are presented in the appendix. Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for 
the variables included in various regression models. Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 present the 
main results for models that include types of electoral composition of school district 
boards as the measure for local political institutions. The set of tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 
and the other set of tables 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 in the appendix present similar results for 
models including districts with an elected or appointed superintendent and fiscal 
dependence as the measures for local political institutions, respectively. These tables 
present results for only key independent variables and their interaction terms along with 
aggregate model-specific statistics. The list of the control variables included in each of 
the models is listed in notes below each table. For the multi-level linear models with 
significant interactions, several additional tables present results for marginal analyses to 
facilitate their substantive interpretations. The Hausman-Taylor regression results for the 
three types of political institutions are presented in tables 5.2, 5.5 and 5.8. The multi-level 
linear regression results for student's math and reading scores in the 10th grade for the 
three types of political institutions are presented in tables 5.3, 5.6, and 5.9. Finally, the 
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multi-level linear regression results for student's math and reading scores in the 12th 
grade for the three types of political institutions are presented in tables 5.4, 5.7, and 5.10. 
The regression models are weighted by the number of students in school districts. One of 
the key methodological difference between the Hausman-Taylor model and the linear 
multilevel model is that whereas the former models a limited form of endogeneity the 
latter assumes away any correlation between independent variables and the error term. 
 5.2. General Results
10
  
 5.2.1. Hausman-Taylor Regression Model Results  
 The sigma_u in the tables for the Hausman-Taylor regression models (tables 5.2, 
5.5, and 5.8) is the standard deviation of the individual student effect and sigma_e is the 
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic error. Similarly, the rho in tables 5.2, 5.5, and 5.8 
is infraclass correlation of the error. A value close to 1 implies that the variance in 
random effects (the individual student effect - sigma_u squared) is very large relative to 
the variance of the idiosyncratic error (sigma_e squared). This happens to be the case in 
the Hausman-Taylor regression models because the rho varies between 0.77 to 0.92.  
 Tables 5.2, 5.5, and 5.8 show that when inter-school district competition is 
allowed to be correlated with the individual level effects, the political institutions and 
inter-school district competition do not have any interacting effects on students' reading 
and math scores. The political institutions do not interact with the within-state median 
housing income quintile rankings of school districts in affecting students' reading and 
math scores. The two measures of inter-school district competition do not influence 
students' reading and math scores as can be seen from the additive models in tables 5.2, 
                                                          
10
 The Chi-square and F-test statistics for the joint significance of the interaction coefficients (not shown 
here) support findings in regard to interactions. 
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5.5, and 5.8. However, the inter-school district competition interacts with the within-state 
median housing income quintile rankings of school districts in affecting students' reading 
and math scores. Only one measure of political institutions has a negative and significant 
effect on students' reading scores. In table 5.8, students' reading scores are significantly 
lower in fiscally dependent school districts than those in fiscally independent school 
districts.  
 5.2.2. General Results from Multilevel Linear Regression Models 
 Multilevel results for students' 10th grade reading and math scores are presented 
in tables 5.3, 5.6, and 5.9 in the appendix. Results show that the two measures of inter-
school district competition do not interact with the type of school district board and 
superintendent's office in school districts in affecting students' 10th grade reading and 
math scores. However, the two measures of inter-school district competition interact with 
the type of school district's fiscal autonomy in affecting students' 10th grade reading 
scores. With an increase in inter-school district competition, students' reading scores are 
higher in fiscally dependent school districts than those in independent school districts.  
 The Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition does not 
interact with the within-state median household income rankings of school district in 
affecting students' 10th grade reading and math scores. The student enrollment weighted 
count measure of inter-school district competition does however interact with the within-
state median household income rankings of school district in affecting students' 10th 
grade reading scores. Specifically, results in models using the type of school district 
board and the type of fiscal autonomy of school district show that students in the third 
income quintile school district have higher reading scores than those in the lowest income 
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quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases. Additionally, 
results in models using the type of school district superintendent show that students in the 
second and the third income quintile school districts have higher reading scores than 
those in the lowest income quintile school districts as inter-school district competition 
increases. 
 Political institutions also interact with the within-state median household income 
rankings of school districts in affecting students' 10th grade reading and math 
achievement with a few exceptions. In models that use the Herfindahl Index measure of 
inter-school district competition, the type of school district board does not interact with 
the within-state median household income rankings of school districts in affecting 
students' 10th grade reading and math achievement. In fact, the type of school district 
board has no effect on students' reading and math scores in models that use the 
Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition. The type of school district 
board does not interact with the within-state median household income rankings of school 
districts in affecting students' 10th grade math achievement in the model that uses student 
enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition. The type of fiscal 
autonomy of the school district does not interact with the within-state median household 
income rankings of school districts in affecting students' 10th grade reading achievement 
in the model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district 
competition. Students' 10th grade reading scores are lower in third income quintile 
mixed-board school districts than those in the lowest income quintile appointed-board 
school districts in the model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of 
inter-school district competition. Students' 10th grade reading and math scores are higher 
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in the second, the third and the fourth income quintile school districts with elected 
superintendents than those in the lowest income quintile school district with appointed 
superintendents. Students' 10th grade reading and math scores are lower in the second, 
the third and the fourth income quintile fiscally dependent school districts than those in 
the lowest income quintile independent school districts in the models that use the 
Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition. Students' 10th grade math 
scores are lower in the fourth and the top income quintile fiscally dependent school 
districts than those in the lowest income quintile independent school districts in models 
that use student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition.  
 Multilevel results for students' 12th grade reading and math scores are presented 
in tables 5.4, 5.7, and 5.10 in the appendix. Results show that the two measures of inter-
school district competition do not interact with the type of fiscal autonomy of school 
district and superintendent's office in school districts in affecting students' 12th grade 
reading and math scores. However, the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district 
competition interacts with the type of school district board in affecting students' 12th 
grade math scores. With an increase in inter-school district competition, students' math 
scores are higher in at-large, ward-based, and mixed board school districts than those in 
appointed board school districts.  
 The Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition does not 
interact with the within-state median household income rankings of school district in 
affecting students' 12th grade reading scores. The student enrollment weighted count 
measure of inter-school district competition does however interact with the within-state 
median household income rankings of school district in affecting students' 12th grade 
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reading scores in the model that uses the type of school district board as political 
institution. Specifically, results in models using the type of school district board show 
that students in the fourth income quintile school districts have higher reading scores than 
those in the lowest income quintile school districts.  
 Political institutions also interact with within-state median household income 
rankings of school districts in affecting students' 12th grade reading and math 
achievement with a few exceptions. The type of school district superintendent and the 
type of fiscal autonomy of school districts do not interact with the within-state median 
household income rankings of school districts in affecting students' 12th grade reading 
achievement. In fact, the two measures of political institutions do not have any effect on 
students' 12th grade reading scores. The type of school district board does however 
interact with the within-state median household income rankings of school districts in 
affecting students' 12th grade reading and math achievement. Specifically, students' 12th 
grade reading scores are lower in the second and the third income quintile school districts 
with ward-based boards than those in the lowest income quintile school district with 
appointed boards. Students' 12th grade math scores are higher in the fourth income 
quintile school districts with mixed boards than those in the lowest income quintile 
school districts with appointed boards. The type of school district superintendent and the 
type of fiscal autonomy of school districts interact with within-state median household 
income rankings of school districts in affecting students' 12th grade math achievement. 
Students' 12th grade math scores are lower in the fourth and the top income quintile 
fiscally dependent school districts than those in the lowest quintile independent school 
districts. Students' 12th grade math scores are higher in the third and the fourth income 
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quintile school districts with elected superintendents than those in the lowest income 
quintile school districts with appointed superintendents. 
 5.2.3. Substantive Summary of General Results 
The two measures for the inter-school district competition in a MA have no effect 
on students' reading and math scores in 10th and 12th grades in additive models. This 
result is consistent with similar empirical studies. Using instrumental variable regression 
model on cross-section data, Rothstein (2007) report that inter-school district competition 
has no effect on student achievement. On the other hand, the study by Hoxby (2000) 
found positive effect of inter-school district competition on student achievement. 
Although these results reject the hypothesis pertaining to the public choice and the 
Leviathan models, they do not robustly confirm the commensurate hypothesis of the 
consolidated local government model either. Substantively, these results suggest that 
inter-school district competition does not robustly affect student achievement. 
The additive models also offer mixed results in regard to the effects of political 
institutions on student achievement. Whereas the type of school board does not affect 
student achievement, the type of school district superintendent and the type of fiscal 
autonomy of school districts have significant effects on student achievement in some 
models. Students' 10th grade math scores are higher in school districts with an elected 
superintendent than those with appointed superintendents. Students' reading scores are 
lower in fiscally dependent school districts than in fiscally independent school districts. 
Although prior studies do not exist on the relationship between local political institutions 
and student achievement, there are several studies that report mixed findings on the 
effects of political institutions on log of per-capita total municipal government 
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expenditure. Using fixed effects model, a similar study by MacDonald (2008) reports no 
effects of political institutions on log of per-capita total municipal government 
expenditure. Results in respect of the type of fiscal autonomy of school districts and the 
type of school district superintendents are counter to the reformism hypothesis (Craw, 
2008) because accountability to parent local government body due to fiscal dependence 
and employer-employee dynamics does not translate in productivity gains in student 
achievement. Overall, the additive models imply that school districts with appointed 
superintendents and those that are fiscally dependent are productively less efficient.  
The interactive models offer mixed results on the joint effects of inter-school 
district competition and local political institutions on student achievement. The results in 
the Hausman-Taylor regression model show that inter-school district competition and 
local political institutions do not have interactive effects on student achievement. While 
the former have equity effects on student achievement the latter do not. In the multilevel 
models however, inter-school district competition and type of political institutions 
interact in influencing student achievement (Model M2 in Table 5.4 and Models R3 and 
R6 in Table 5.9). With an increase in the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school 
district competition, students' 12th grade math scores are higher in at-large, ward-based, 
and mixed board school districts than those in appointed board school districts. This 
finding does not support the Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008) because with an 
increase in competition more professional political institutions such as the appointed 
school district board did not turn out to be productively more efficient. With an increase 
in inter-school district competition, students' reading scores are higher in fiscally 
dependent school districts than those in independent school districts. This finding implies 
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that the fiscally dependent school districts are productively more efficient than their 
independent counterparts. This finding supports the Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw 
(2008).  
The student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district 
competition interacts with the within-state median household income rankings of school 
district in affecting student's 10th grade reading scores. In regard to the type of school 
district board and the type of fiscal autonomy of school districts, students in the third 
income quintile school districts have higher 10th grade reading scores than those in the 
lowest income quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases. 
Additionally, in regard to the type of school district superintendent, students in the 
second and the third income quintile school districts have higher 10 grade reading scores 
than those in the lowest income quintile school districts as inter-school district 
competition increases. Results in the model using the type of school district board show 
that students in the fourth income quintile school districts have higher 12th grade reading 
scores than those in the lowest income quintile school districts as the student enrollment 
weighted count measure of inter-school district competition increases. These results 
imply that the increased inter-school district competition leads to inequity in students' 
reading scores in 10th and 12th grades. 
Students' 10th grade reading scores are lower in the third income quintile mixed 
board school district than those in lowest income quintile appointed board school district 
in the model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district 
competition. Students' 10th grade reading and math scores are higher in the second, the 
third and the fourth income quintile school districts with elected superintendents than 
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those in the lowest income quintile school district with appointed superintendents in 
models that use either measures of inter-school district competition. Students' 10th grade 
reading and math scores are lower in the second, third and fourth income quintile fiscally 
dependent school districts than those in the lowest income quintile independent school 
districts in the models that use the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district 
competition. Students' 10th grade math scores are lower in fourth and top income quintile 
fiscally dependent school districts than those in the lowest income quintile independent 
school districts in models that use student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-
school district competition.  
 Students' 12th grade reading scores are lower in second and third income quintile 
school districts with ward-based boards than those in the lowest income quintile school 
district with appointed boards in models that use either type of inter-school district 
competition. Students' 12th grade math scores are higher in fourth income quintile school 
districts with mixed boards than those in the lowest income quintile school district with 
appointed boards in models that use either type of inter-school district competition. 
Students' 12th grade math scores are lower in fourth and top income quintile fiscally 
dependent school districts than those in the lowest quintile independent school districts in 
models that use either type of inter-school district competition. Students' 12th grade math 
scores are higher in third and fourth income quintile school districts with elected 
superintendents than those in the lowest income quintile school districts with appointed 
superintendents in models that use either type of inter-school district competition.  
 Clearly, these results imply that differences in political institutions across school 
districts lead to inequity in students' reading and math scores in 10th and 12th grades. 
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 5.3. Substantive Results from Multi-level Models 
 Tables 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, and 5.4.4 in the appendix present results for 
marginal analyses of interactions in multi-level linear regression models in tables 5.3 and 
5.4. Tables 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, 5.6.4, 5.6.5, 5.7.1, 5.7.2, 5.7.3, and 5.7.4 in the appendix 
present results for marginal analyses of interactions in multi-level linear regression 
models in tables 5.6 and 5.7. Finally, Tables 5.9.1, 5.9.2, 5.9.3, 5.9.4, 5.9.5, 5.9.6, 5.10.1, 
5.10.2, and 5.10.3 in the appendix present results for marginal analyses of interactions in 
multi-level linear regression models in tables 5.9 and 5.10. This is done to separate 
marginal effects of the interacting variables from each other (Brambor, Clark, and 
Golder, 2006; Craw, 2008; Dawson and Richter, 2006). This separation also facilitates 
testing of various interactive hypotheses: whether differences in marginal effects and 
marginal predictions reported at different combinations of specific values of the 
moderating variables are different from zero. Bonferroni adjusted standard errors are 
applied in this regard (Dawson and Richter, 2006). 
 As noted above, while the main results in the interactive model M2 in Table 5.4 
do not support the Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008), similar results in Models R3 
and R6 in Table 5.9 show some support. The results in table 5.9.1 support the productive 
efficiency argument in the Tamed Leviathan model because increase in competition 
widens the gap in students' 10th grade reading scores between those in fiscally dependent 
school districts and those in fiscally independent school districts. The singular 
comparative marginal in table 5.9.3 shows similar relationship when the inter-school 
district competition is measured as student weighted count of school districts in a MA.  
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 The results in Table 5.3.1 support the equity argument in the consolidated local 
government model with one exception. They show that increased competition helps 
students in the third income quintile school districts score higher in 10th grade reading 
scores than those in the top income quintile school districts. This finding does not support 
the equity hypotheses under the consolidated local government model. The singular 
comparative marginals in table 5.6.2 however shows that the increase in competition 
widens the gap in students' 10th grade reading scores between those in the third income 
quintile school districts and those in the lowest income quintile school districts. This 
finding supports the equity hypotheses under the consolidated local government model. 
The comparative marginals in tables 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 similarly show that increase in 
competition widens the gap in students' 12th grade reading and math scores respectively 
between those in the fourth income quintile school districts and those in the second 
income quintile school districts for the former and between those in the top and the fourth 
income quintile school districts and those in the lowest income quintile school districts 
for the latter.  
 The singular comparative marginal in table 5.9.4 similarly supports the equity 
argument in the consolidated local government model because there is inequity in 
students' 10th grade reading scores between those in the third income quintile school 
districts and those in the lowest income quintile school districts as the inter-school district 
competition increases. The singular comparative marginal in table 5.10.1 reports similar 
finding because students' 12th grade reading scores are higher in the fourth income 
quintile school districts than those in the second income quintile school districts as the 
inter-school district competition increases. 
  94   
 Results for marginal analyses of 10th grade reading scores are presented in table 
5.3.2 for interactions in the model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure 
of inter-school district competition. These results suggest that school districts with at-
large boards are the most inequitable, followed by those with the mixed boards, those 
with the ward-based boards in that order. The school districts with the appointed boards 
however show equal student achievements across all income quintile districts. This is 
evident because school districts with appointed boards in all income quintiles 
demonstrate equity in student achievement, whereas the school districts with at-large 
boards in all income quintiles show inequity in 10th grade reading scores. Similarly, 
school districts with mixed boards in the top and the fourth income quintiles and school 
districts with ward-based boards in the top income quintiles show inequity in 10th grade 
reading scores. So, appointed school district boards help with equity when the focus is on 
poorer school districts. 
 Results for marginal analyses of 12th grade reading scores are presented in table 
5.4.1 for interactions in the model that uses the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school 
district competition. Similar to the results in table 5.3.2, the results in table 5.4.1 suggest 
that school districts with at-large boards are the most inequitable, followed by those with 
the ward-based boards, those with the appointed boards and those with the mixed boards 
in that order. So, in addition to the appointed school district boards, the mixed school 
district boards also help with equity when the focus is on student outcomes in poorer 
school districts. Tables 5.4.2, 5.4.3, and 5.4.4 report similar results in case of 12th grade 
reading scores and student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district 
competition, 12th grade math scores and the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school 
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district competition, and 12th grade math scores and student enrollment weighted count 
measure of inter-school district competition respectively. 
 The school districts with appointed and mixed boards are more equitable perhaps 
because they are better able to manage cooperation with other school districts in 
providing public education. Frederickson (1999) and LeRoux, Brendenburger, and 
Pandey (2010) argue that professional managers are more adept in brokering and 
maintaining cooperative service arrangements across local government boundaries than 
elected officials, who have a shorter time horizon and may be averse to the electoral 
consequences of cooperation. 
 Additionally, table 5.4.2 provides partial support for the reformism perspective 
because students' 12th grade reading score is higher in the third income quintile school 
districts with appointed boards than those with mixed boards in the same quintile. 
However, in another case the reformism perspective is not supported because student's 
12th grade reading score is higher in school districts with ward-based boards than those 
with at-large boards within the lowest income quintile school districts. Results in Tables 
5.4.3 and 5.4.4 also do not support the reformism perspective. As can be seen from Table 
5.4.3 students' 12th grade math scores are higher in the fourth income quintile school 
districts with mixed and at-large boards than those with appointed boards in the same 
quintile. So school districts with more professional political institutions aren't showing 
higher student achievement. Results in Table 5.4.4 show similar relationships. 
 Tables 5.6.1, 5.6.3, 5.6.4, and 5.6.5 list equity effects of elected / appointed 
superintendents. Results in Table 5.6.1 and 5.6.3 suggest that school districts with 
appointed superintendents are more inequitable than those with elected superintendents. 
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This is evident because students' 10th grade reading scores are higher in most income 
quintile school districts with appointed superintendents in comparison to those with 
appointed superintendents in lower level income quintiles respectively. However, as is 
evident from Table 5.6.1, school districts in the second income quintile with elected 
superintendent do not show any inequity in 10th grade reading scores. Results from 
marginal analyses for 10th grade math scores in table 5.6.4 for interactions in the model 
that uses the Herfindahl index measure of inter-school district competition suggest that 
school districts with either types of superintendents are equally inequitable. Results from 
marginal analyses for 10th grade math in table 5.6.5 for interactions in the model that 
uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition 
however suggest that school districts with appointed superintendents are more inequitable 
than those with elected superintendents. Tables 5.7.3 and 5.7.4 show similar results for 
12th grade math scores. So, overall school districts with elected superintendents help with 
equity when the focus is on student outcomes in poorer school districts.  
 These findings do not support the argument that professional managers are better 
able to manage cooperation with other school districts in providing public education than 
elected officials, who have a shorter time horizon and may be averse to the electoral 
consequences of cooperation. Additionally, results in table 5.6.4 do not support the 
reformism perspective because students' 10th grade math scores are higher in the fourth 
and the second income quintile school districts with elected superintendents than those 
with appointed superintendents in similar income quintiles respectively and because 
appointed superintendents are arguably more professional. 
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 Table 5.9.2 lists equity effects of fiscally dependent / independent school districts 
for students' 10th grade reading scores. Similar results from marginal analyses for 10th 
grade math scores are presented in table 5.9.5 for interactions in the model that uses the 
Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition. And results from marginal 
analyses for 10th grade math scores are presented in table 5.9.6 for interactions in the 
model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district 
competition. These results suggest that fiscally independent school districts are more 
inequitable than fiscally independent school districts. This is evident because inequity in 
exists for more number of comparisons across income quintiles for fiscally independent 
school districts than those for fiscally dependent school districts. Results in Tables 5.10.2 
and 5.10.3 for 12th grade math scores show similar patterns. So, fiscally dependent 
school districts help with equity when the focus is on student outcomes in poorer school 
districts. This finding supports the equity argument in the consolidated local government 
model. 
 Additionally, results in table 5.9.6 do not support the reformism perspective 
because students' 10th grade math some in the fourth income quintile fiscally 
independent school districts is higher than those in the same income quintile fiscally 
dependent school districts and because fiscally dependent school districts are arguably 
more professional. Similarly, results in tables 5.10.2 and 5.10.3 do not support the 
reformism perspective. 
 5.4. Summary of Key Findings 
The marginal analyses go deeper into the details of productive efficiency and 
equity effects of inter-school district competition and political institutions. With an 
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increase in the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition, student's 
12th grade math scores are higher in at-large, ward-based, and mixed board school 
districts than those in appointed board school districts. This finding does not support the 
Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008) because with an increase in competition more 
professional political institutions such as the appointed school district board did not turn 
out to be productively more efficient. With an increase in inter-school district 
competition students' 10th grade reading scores however, are higher in fiscally dependent 
school districts than those in fiscally independent school districts in models that use 
either type of inter-school district competition. This finding implies that productive 
efficiency of inter-school district competition is higher in fiscally dependent school 
districts than in independent school districts. This finding supports the Tamed Leviathan 
model in Craw (2008). However, there are no productive efficiency effects of different 
types of political institutions in different school districts with different levels of inter-
school district competition. 
Students' 10th grade reading scores are lower in the top income quintile school 
district than those in the third income quintile as the competition increases in the model 
that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition 
and the type of school district board. Students' 10th grade reading scores are higher in the 
third income quintile school districts than those in the lowest income quintile school 
districts as the inter-school district competition increases in the model that uses student 
enrollment weighted count measure of inter-school district competition and the type of 
school district superintendent. Similar model for students' 12th grade reading scores 
shows that they are higher in the fourth income quintile school districts than those in the 
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second income quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition increases. 
Students' 12th grade math scores in the top and the fourth income quintile school districts 
are higher than those in the lowest income quintile school districts as the inter-school 
district competition increases in the model that uses the Herfindahl Index measure of 
inter-school district competition and the type of school district superintendent. Students' 
10th grade reading scores are higher in the third income quintile school districts than 
those in the lowest income quintile school districts as the inter-school district competition 
increases in the model that uses student enrollment weighted count measure of inter-
school district competition and the type of school district fiscal autonomy. Similar model 
for students' 12th grade reading scores shows that they are higher in the fourth income 
quintile school districts than those in the second income quintile school districts as the 
inter-school district competition increases. These results show that with an increase in 
competition inequity in student achieve widens between students in higher income 
quintile school districts and those in lower income quintile school districts. These 
findings support the equity argument in the consolidated local government model. 
The marginal analyses of equity effects of different types of political institutions 
show that there are equity implications of different types of political institution on 
students' reading and math scores. Students' 10th grade reading scores are generally 
higher in comparatively higher income quintile school districts than those in 
comparatively lower income quintile school districts. These results suggest that school 
districts with at-large boards are the most inequitable, followed by those with the ward-
based boards, those with the mixed boards and those with the appointed boards in that 
order. Similarly, fiscally independent school districts are more inequitable than fiscally 
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dependent school districts. And school districts with elected superintendents are less 
inequitable than school districts with appointed superintendents. Overall, these findings 
support the argument that professional managers are better able to manage cooperation 
with other school districts in providing public education than elected officials, who have 
a shorter time horizon and may be averse to the electoral consequences of cooperation. 
Within income quintile group comparison shows that the reformism model is not 
supported. These findings collectively suggest that differences in types of political 
institutions and differences in income levels of school districts matter in equitable 
distribution of student achievements across school districts in the US. 
Overall, the findings robustly support the equity effects of the type of local 
political institutions and inter-school district competition. The additive models, the 
interactive models, and the marginal analyses support the productive efficiency 
arguments in the Tamed Leviathan Model, the equity argument under the consolidated 
local government model but reject the reformism hypothesis to some extent. Results from 
Hausman-Taylor regression refute consolidated local governments models because 
increased inter-school district competition does lead to equitable educational outcomes. 
However, results from multilevel linear regression model show that competition leads to 
inequity in student achievement and therefore the consolidated local government model is 
supported. There is mixed support for the Tamed Leviathan Model. Findings support 
productive efficiency argument in the Tamed Leviathan Model in one case, but negates in 
another. So, there is some support for the productive efficiency effects of competition. 
However, there is no support for the productive efficiency effects of political institutions. 
Overall, the findings support the equity effects of the type of local political institutions 
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with few exceptions. School districts with relatively more professional political 
institutions are also relatively less inequitable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
 
This dissertation studies interrelated questions concerning the policy implications 
of equity in provisioning and equity and productive efficiency in educational outcomes in 
K-12 public education by filling several gaps in the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature. In addressing these gaps, this dissertation focuses on the role of school district-
level locational factors including inter-school district competition and the type of political 
institutions in school district spending and student achievement. In order to study these 
relationships, this dissertation combines and extends the extant theoretical traditions in a 
novel way. This synthesis of the extant literature on efficiency and equity implications of 
inter-school district competition provides a conceptual model that entails empirical 
estimation of the interactive effects of political institutions with inter-school district 
competition on provisioning and efficiency of public education. Provisioning and 
efficiency of public education have not been studied along this line before.  
There is limited research on the role of school choice, defined as inter-school 
district competition, on unequal school district spending and productive efficiencies and 
equity in educational outcomes. The broader view in the literature on school choice is 
that market-like competition for students would nudge public schools toward productive 
efficiency in resource use and better educational outcomes (Belfield and Levin, 2005b; 
Chubb and Moe, 1990; Gill and Booker, 2008; Godwin and Kemerer, 2002). Critics of 
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school choice find such policies inequitable and inefficient. The few studies on the effects 
of inter-school district competition on both student achievement and school district 
spending offer inconclusive empirical evidence (Hoxby, 2000; Rothstein, 2007). 
Therefore, an empirical investigation of the role of school choice defined as inter-school 
district competition is important and has policy relevance.  
 Similarly, an investigation of the role of political institutions in spending and 
student learning is important because existing studies ignore the role of political 
institutions in the equity of school district spending and in the productive efficiency of 
educational outcomes.  Political institutions are important to consider while investigating 
equity in spending and equity and productive efficiency in student learning because the 
local political institutions influence efficiencies in local taxation and spending (Craw, 
2008; Feiock, Jeong, and Kim, 2003). As local residents’ political representatives, 
political institutions also match citizen demand with school district spending (Berkman 
and Plutzer, 2005). 
The questions about inequity in provisioning have received significant policy 
attention during past several decades. Since the landmark decision in Serrano v. Priest in 
1971 in California and the famous US Supreme Court’s judgment in Rodriguez v. San 
Antonio in 1973, there has been a great deal of activism on the part of the judiciary, states 
and civil society actors in attaining the goal of equitable provisioning of public education 
among school districts in the US. The funding of public schools is a very important issue 
because it consumes a major portion of resources of the state and school districts in the 
US. In spite of several decades of effort at addressing inequity in education financing, the 
problem still persists. From the public policy perspective, therefore, it is very important 
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to list out the factors that explain this inequity in provisioning. The findings on the 
interactive effects of inter-school district competition and political institution on spending 
levels inform the policymakers in regard to bringing appropriate institutional and political 
changes for more equitable and better outcomes. Furthermore, since public education is a 
de facto public good, the political institutions of the local school districts and state 
governments should be made aware of the most appropriate ways of translating public 
preferences into spending levels. In such an endeavor, spending behavior of different 
types of political institutions of local governments plays important role. This dissertation 
attempts to disentangle the most important factors that explain inequitable provisioning in 
the school districts across the US. This goal is achieved by examining the roles of 
political institutions and inter-school district competition on differential spending by 
school districts in different within-state income quintiles in the US after controlling for a 
number of other relevant factors.  
Specifically, the interactive effects of political institutions and inter-school district 
competition in a MA on school district's spending are examined in general and equity in 
school district's spending in particular. The equity effects of political institutions and 
inter-school district competition on school district spending are examined by separately 
testing their interactions with school districts' within-state median household income 
rankings. The empirical investigation of these interactive hypotheses are situated within 
the purview of the Extended Tamed Leviathan model that integrates several topical 
theories, including the public choice, the Leviathan, the consolidated local governments, 
the reformism, the Tamed Leviathan, and the policy responsiveness models.  
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The Extended Tamed Leviathan model accomplishes this integration by 
formulating hypotheses in opposite direction to the key arguments in the Tamed 
Leviathan and the consolidated local governments models because the two models 
predict opposing effects of inter-local competition / decentralization on local government 
spending. The theoretical argument in the Extended Tamed Leviathan model is that the 
consolidation of government between suburban regions and inner-cities provides 
economies of scale. Such local governments can also efficiently and equitably manage 
spillovers from inter-dependent localities. However, some forms of political institutions 
may cater to narrower constituency needs and hence may spend higher dollars even when 
there is less decentralization. Conversely, the Tamed Leviathan model argues that with 
fewer options to relocate to other local jurisdictions, the residents can be taxed at higher 
rates for a given level of public good. However, some forms of political institutions can 
objectively take broader constituency perspective and spend fewer dollars even when 
there is less decentralization. 
Prior studies have not considered these interactive effects in the contexts of school 
district spending in the US and the Extended Tamed Leviathan model. For examining 
these hypotheses, a unique longitudinal dataset has been constructed by combining 
relevant datasets from several sources. Fixed effects and instrumental variable fixed 
effects regression models are employed to handle the endogeneity problem in most 
econometric studies (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009) and several policy evaluation studies 
that utilize non-experimental data (see for example, Harris et al., 2001; Bettinger, 2005).  
This dissertation also utilizes the Extended Tamed Leviathan model to evaluate 
the interactive effects of political institutions and inter-school district competition on 
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student achievement. This investigation makes theoretical and empirical contributions to 
the literatures on productive efficiency of school choice in general and school choice 
option in the form of inter-school district competition in particular. School choice in 
terms of home schooling, private schools, and residential choice has always existed. 
Some scholars favor residential choice, while others find it inequitable and inefficient in 
public education. School choice reform creates market-type schools so that parents have 
more choice and schools have autonomy. Several scholars propose that through program 
design, school choice programs can protect inner-city students from disadvantages on 
account of ethnicity and SES. Critics of school choice find such policies inequitable and 
inefficient. In recent decades, more market-like schools in the form of charter schools, 
vouchers, and magnet schools have come up. However, there is no conclusive evidence 
of the positive effects of such reform policies on educational outcomes. In fact, empirical 
evidence suggests that these policies have led to resegregation. Also, the theoretical and 
empirical literatures have not conclusively established the supremacy of school choice 
policies over the traditional public education system. This dissertation looks at this debate 
afresh in the context of the school choice in the form inter-school district competition. 
Specifically, the empirical estimation evaluates the interactive effects of political 
institutions with inter-school district competition on productive efficiency and equity in 
student achievement.  
This dissertation offers several interesting findings. In regard to school district 
spending the results show that inter-school district competition does not robustly affect 
school district spending. Results also show that local political institutions do not 
conclusively affect the level of school district spending. School districts with ward based 
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and mixed boards spend more than those with appointed boards as the level of inter-
school district competition increases. These results are consistent with the reformism and 
the Tamed Leviathan models. However, results show that the type of school district board 
with seemingly less incentive for inflating public budgets to win votes and allies such as 
the at-large district boards actually spend more than ward-based school district boards 
that arguably have more incentive to spend. These findings provides some evidence 
against the reformism perspective. Results also show that school districts that are either 
an arm of other local governments or fully dependent on state governments reap the 
benefits from economies of scale and hence spend lower amounts than fiscally 
independent school districts. This finding supports the consolidated local government 
model. Additionally, the Tamed Leviathan hypothesis is supported because 
accountability to parent local government restricts the ability of fiscally dependent 
districts from inflating budgets for rent-seeking.  
The absence for evidence for interaction between inter-school district competition 
and median household income rankings implies that inter-school district competition does 
not lead to inequity in spending by school districts in different income quintiles. This 
result is not surprising because there is not enough support for the general overall effects 
of inter-school district competition in both additive and interactive models. This finding 
does not support the relevant hypothesis in the consolidated local governments model. 
This absence of equity implications may be due to the fact that court-ordered school 
finance reform has resulted in relatively higher spending in lower income school districts 
in comparison to upper income school districts (Harris et al., 2001; Murray et al., 1998). 
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In respect of equity effects of different types of political institutions on school 
district spending, results show that with few exceptions school districts with appointed 
boards are more equitable in spending than their counterparts in similar income quintile 
groups. Similarly results show that the extent of inequity in spending is more pronounced 
for school districts with elected superintendents. School districts with professional 
officials are more equitable perhaps because they are better able to manage cooperation 
with other school districts in providing public education. Frederickson (1999) and 
LeRoux, Brendenburger, and Pandey (2010) argue that professional managers are more 
adept in brokering and maintaining cooperative service arrangements across local 
government boundaries than elected officials, who have a shorter time horizon and may 
be averse to the electoral consequences of cooperation. These results partially support  
the reformism perspective in terms of school district spending. 
 Overall, the findings in regard to school district spending robustly support the 
equity effects of the type of local political institutions. School districts with relatively 
more professional political institutions are also more equitable. The additive models, the 
interactive models, and the marginal analyses support the reformism model, the extended 
Tamed Leviathan Model and the consolidated local governments models to some extent. 
With an increase in competition school districts with relatively more professional 
political institutions spend less. Dependent school districts reap the benefits from 
economies of scale and hence spend less than independent school districts. Inter-school 
district competition does not lead to inequity in spending. 
In regard to the equity and productive efficiency effects of inter-school district 
competition and local political institutions on student achievement the interactive models 
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offer mixed results. The results in the Hausman-Taylor regression model show that inter-
school district competition and local political institutions do not have productive 
efficiency effects on student achievement. Additionally, the Hausman-Taylor regression 
results show that while the former have equity effects on student achievement the latter 
do not. In the multilevel models however, inter-school district competition and type of 
political institutions interact in influencing student achievement. In particular, the 
interactive multilevel linear regression models show that inter-school district competition 
has productive efficiency and equity effects on student achievement. Although the 
political institutions do not have any productive efficiency effects on student achievement 
in interactive models, they do affect the equity in distribution of student achievement 
across school districts in various income quintiles.  
The multilevel linear interactive regression models find evidence that the inter-
school district competition has differential productive efficiency effects on student 
achievement in school districts with different political institutions. However, the results 
confirm the hypotheses in the Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008) in one case and 
negate those hypotheses in others. With an increase in inter-school district competition, 
student's 10th grade reading scores are higher in fiscally dependent school districts than 
those in independent school districts. This finding implies that the fiscally dependent 
school districts are productively more efficient than their independent counterparts. This 
finding also supports the Tamed Leviathan Model in Craw (2008). With an increase in 
the Herfindahl Index measure of inter-school district competition, student's 12th grade 
math scores are higher in at-large, ward-based, and mixed board school districts than 
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those in appointed board school districts. This finding does not support the reformism 
hypothesis in Craw (2008).  
The multilevel linear interactive regression models also suggest that the inter-
school district competition and political institutions have differential equity effects on 
student achievement. In regard to the former, results imply that the increased inter-school 
district competition leads to inequity in student's 10th grade reading scores and 12th 
grade reading and math scores. In regard to the latter, results imply that differences in 
political institutions across school districts lead to inequity in student's 10th and 12th 
grade reading and math scores. Student's reading and math scores are generally higher in 
comparatively higher income quintile school districts than those in comparatively lower 
income quintile school districts. 
Overall, the findings robustly support the equity effects of the type of local 
political institutions and inter-school district competition on student achievement. The 
additive models, the interactive models, and the marginal analyses support the productive 
efficiency arguments in the Tamed Leviathan Model, the equity argument under the 
consolidated local government model but reject the reformism hypothesis to some extent. 
Results from Hausman-Taylor regression refute consolidated local governments models 
because increased inter-school district competition does lead to equitable educational 
outcomes. However, results from multilevel linear regression model show that 
competition leads to inequity in student achievement and therefore the consolidated local 
government model is supported. There is mixed support for the Tamed Leviathan Model. 
Findings support productive efficiency argument in the Tamed Leviathan Model in one 
case, but negates in another. So, there is some support for the productive efficiency 
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effects of competition on student achievement. However, there is no support for the 
productive efficiency effects of political institutions on student achievement. Overall, the 
findings support the equity effects of the type of local political institutions on student 
achievement with few exceptions. School districts with relatively more professional 
political institutions are also relatively less inequitable. 
An adequate understanding of the regional and local contexts such as the roles of 
the levels of inter-school district competition and types of local political institutions in 
equity in school district spending and equity and productive efficiency in educational 
outcomes helps policymakers adapt policies to those contexts. The empirical findings of 
this dissertation clarify why and how organizational, socioeconomic, and political 
contexts matter in bringing desirable educational outcomes. Policymakers can bring 
commensurate changes in the organizational and political set-up of school districts for 
achieving the goal of more equitable and effective public education. From a public policy 
perspective, findings of this dissertation therefore inform the formulation of appropriate 
policies for better educational outcomes through reorganization of school finance. 
The findings of this dissertation suggest that if policymakers intend to address 
inequity in spending across school districts without raising the level of spending then 
they might consider having more professional political institutions such as appointed 
boards in school districts as one of the policy solutions. Additionally, in achieving this 
policy goal, policymakers needn't worry about the degree of inter-school district 
competition in metropolitan areas because it neither affects the level of spending nor 
inequity in spending among school districts.  
112 
 
In regard to the equity and productive efficiency in educational outcomes, the 
findings are more nuanced. While the Hausman-Taylor regression model that addresses 
endogeneity in a limited way finds no support for the productive efficiency effects of 
inter-school district competition and political institutions and equity effects of political 
institutions, it does find that increased inter-school district competition leads to inequity 
in educational outcomes. Based on these results, this dissertation would suggest 
policymakers to formulate policies that lift student achievements in lower income school 
districts without any negative impact on student achievements in higher income school 
districts in metropolitan areas where inter-school district competition is high. One such 
policy may include some reorganization in school finance: for example, consolidating a 
low income school district with an adjacent high income school district. This policy 
would abate the level of overall inequity in educational outcomes in metropolitan areas 
by lowering the level of inter-school district competition and hence its negative effects on 
equity in student achievements.    
Except for the productive efficiency effects of the types of local political 
institutions, results from the multilevel linear regression models support the productive 
efficiency effect of inter-school district competition and equity effects of political 
institutions and inter-school district competition on educational outcomes. The findings 
in regard to the inter-school district competition pose a dilemma for policymakers. On 
one hand having higher levels of inter-school district competition in metropolitan areas 
encourages overall growth in student achievement, but the gaps in students' achievement 
between the lower and the higher income school districts also register a spike. However, 
policymakers can mitigate this tradeoff to some extent by generating more professional 
113 
 
political institutions as such political institutions reduce inequality in student 
achievements across school districts with different income levels. 
There are however a few data and methodological limitations of this study. The 
Census Bureau has stopped collecting data on local political institutions in years 
subsequent to the year 1992 when such data were collected last. The results from the 
random effects models for the fiscally dependent districts are indicative because the fixed 
effects models are more appropriate. However, the latter did not identify the coefficient 
for the fiscally dependent school districts, so the random effects model was used instead. 
Apart from the methodological issues, the policy suggestions from this 
dissertation entail support from important local political constituents with varying 
political interests in public education including parents with children, old-age population, 
and inner-city residents. Local school district governments may face a situation in which 
the old-age population is less supportive of higher spending on public education (Poterba, 
1997; Harris et. al., 2001) because they may believe that families with school-age 
children receive nearly all of the benefits from spending on public schools. However, 
Harris et. al. (2001) offer a number of reasons why the elderly might support public 
education. One, the old-age population may expect to receive higher revenue for Social 
Security and Medicare from taxing higher wages of younger workers. This economic 
scenario becomes possible because higher investment in public education improves 
workers' skills and productivity that ultimately result in higher wages. Two, the elderly 
may simply believe in philanthropy when it comes to public education. Three, elderly 
homeowners may hold the expectation that higher spending on education will be 
capitalized into the value of their homes. Four, Tiebout sorting by the elderly could leave 
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education spending unchanged because they may simply choose to live in districts with 
low education spending. Finally, the elderly may have higher interests in reducing crime 
rates and increasing economic activities. In achieving these goals the elderly may support 
public education because public schools socialize children, giving them an understanding 
of civic duties, social norms, and regular work habits.  
Since having more professional political institutions is both good for equity in 
spending and student achievement, the elderly may support this policy option. Although 
the elderly may prefer more school districts within their metropolitan area for raising 
general skills and educational outcomes of younger generation in public schools, they 
might also prefer to achieve some balance in equity and productive efficiency as having 
more inter-school district competition leads to inequitable educational outcomes.  
Since parents with school-age children have real interest in supporting public 
education with better educational outcomes, the other important local interest group that 
influences local educational policy comprises inner-city residents. Unlike the elderly, the 
inner-city residents do not possess the wherewithal to exercise the Tiebout residential 
choice. In fact they bear the brunt of several bad policy consequences of Tiebout 
competition. However, similar to the elderly it is in economic interests of inner-city 
residents to support policy options for equitable public education spending and 
educational outcomes.  
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Table 4.1: Key Arguments in the Theoretical Models Concerning Efficiency and Equity in Local 
Government  
Models Policy Outcome / Feature 
 Key Efficiency / Equity Argument Sources of 
Inefficiency 
Mechanism of Inefficiency Discussion 
of Equity 
The Public 
Choice Model 
Higher levels of competition 
between local governments for 
residents bring efficiency and 
economy in local service provision. 
These governments spend less. 
Fewer local 
governments in a 
region and 
concentration of 
residents in fewer 
of these local 
governments. 
Fewer options for residents to 
realize their choice for most 
preferred bundle of taxation and 
local public goods. 
No 
The Leviathan 
Model 
The decentralization hypothesis of 
the Leviathan Model implies that the 
existence of more decentralized / 
fragmented local governments in a 
region constrains them in imposing 
higher taxation on residents. Such 
local governments spend less. 
Fewer local 
governments in a 
region.  
Residents have fewer options to 
relocate to other local 
jurisdictions and hence they can 
be taxed at higher rates for a 
given level of public good.   
No 
The 
Consolidation 
Model 
Higher levels of competition 
between local governments for 
residents cause sprawl and 
segregation. These spillovers bring 
inefficiency and inequity in local 
service provision. Consolidated local 
governments that have jurisdictions 
over inner-city and suburban regions 
enjoy economies of scale and can 
internalize spillovers. Therefore, 
they are more efficient and equitable. 
Such local governments spend less. 
More local 
governments in a 
region lead to 
flight of affluent 
residents from 
inner-city to 
suburbs.  
 
Suburban 
localities prevent 
low-income and 
minority 
population from 
residing there. 
Consolidation of suburban 
regions with inner-city provides 
economies of scale. Such local 
governments can also efficiently 
and equitably manage spillovers 
from inter-dependent localities. 
Yes 
The 
Reformism 
Model 
If elected officials of a local 
government exercise less direct 
control over budgets then that local 
government would spend less in 
comparison to a local government 
where local elected officials has 
more direct control over budgets.  
Type of local 
governing / 
political institution 
and direct control 
over budgets. 
The political institutions that 
have the incentive to cater to 
narrow constituency demands 
will ignore the preferred level of 
spending on public education by 
the residents and hence spend 
more. 
No 
The Policy 
Responsivenes
s Model 
Different types of local political 
institutions constantly make policy 
choices differentially from among 
several, and often competing policy 
options that match with citizen 
preferences for desired policy 
outcomes.  
More democratic 
forms of school 
boards (e.g., ward-
based v. at-large 
elected school 
boards) and 
miscalculation of 
local needs. 
The forms of political 
institutions that cannot 
objectively evaluate broader 
constituency needs (e.g., ward-
based v. at-large elected school 
boards) will poorly translate 
citizens’ demand into policy 
outcomes. 
No  
The Tamed 
Leviathan 
Model 
Higher levels of decentralization / 
fragmentation of local governments 
lead to lower spending, but this 
spending depends on the type of 
political institution. Higher level of 
decentralization restricts the capacity 
of elected officials with more direct 
control over budgets from spending 
more than elected officials with less 
direct control over budgets.  
Fewer local 
governments in a 
region, the type of 
local political 
institution and 
direct control over 
budgets. 
Residents have fewer options to 
relocate to other local 
jurisdictions and hence they can 
be taxed at higher rates for a 
given level of public good. 
However, some forms of 
political institutions can 
objectively take broader 
constituency perspective and 
spend lower dollars even when 
there is less decentralization.  
No 
The Extended 
Tamed 
Leviathan 
Model (ETL) 
 
 
The ETL integrates the 
Consolidation model in formulating 
hypotheses in opposite direction to 
the key arguments in the Tamed 
Leviathan Model above. This is so  
 
Levels of 
competition 
between local 
governments and 
the type of local  
The mechanism in the Tamed 
Leviathan Model also applies 
here. Consolidation of suburban 
regions with inner-city provides 
economies of scale. Such local  
Yes 
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because the Leviathan and the 
Consolidation models above predict 
opposing effects of inter-local 
competition / decentralization on 
local government spending. 
 
 
political institution 
 
 
governments can also efficiently 
and equitably manage spillovers 
from inter-dependent localities. 
However, some forms of 
political institutions may cater to 
narrower constituency needs and 
hence may spend higher dollars 
even when there is less 
decentralization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The Extended Tamed Leviathan Model 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics: Year-wise Means and Standard Deviations of the Study 
Variables  
 
 
Table 4.3: Effects of Inter-School District Competition and Political Institutions (Type of School District 
Board) on Log of Per Pupil Spending by School Districts 
 Models without Interactions Models with Interactions 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects: IV Pooled OLS Fixed Effects 
Variables Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count  
Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count 
School District 
Competition 
0.040 -0.036 0.806** -0.594 2.100 -1.170 0.312*** 0.589*** 0.816** -0.829* 
 (0.033) (0.052) (0.288) (0.340) (4.050) (77.800) (0.069) (0.140) (0.284) (0.389) 
At-Large District 
Board 
0.080*** 0.082*** -0.001 -0.001 0.026 0.038 0.324*** 0.170*** 0.039 -0.027 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.333) (0.060) (0.020) (0.038) (0.054) 
Ward-based District 
Board 
0.074*** 0.076*** -0.012 -0.012 0.031 0.043 0.299*** 0.152*** 0.041 -0.073 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.325) (0.064) (0.028) (0.037) (0.054) 
Mixed District Board 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.000 0.003 0.029 0.040 0.292*** 0.175*** 0.059 -0.029 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.030) (0.032) (0.028) (0.411) (0.063) (0.035) (0.046) (0.058) 
At-Large DB 
*Competition 
      -0.311*** -0.708***  0.395 
       (0.067) (0.138)  (0.214) 
Ward DB 
*Competition 
      -0.275*** -0.625***  0.608** 
       (0.071) (0.152)  (0.220) 
Mixed DB 
*Competition 
      -0.235** -0.570***  0.527* 
       (0.072) (0.152)  (0.217) 
2nd Qntl       -0.050 -0.115** 0.061 0.066* 
       (0.046) (0.040) (0.033) (0.029) 
3rd Qntl       0.049 -0.050 0.107* 0.105* 
       (0.039) (0.027) (0.045) (0.047) 
Mean Std. Dev.
Variables / Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Per Pupil Total Expenditure 5314.244 5607.904 5742.480 6022.332 6221.938 6452.584 1554.057 1670.829 1692.010 1751.245 1790.705 1823.180
Herfindahl Index of School District 
Competition 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.762 0.763 0.764 0.237 0.238 0.239 0.240 0.240 0.240
Number of School District Per 1000 
Students in Metro Areas 0.159 0.155 0.152 0.149 0.146 0.144 0.126 0.124 0.122 0.120 0.119 0.117
10 Year Lag: Herfindahl Index of School 
District Competition 0.760 0.761 0.758 0.758 0.757 0.757 0.236 0.237 0.238 0.238 0.239 0.240
10 Year Lag: Number of School District 
Per 1000 Students in Metro Areas 0.191 0.200 0.207 0.205 0.205 0.204 0.150 0.157 0.169 0.168 0.167 0.167
Appointed School Board 0.113 0.112 0.112 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.317 0.316 0.315 0.298 0.298 0.297
Elected at-Large School Board 0.700 0.702 0.703 0.550 0.551 0.552 0.458 0.458 0.457 0.498 0.497 0.497
Ward-Based Elected School Board 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.253 0.253 0.252 0.325 0.325 0.324 0.435 0.435 0.434
Mixed School Board 0.067 0.066 0.066 0.099 0.098 0.098 0.250 0.248 0.248 0.298 0.297 0.297
Elected School Superintendent 0.072 0.074 0.075 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.259 0.262 0.263 0.177 0.178 0.179
Fiscally Dependent School District 0.180 0.179 0.178 0.178 0.179 0.179 0.384 0.383 0.383 0.383 0.383 0.383
School District Population 531879 540632 545621 550278 555685 559809 1383380 1396183 1405916 1416783 1428407 1438086
Metropolitan Area Population 2193146 2212752 2239840 2264007 2291228 2317606 2483891 2492284 2510792 2526836 2543717 2559111
Percent School Age (5-17 Years) 
Children 0.181 0.183 0.184 0.185 0.186 0.187 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028
Percent 25 Years Plus: High School and 
Above Educated 76.391 76.827 77.290 77.744 78.201 78.663 10.043 9.971 9.900 9.832 9.782 9.747
Percent Foreign Born Population 8.917 9.331 9.711 10.029 10.362 10.708 10.042 10.241 10.415 10.549 10.705 10.880
Percent Non-White Population 21.073 21.724 22.372 22.999 23.596 24.132 18.942 18.866 18.943 19.045 19.155 19.267
Racial Diversity Index 0.336 0.346 0.355 0.364 0.372 0.379 0.146 0.149 0.149 0.149 0.150 0.150
Median Household Income 33009.050 34337.620 35681.110 37012.270 38370.820 39764.670 10370.780 10744.230 11136.450 11549.600 11992.370 12467.070
Percent Owner Occupied Housing 63.525 63.686 63.846 64.042 64.242 64.471 14.683 14.658 14.643 14.630 14.635 14.645
Median House Value 105225.100 108456.400 111867.500 115028.100 118296.600 121709.800 66753.030 66523.970 66853.110 67314.570 68089.570 69215.570
Percent Local Revenue from Property 
Taxes 61.613 61.696 64.351 64.341 64.304 63.365 32.003 31.938 32.506 32.506 32.555 32.616
Percent of Population in Poverty 13.735 13.566 13.378 13.192 12.992 12.788 10.714 10.143 9.607 9.097 8.624 8.217
Percent State Public Sector Employees 
Under Collective Bargaining Agreements 44.532 44.882 44.839 45.343 46.495 45.534 17.903 18.161 17.609 17.154 17.776 18.472
Percent 65 Years-Plus Population 11.523 11.530 11.542 11.552 11.564 11.576 4.192 4.151 4.106 4.068 4.038 4.018
Court Rulings Against State Funding 
System 0.320 0.323 0.326 0.325 0.325 0.324 0.467 0.468 0.469 0.469 0.468 0.468
Fiscal Capacity: Percent Per Pupil 
Revenue from Local Sources 47.928 47.751 47.232 46.694 47.697 46.861 20.221 20.499 20.895 19.883 19.195 18.732
Per Pupil State Revenue 2312.525 2432.322 2511.227 2706.312 2701.525 2874.236 968.448 1041.725 1092.515 1087.688 1087.373 1160.475
Percent Non-White in Governing Board 19.623 19.545 19.471 27.466 27.372 27.244 28.972 28.875 28.841 33.891 33.891 33.871
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
4th Qntl 
       
 
0.024 
 
 
-0.058 
 
 
0.099* 
 
 
0.086* 
       (0.046) (0.030) (0.040) (0.041) 
Top Qntl       -0.006 -0.006 0.018 -0.007 
       (0.056) (0.045) (0.040) (0.042) 
2nd Qntl 
*Competition 
      -0.019    
       (0.044)    
3rd Qntl*Competition       -0.113**    
       (0.040)    
4th Qntl 
*Competition 
      -0.090*    
       (0.044)    
Top Qntl 
*Competition 
      -0.018    
       (0.052)    
2nd Qntl *At-Large 
DB 
      0.007 0.053 -0.045 -0.051 
       (0.031) (0.038) (0.033) (0.029) 
3rd Qntl *At-Large 
DB 
      -0.052* -0.049* -0.109* -0.109* 
       (0.024) (0.022) (0.046) (0.049) 
4th Qntl *At-Large 
DB 
      -0.044 -0.043 -0.112** -0.102* 
       (0.026) (0.026) (0.042) (0.044) 
Top Qntl *At-Large 
DB 
      -0.052 -0.078* -0.015 0.004 
       (0.031) (0.035) (0.040) (0.044) 
2nd Qntl *Ward DB       0.019 0.071 -0.074* -0.068* 
       (0.035) (0.043) (0.034) (0.031) 
3rd Qntl *Ward DB       -0.073** -0.064* -0.117* -0.109* 
       (0.024) (0.025) (0.049) (0.050) 
4th Qntl *Ward DB       -0.046 -0.037 -0.125** -0.101* 
       (0.026) (0.029) (0.043) (0.044) 
Top Qntl *Ward DB       -0.059 -0.073 -0.029 0.010 
       (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.043) 
2nd Qntl *Mixed DB       -0.006 0.033 -0.057 -0.062 
       (0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.044) 
3rd Qntl *Mixed DB       -0.048 -0.041 -0.123* -0.114 
       (0.036) (0.039) (0.061) (0.063) 
4th Qntl *Mixed DB       -0.064 -0.060 -0.121* -0.102 
       (0.040) (0.039) (0.052) (0.054) 
Top Qntl *Mixed DB       -0.094* -0.118** -0.091 -0.062 
       (0.043) (0.044) (0.056) (0.058) 
Intercept 6.080*** 6.040*** 5.320** 6.240*** 2.550 5.040 5.300*** 5.430*** 5.340** 6.160*** 
 (0.438) (0.453) (1.670) (1.660) (3.240) (52.100) (0.467) (0.477) (1.630) (1.570) 
R2 (Within for FE 
Models) 
  0.467 0.467 0.415 0.416   0.470 0.472 
R2 (Between)   0.240 0.237 0.173 0.210   0.240 0.260 
R2 (Overall) 0.771 0.771 0.251 0.254 0.177 0.226 0.786 0.784 0.250 0.276 
Correlation: time-
invariant school 
district effects and Xb 
  -0.526 -0.427 -0.768 -0.515   -0.522 -0.373 
First-stage F-statistics     182.67*** 923.95***     
N 25419 25419 25494 25494 23821 23803 25419 25419 25494 25494 
Notes: a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies.  
c. The pooled cross-section models additionally control for State dummies, Region and State court rulings against education funding 
system. 
d. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table 4.4: Effects of Inter-School District Competition and Political Institutions (Elected School 
Superintendent) on Log of Per Pupil Spending by School Districts 
 Models without Interactions Models with Interactions 
 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects: IV Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed 
Effects: 
IV 
Variables 
 
 
Herfin-
dahl 
Index 
Enrol-
ment 
Weigh- 
Herfin-
dahl 
Index 
Enrol-
ment 
Weigh- 
Herfin-
dahl Index 
Enrol-
ment 
Weigh-ted  
Herfin-
dahl 
Index 
Enrol-
ment 
Weighted  
Herfin-
dahl 
Index 
Enrol-
ment 
Weigh- 
Herfin-
dahl Index 
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Table 4.4 (continued)  
ted 
Count  
 
ted 
Count  
 
Count  
 
Count  
 
ted 
Count  
School Dist 
Competition 
0.047 -0.021 0.748** -0.375 2.090 -0.021 0.089 -0.047 0.763** -0.386 2.060 
 (0.033) (0.054) (0.281) (0.339) (3.850) (380.000) (0.047) (0.054) (0.284) (0.339) (3.160) 
Elected 
Superintendent 
0.028 0.028 0.071** 0.070** 0.060*** 0.061 0.038 -0.050 -0.018 -0.015 -0.022 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (1.550) (0.032) (0.029) (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) 
El_Supdt 
*Competition 
      -0.081*     
       (0.038)     
2nd Qntl       -0.100* -0.075*** 0.015 0.016 0.002 
       (0.049) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024) (0.010) 
3rd Qntl       0.022 -0.102*** 0.006 0.006 -0.010 
       (0.038) (0.018) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) 
4th Qntl       0.004 -0.102*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.019 
       (0.045) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021) 
Top Qntl       -0.014 -0.077** -0.006 -0.008 -0.022 
       (0.059) (0.028) (0.033) (0.032) (0.024) 
2nd Qntl 
*Competition 
      0.042     
       (0.058)     
3rd Qntl 
*Competition 
      -
0.153*** 
    
       (0.046)     
4th Qntl 
*Competition 
      -0.127*     
       (0.055)     
Top Qntl 
*Competition 
      -0.080     
       (0.072)     
2nd Qntl *El_Supdt       0.090** 0.077** 0.074* 0.072** 0.120 
       (0.035) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.098) 
3rd Qntl *El_Supdt       0.023 0.085** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.078* 
       (0.028) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) 
4th Qntl *El_Supdt       0.054 0.104** 0.100** 0.095** 0.098** 
       (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) 
Top Qntl *El_Supdt       0.014 0.048 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 
       (0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
Intercept 6.320*** 6.260*** 5.590*** 6.340*** 2.610 4.340 5.740*** 5.770*** 5.550*** 6.310*** 2.460 
 (0.449) (0.462) (1.610) (1.610) (3.010) (3.290) (0.501) (0.510) (1.630) (1.630) (2.560) 
R2 (Within: FE 
Models) 
  0.471 0.471 0.415 0.419   0.472 0.471 0.416 
R2 (Between)   0.233 0.245 0.172 0.304   0.231 0.242 0.175 
R2 (Overall) 0.769 0.768 0.246 0.264 0.177 0.315 0.779 0.776 0.244 0.261 0.180 
Correlation: time-
invariant school 
district effects and 
Xb 
  -0.486 -0.353 -0.766 -0.327   -0.496 -0.363 -0.761 
First-stage F-
statistics 
    196.03*** 1002.09***     148.14*** 
N 25419 25419 25494 25494 23821 23803 25419 25419 25494 25494 23821 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies.  
c. The pooled cross-section models additionally control for State dummies, Region and State court rulings against education funding 
system.  
d. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table 4.5: Effects of Inter-School District Competition and Political Institutions (Dependent School 
Districts) on Log of Per Pupil Spending by School Districts 
 Models without Interactions Models with Interactions 
 Pooled OLS Random Effects Pooled OLS Random 
Effects 
 
Variables 
Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count  
Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count  
Herfindahl 
Index 
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count  
Enrollment 
Weighted 
Count  
School Dist Competition 0.029 -0.053 -0.158 0.031 -0.007 -0.112* 0.053 
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Table 4.5 (continued)  
(0.032) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.085) 
Dependent School 
Districts 
-0.157*** -0.163*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.357*** -0.348*** -0.043 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.034) (0.035) (0.059) (0.046) (0.046) 
DepSchdist*Competition     0.254*** 0.992*** -0.460* 
     (0.057) (0.159) (0.192) 
2nd Income Quintile     -0.035   
     (0.040)   
3rd Income Quintile     -0.004   
     (0.036)   
4th Income Quintile     -0.015   
     (0.040)   
Top Income Quintile     -0.048   
     (0.047)   
2nd Qntl*Competition     -0.026   
     (0.050)   
3rd Qntl*Competition     -0.108*   
     (0.045)   
4th Qntl*Competition     -0.086   
     (0.050)   
Top Qntl*Competition     -0.014   
     (0.059)   
Intercept 6.290*** 6.290*** 4.380*** 4.440*** 5.933*** 6.468*** 4.382*** 
 (0.462) (0.473) (0.434) (0.460) (0.516) (0.456) (0.461) 
R2 (Within: RE Models)   0.397 0.397   0.397 
R2 (Between)   0.631 0.624   0.629 
R2 (Overall) 0.773 0.773 0.594 0.589 0.785 0.778 0.593 
N 25419 25419 25494 25494 25419 25419 25494 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies.  
c. The pooled cross-section models additionally control for State dummies, Region and State court rulings against education funding 
system. 
d. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table 4.3.1. Significance of Differences in Marginal Effects of School District Competition Log of Per 
Pupil Spending Across School Districts Grouped by Political Institutions (Fixed Effects Model Using 
Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA) 
Marginal Effects of School District Competition Across School 
Districts Grouped by Political Institutions a 
dy/dx 
Contrast 
Bonferroni 
P-Value 
Ward DB - Appointed DB 0.608 0.034 
Mixed DB - Appointed DB 0.527 0.090 
Ward DB - At-Large DB 0.212 0.000 
a Marginal Effect of Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts is negative and statistically significant for school districts 
with appointed boards only (b=-0.830; p=0.033). For other school districts grouped by different types of district boards, the marginal 
effects of Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts are negative but statistically not significant. 
 
Table 4.3.2. Significance of Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across 
School Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Level of School District Competition 
(Fixed Effects Model Using Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA) 
Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across School 
Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Level 
of School District Competition 
Contrast Bonferroni 
P-Values 
Ward DB & Low Competition - At-Large DB & Low Competition -0.041 0.024 
Note: Bonferroni P-Values used to avoid Type-I Error (Rejecting the true null hypothesis) 
 
 
Table 4.3.3. Significance of Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Total Spending Across 
School Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Median Household Income Rankings 
(Fixed Effects Model Using Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA) 
Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across  Contrast Bonferroni 
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Table 4.3.3 (continued) 
 
School Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and 
Median Household Income Rankings 
 
 
P-Values 
Appointed & 2nd Qntl - Appointed & Lowest Qntl 0.224 0.031 
 
Table 4.4.1. Significance of Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across 
School Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Median Household Income Rankings 
(Fixed Effects Model Using Herfindahl Index in an MSA) 
Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across School 
Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Median Household 
Income Rankings 
Contrast Bonferroni 
P-Value 
Elected Superintendent & Top Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & Top Quintile 0.088 0.062 
 
Table 4.4.2. Significance of Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across 
School Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Median Household Income Rankings 
(Fixed Effects Model Using Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA) 
Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across School 
Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Median Household 
Income Rankings 
Contrast Bonferroni 
P-Value 
Elected Superintendent & 2nd Quintile - Elected Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.220 0.008 
Elected Superintendent & Top Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & Top Quintile 0.089 0.046 
 
Table 4.4.3. Significance of Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across 
School Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Median Household Income Rankings 
(Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable Model Using Herfindahl Index in an MSA) 
Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across School Districts 
Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Median Household Income Rankings 
Contrast Bonferroni 
P-Value 
Elected Superintendent & Top Quintile - Elected Superintendent & 4th Quintile 0.153 0.001 
Elected Superintendent & Top Quintile - Elected Superintendent & 3rd Quintile 0.263 0.000 
Elected Superintendent & Top Quintile - Elected Superintendent & 2nd Quintile 0.311 0.038 
Elected Superintendent & Top Quintile - Elected Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.542 0.000 
Elected Superintendent & 4th Quintile - Elected Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.389 0.000 
Elected Superintendent & 3rd Quintile - Elected Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.280 0.000 
Elected Superintendent & 2nd Quintile - Elected Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.232 0.096 
Appointed Superintendent & Top Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & 4th Quintile 0.154 0.000 
Appointed Superintendent & Top Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & 3rd Quintile 0.244 0.000 
Appointed Superintendent & Top Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & 2nd Quintile 0.334 0.001 
Appointed Superintendent & Top Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.446 0.000 
Appointed Superintendent & 4th Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.291 0.000 
Appointed Superintendent & 3rd Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & Bottom Quintile 0.202 0.000 
Elected Superintendent & 4th Quintile - Appointed Superintendent & 4th Quintile 0.076 0.051 
 
Table 4.5.1. Significance of Differences in Marginal Effects of School District Competition on Log of Per 
Pupil Spending Across School Districts Grouped by Political Institutions (Random Effects Model Using 
Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA) 
Marginal Effects of School District Competition on Log of Per Pupil 
Spending Across School Districts Grouped by Political Institutions 
dy/dx 
Contrast 
Unadjusted 
P-Value 
Fiscally Dependent School District - Fiscally Independent School District a -0.460 0.017 
a  Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA has positive and non-significant effect (b=0.053; p=0.533) for 
independent school districts. For dependent school districts, Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA has 
negative and significant effect (b=-0.406; p=0.031).
 
Table 4.5.2. Significance of differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across 
School Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Levels of School District Competition 
(Random Effects Model Using Student Enrollment Weighted Count of School Districts in an MSA) 
Differences in Marginal Predictions of Log of Per Pupil Spending Across School 
Districts Grouped by Type of Local Political Institutions and Levels of School 
District Competition 
Contrast Bonferroni 
P-Value 
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Table 4.5.2 (continued) 
 
Dependent SD & Average Competition - Independent SD & Average Competition 
 
 
-0.111 
 
 
0.008 
Dependent SD & High Competition - Independent SD & High Competition -0.167 0.000 
 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics by Year - Student Achievement  
Variable 1990 
 
1992 
 
Variable 1990  1992  
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Reading Score 49.393 10.123 50.419 10.253 Elected Superintendents 0.132 0.339 0.147 0.354 
Math Score 49.383 10.673 50.372 10.511 Fiscally Dependent SDs 0.418 0.493 0.387 0.487 
8th Gr. Reading 
Score 
50.464 10.203 51.136 10.078 Lowest Quintile SDs 0.097 0.297 0.091 0.287 
8th Gr. Math Score 50.746 10.583 51.259 10.780 2nd Qntl SDs 0.594 0.491 0.589 0.492 
White 0.366 0.482 0.379 0.485 3rd Income Quintile SDs 0.126 0.332 0.139 0.346 
Black 0.317 0.465 0.312 0.463 4th Income Quintile SDs 0.107 0.309 0.109 0.311 
Hispanic 0.183 0.387 0.177 0.382 
Top Income Quintile 
SDs 
0.075 0.264 0.073 0.259 
Asian 0.117 0.321 0.112 0.315 % Non-white in SBs 18.614 27.140 19.255 27.535 
American Indian 0.017 0.128 0.021 0.142 
Fiscal Capacity: % Per-
Pupil Revenue from 
Local Sources 
41.747 15.513 38.318 17.749 
Male 0.502 0.500 1.480 0.500 Per-Pupil State Revenue 2994.90 882.64 3107.40 923.04 
Lowest SES Qntl 0.302 0.459 0.283 0.450 Log-Per-Pupil St. Rev. 7.945 0.394 7.980 0.416 
2nd SES Quintile 0.224 0.417 0.218 0.413 
Log-Total SD 
Population 
14.402 1.603 14.399 1.519 
3rd SES Quintile 0.212 0.409 0.216 0.411 Total SD Population 3733810 2926200 3620380 2907050 
Top SES Quintile 0.261 0.439 0.283 0.451 Total MSA Population 5843260 3453980 5831160 3508330 
% Minority-8th 56.636 35.578 56.597 35.994 Log- MSA Population 15.164 1.219 15.185 1.109 
% Free Lunch-8th 33.792 34.076 33.232 34.119 
Proportion of 5-17 Years 
Pop. 
0.169 0.020 0.173 0.018 
St.-Teacher 
Ratio:8th 
19.886 6.279 19.931 6.098 % with HS or more 70.327 7.481 70.971 7.709 
Private School 0.227 0.419 0.258 0.437 % Foreign Born Pop. 24.258 13.315 25.323 13.747 
North East 0.360 0.480 0.324 0.468 % Non-white Pop. 40.260 15.393 41.253 15.517 
North Central 0.098 0.297 0.094 0.292 
Racial Diversity Index: 
MSA 
0.498 0.136 0.515 0.140 
South 0.245 0.430 0.256 0.436 Median HH Income 30330.19 5577.95 32435.03 6165.57 
West 0.297 0.457 0.325 0.469 Log-Median HH Income 10.306 0.163 10.372 0.164 
Herfinhahl Index 0.541 0.308 0.560 0.308 
% Owner Occupied 
Housing 
43.671 14.638 44.892 14.658 
Weighted Count of 
SDs 
0.063 0.062 0.060 0.061 Median Housing Values 154313.1 66793.7 158964.5 65607.1 
Appointed SBs 0.520 0.500 0.483 0.500 
% Local Revenue-
Property Tax 
38.847 35.982 48.218 39.001 
At-Large SBs 0.334 0.472 0.364 0.481 % Population in Poverty 17.753 6.586 17.764 6.316 
Ward-Based SBs 0.096 0.294 0.100 0.299 
% 65 Years & above 
Pop. 
11.611 2.673 11.413 2.610 
Mixed SBs 0.050 0.219 0.053 0.225 
% Public Sector 
Employees Under 
Collective Bargaining 
54.461 18.306 53.519 17.109 
 
 
Table 5.2: Results of the Hausman-Taylor Regression Models - Type of School District Governing Board 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
2nd Lowest Qntl 
0.369 
(0.337) 
0.406 
(0.366) 
5.070 
(3.050) 
-0.032 
(0.270) 
0.369 
(0.359) 
-0.833 
(1.030) 
0.002 
(0.231) 
-0.028 
(0.250) 
-0.786 
(1.980) 
-0.047 
(0.197) 
-0.074 
(0.257) 
0.730 
(0.741) 
3rd Qntl 
0.455 
(0.420) 
0.603 
(0.451) 
4.360 
(3.310) 
-0.014 
(0.350) 
0.557 
(0.434) 
-0.954 
(1.210) 
-0.072 
(0.291) 
-0.166 
(0.312) 
-0.873 
(2.160) 
-0.187 
(0.256) 
-0.346 
(0.311) 
1.320 
(0.876) 
4th Qntl 
-0.156 
(0.473) 
-0.124 
(0.482) 
4.950 
(3.470) 
-0.601 
(0.431) 
-0.250 
(0.475) 
-1.410 
(1.230) 
-0.143 
(0.326) 
-0.207 
(0.338) 
0.849 
(2.290) 
-0.335 
(0.313) 
-0.415 
(0.340) 
1.310 
(0.891) 
Top Qntl 
0.120 
(0.587) 
0.193 
(0.600) 
5.140 
(3.540) 
-0.406 
(0.541) 
0.177 
(0.601) 
-0.842 
(1.340) 
-0.138 
(0.395) 
-0.271 
(0.410) 
-0.161 
(2.340) 
-0.335 
(0.393) 
-0.594 
(0.430) 
1.080 
(0.969) 
School District 
Competition 
3.990 
(2.160) 
4.390 
(5.410) 
12.400 
(7.050) 
-0.101 
(3.190) 
17.100 
(15.00) 
12.200 
(15.70) 
0.518 
(1.540) 
-1.130 
(3.800) 
0.155 
(4.740) 
-0.524 
(2.300) 
4.100 
(10.700) 
11.000 
(11.200) 
At-Large DB 
-0.132 
(0.344) 
1.700 
(4.760) 
3.540 
(4.920) 
-0.142 
(0.337) 
1.150 
(1.500) 
1.220 
(1.510) 
-0.296 
(0.299) 
-0.051 
(3.400) 
1.240 
(3.470) 
-0.273 
(0.249) 
0.837 
(1.070) 
0.694 
(1.080) 
Ward-based  0.165 2.300 6.020 -0.018 4.250* 4.340* -0.283 -13.400 -9.080 -0.273 -1.780 -1.930 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
 
 
DB 
 
 
 
(0.404) 
 
 
 
(11.40) 
 
 
 
(11.70) 
 
 
 
(0.386) 
 
 
 
(2.110) 
 
 
 
(2.150) 
 
 
 
(0.344) 
 
 
 
(7.990) 
 
 
 
(8.040) 
 
 
 
(0.285) 
 
 
 
(1.510) 
 
 
 
(1.540) 
Mixed DB 
-0.404 
(0.420) 
-4.640 
(6.830) 
-1.820 
(7.310) 
-0.352 
(0.411) 
-3.560 
(2.950) 
-3.670 
(3.060) 
0.282 
(0.369) 
4.670 
(4.940) 
6.990 
(5.180) 
0.287 
(0.305) 
1.360 
(2.120) 
2.460 
(2.210) 
At-Large DB 
*Competition  
-2.350 
(6.730) 
-4.990 
(6.940)  
-17.400 
(16.10) 
-17.000 
(16.10)  
-0.030 
(4.780) 
-2.090 
(4.870)  
-7.660 
(11.500) 
-9.040 
(11.600) 
Ward DB 
*Competition  
-2.970 
(16.70) 
-8.410 
(17.20)  
-42.800 
(22.30) 
-42.300 
(22.70)  
19.200 
(11.700) 
12.700 
(11.800)  
12.700 
(15.900) 
12.100 
(16.300) 
Mixed DB 
*Competition  
5.870 
(9.470) 
1.990 
(10.10)  
7.810 
(21.50) 
9.610 
(22.20)  
-6.100 
(6.850) 
-9.310 
(7.160)  
-8.420 
(15.300) 
-16.300 
(15.900) 
2nd Qntl 
*Competition   
-5.690 
(3.660)   
5.460 
(4.430)   
0.932 
(2.370)   
-3.580 
(3.210) 
3rd Qntl 
*Competition   
-4.590 
(4.030)   
7.100 
(5.490)   
0.823 
(2.620)   
-8.300* 
(3.970) 
4th Qntl 
*Competition   
-6.250 
(4.280)   
5.360 
(5.830)   
-1.310 
(2.810)   
-9.030* 
(4.220) 
Top Qntl 
*Competition   
-6.070 
(4.390)   
4.250 
(7.620)   
0.000 
(2.870)   
-8.780 
(5.500) 
Intercept 
3.870 
(22.70) 
-5.000 
(25.40) 
-11.000 
(25.60) 
0.527 
(22.70) 
4.490 
(23.30) 
5.460 
(26.00) 
15.300 
(15.500) 
22.600 
(17.600) 
24.000 
(17.400) 
5.650 
(16.400) 
7.170 
(16.800) 
3.940 
(18.700) 
Chi-Square Statistics 
12171*
** 
9557**
* 
9035**
* 
12765*
** 
11390*
** 
11483*
** 
19555**
* 
15942**
* 
14312**
* 
29133**
* 
27233**
* 
27409*** 
sigma_u 7.990 9.810 10.200 7.690 8.390 8.340 7.580 8.640 9.430 5.230 5.570 5.490 
sigma_e 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 
Rho 0.787 0.848 0.858 0.774 0.803 0.801 0.887 0.911 0.924 0.789 0.809 0.805 
N 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 10th Grade Reading & Math Scores 
Variable 10th Grade Reading Scores 10th Grade Math Scores 
 
Herfindahl Index 
Weighted Count of 
SDs 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School District 
Competition 
-0.157 
(0.439) 
0.135 
(1.418) 
1.050 
(1.020) 
-0.892 
(1.070) 
-5.215 
(5.016) 
0.146 
(0.442) 
-0.834 
(1.541) 
0.187 
(1.150) 
0.331 
(0.881) 
-7.784 
(5.518) 
-5.550 
(3.800) 
At-Large District 
Board 
-0.316 
(0.494) 
-1.120 
(1.200) 
0.934 
(0.684) 
-0.328 
(0.490) 
-1.520 
(1.120) 
-0.186 
(0.394) 
0.192 
(1.130) 
0.022 
(0.748) 
-0.185 
(0.397) 
-0.496 
(1.060) 
-0.731 
(0.535) 
Ward-based District 
Board 
-0.307 
(0.523) 
0.183 
(1.560) 
0.139 
(0.699) 
-0.324 
(0.518) 
0.289 
(1.380) 
-0.142 
(0.410) 
0.696 
(1.310) 
-0.467 
(0.838) 
-0.141 
(0.414) 
0.418 
(1.110) 
-0.651 
(0.582) 
Mixed District 
Board 
-0.518 
(0.548) 
-2.070 
(1.740) 
-2.010 
(1.150) 
-0.533 
(0.548) 
-0.291 
(1.120) 
0.348 
(0.412) 
-0.379 
(1.400) 
-0.477 
(0.941) 
0.351 
(0.415) 
-0.137 
(1.210) 
-0.530 
(0.692) 
2nd Lowest Income 
Quintile 
0.098 
(0.317) 
-0.411 
(1.410) 
0.299 
(0.341) 
0.083 
(0.311) 
-1.150 
(0.956) 
0.168 
(0.280) 
-0.228 
(1.430) 
0.225 
(0.286) 
0.166 
(0.274) 
0.107 
(0.987) 
0.185 
(0.282) 
3rd Income Quintile 
-0.006 
(0.422) 
0.051 
(1.370) 
0.229 
(0.448) 
-0.015 
(0.418) 
-0.266 
(1.040) 
0.123 
(0.319) 
0.231 
(1.620) 
0.200 
(0.326) 
0.118 
(0.312) 
0.905 
(1.240) 
0.163 
(0.320) 
4th Income Quintile 
-0.417 
(0.442) 
-0.756 
(1.320) 
-0.187 
(0.477) 
-0.434 
(0.436) 
-1.640 
(1.090) 
-0.164 
(0.344) 
-1.240 
(1.210) 
-0.096 
(0.348) 
-0.167 
(0.338) 
-0.627 
(0.808) 
-0.128 
(0.342) 
Top Income 
Quintile 
-0.508 
(0.615) 
-0.163 
(1.930) 
-0.223 
(0.662) 
-0.524 
(0.607) 
-1.670 
(1.710) 
-0.022 
(0.447) 
0.796 
(1.290) 
0.059 
(0.450) 
-0.028 
(0.438) 
0.889 
(0.977) 
0.021 
(0.445) 
At-Large DB 
*Competition  
0.038 
(1.040) 
-1.670 
(0.997)  
3.230 
(4.850)  
-0.006 
(1.110) 
-0.267 
(1.100)  
6.970 
(5.450) 
5.750 
(3.810) 
Ward DB 
*Competition  
0.056 
(1.150) 
-0.643 
(1.110)  
-0.048 
(5.090)  
0.297 
(1.350) 
0.438 
(1.220)  
4.710 
(5.780) 
5.390 
(3.990) 
Mixed DB 
*Competition  
1.510 
(1.710) 
1.950 
(1.590)  
-0.269 
(5.230)  
1.580 
(1.480) 
1.090 
(1.330)  
8.570 
(5.960) 
7.500 
(4.300) 
2nd Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.176 
(1.360)   
2.310 
(2.230)  
1.020 
(1.220)   
1.820 
(1.840)  
3rd Quintile 
*Competition  
0.140 
(1.430)   
3.560* 
(1.660)  
1.210 
(1.290)   
2.790 
(1.560)  
4th Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.902 
(1.310)   
0.358 
(1.850)  
1.090 
(1.300)   
1.030 
(1.610)  
Top Quintile 
*Competition  
-1.950 
(1.410)   
-1.800 
(2.380)  
0.395 
(1.290)   
-0.282 
(1.920)  
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2nd Quintile *At-
Large DB 
 
 
 
0.921 
(0.993) 
  
 
 
0.983 
(0.983) 
 
 
 
-0.460 
(0.969) 
  
 
 
-0.391 
(1.090) 
 
3rd Quintile *At-
Large DB  
0.313 
(0.914)   
-0.051 
(0.959)  
-1.090 
(1.300)   
-1.420 
(1.210)  
4th Quintile *At-
Large DB  
1.470 
(1.010)   
1.510 
(1.060)  
0.426 
(0.682)   
0.416 
(0.819)  
Top Quintile *At-
Large DB  
1.400 
(1.650)   
1.600 
(1.620)  
-1.090 
(0.818)   
-0.958 
(0.913)  
2nd Quintile *Ward 
DB  
-0.300 
(1.340)   
-0.323 
(1.310)  
-0.821 
(1.120)   
-0.669 
(1.160)  
3rd Quintile *Ward 
DB  
-1.550 
(1.320)   
-1.690 
(1.370)  
-1.590 
(1.450)   
-1.700 
(1.370)  
4th Quintile *Ward 
DB  
-0.441 
(1.280)   
-0.530 
(1.310)  
-0.881 
(0.790)   
-0.866 
(0.834)  
Top Quintile *Ward 
DB  
1.060 
(1.890)   
1.320 
(1.850)  
-1.360 
(0.986)   
-0.995 
(1.010)  
2nd Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
1.030 
(1.480)   
0.352 
(1.280)  
-0.197 
(1.180)   
-0.168 
(1.240)  
3rd Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
-1.480 
(1.190)   
-2.590* 
(1.180)  
-1.010 
(1.430)   
-1.570 
(1.340)  
4th Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
1.300 
(1.190)   
0.814 
(1.330)  
-0.229 
(1.680)   
0.017 
(1.820)  
Top Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
2.710 
(2.030)   
2.640 
(2.020)  
-1.850 
(0.987)   
-1.480 
(1.060)  
Intercept 
16.700 
(9.420) 
19.900* 
(9.650) 
20.500* 
(9.620) 
17.800 
(9.530) 
20.000* 
(9.070) 
8.880 
(7.820) 
10.700 
(7.540) 
10.500 
(7.790) 
8.320 
(7.530) 
8.150 
(7.390) 
9.340 
(7.720) 
Log-MSA Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
-0.256 
(0.136) 
-0.335* 
(0.146) 
-0.295* 
(0.140) 
-0.261 
(0.139) 
-0.345* 
(0.153) 
-0.483*** 
(0.146) 
-0.469** 
(0.146) 
-0.471** 
(0.145) 
-0.482** 
(0.147) 
-0.478** 
(0.150) 
-0.476** 
(0.148) 
Log-Residual 
Random Effects (Std. 
Dev.) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.740*** 
(0.010) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.740*** 
(0.010) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
Chi-Square Statistics 29797*** 36810*** 30706*** 29825*** 41164*** 33099*** 43742*** 33592*** 34540*** 45833*** 34499*** 
Loglikelihood -30707 -30690 -30703 -30707 -30687 -28575 -28566 -28574 -28575 -28563 -28574 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
Table 5.3.1: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with Different Income Levels on 
Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R5 with Weighted Count of School District in Table 5.3) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Weighted Count of School 
District Competition 
Contrast  
Bonferroni 
P-Value 
Top Quintile Sch_Dist – 3rd Quintile Sch_Dist -5.366 0.085 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
Table 5.3.2: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Boards and School Districts with 
Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R5 with Weighted Count of School 
District in Table 5.3) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Board Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 4th Qntl*Ward_SB 3.480 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 3rd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.601 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 2nd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.586 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - Lowest Qntl*Ward_SB 5.510 0.000 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - 3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB 6.836 0.000 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - 2nd Qntl*Mixed_SB 5.238 0.054 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 6.851 0.000 
4th Qntl*Mixed_SB - 3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB 3.382 0.055 
4th Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 3.396 0.001 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 4th Qntl*At-Large_SB 1.785 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.128 0.000 
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Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 
 
 
3.492 
 
 
0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 5.531 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - 3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB 1.344 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 1.707 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.747 0.000 
3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.403 0.000 
2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.039 0.000 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 12th Grade Reading & Math Scores 
Variable 12th Grade Reading Score 12th Grade Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M4 M5 M6 
School District 
Competition 
-0.793 
(0.537) 
-1.669 
(1.438) 
-1.530 
(0.805) 
-1.820 
(1.650) 
-1.246 
(5.135) 
-0.531 
(4.520) 
0.250 
(0.593) 
-4.727** 
(1.573) 
1.790 
(1.270) 
-4.602 
(7.806) 
-2.890 
(7.310) 
At-Large District Board 
-0.561 
(0.430) 
-1.260 
(1.150) 
-1.330 
(1.110) 
-0.549 
(0.431) 
-0.284 
(1.130) 
-0.442 
(1.120) 
-0.338 
(0.438) 
-2.360 
(1.230) 
-0.325 
(0.441) 
-0.436 
(1.530) 
-0.370 
(1.490) 
Ward-based District 
Board 
-0.210 
(0.417) 
1.340 
(1.320) 
1.170 
(1.300) 
-0.200 
(0.419) 
1.230 
(1.120) 
1.170 
(1.130) 
-0.179 
(0.454) 
-1.020 
(1.520) 
-0.157 
(0.453) 
0.414 
(1.650) 
0.342 
(1.710) 
Mixed District Board 
-0.893 
(0.516) 
-2.260 
(1.690) 
-2.500 
(1.670) 
-0.875 
(0.516) 
-0.093 
(1.430) 
-0.206 
(1.430) 
-0.038 
(0.478) 
-1.030 
(1.530) 
-0.047 
(0.479) 
-0.968 
(1.550) 
-1.020 
(1.510) 
2nd Lowest Income 
Quintile 
0.141 
(0.390) 
0.110 
(1.510) 
0.146 
(0.929) 
0.164 
(0.384) 
0.450 
(1.050) 
0.477 
(1.010) 
-0.171 
(0.342) 
-2.440 
(1.450) 
-0.151 
(0.340) 
0.403 
(1.360) 
0.477 
(1.290) 
3rd Income Quintile 
-0.148 
(0.470) 
0.758 
(1.610) 
1.230 
(1.130) 
-0.102 
(0.464) 
1.010 
(1.120) 
1.220 
(1.110) 
-0.216 
(0.439) 
-1.460 
(1.630) 
-0.213 
(0.432) 
0.955 
(1.530) 
1.250 
(1.430) 
4th Income Quintile 
-0.281 
(0.491) 
-1.970 
(1.440) 
-1.790 
(1.050) 
-0.251 
(0.486) 
-1.970 
(1.020) 
-1.630 
(1.030) 
-0.663 
(0.535) 
-4.170** 
(1.480) 
-0.634 
(0.529) 
-2.310 
(1.250) 
-2.190 
(1.210) 
Top Income Quintile 
0.202 
(0.613) 
-0.483 
(1.710) 
-0.514 
(1.230) 
0.241 
(0.609) 
-0.626 
(1.220) 
-0.543 
(1.240) 
-0.293 
(0.621) 
-2.530 
(1.420) 
-0.278 
(0.617) 
-0.153 
(1.340) 
-0.133 
(1.260) 
At-Large DB 
*Competition  
0.592 
(1.000) 
0.655 
(0.793)  
-2.300 
(4.530) 
-2.000 
(4.280)  
2.680* 
(1.240)  
5.220 
(7.440) 
4.070 
(7.130) 
Ward DB *Competition 
 
0.659 
(1.100) 
0.804 
(1.040)  
3.410 
(4.550) 
4.040 
(4.450)  
2.940* 
(1.330)  
7.950 
(7.560) 
7.770 
(7.370) 
Mixed DB 
*Competition  
1.610 
(1.600) 
1.870 
(1.530)  
-3.650 
(5.500) 
-3.370 
(5.080)  
1.590 
(1.540)  
8.120 
(7.840) 
7.590 
(7.390) 
2nd Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.001 
(1.580)   
-1.730 
(2.870)   
2.780* 
(1.250)  
-0.239 
(2.470) 
 
3rd Quintile 
*Competition  
0.653 
(1.590)   
2.570 
(2.660)   
3.200* 
(1.330)  
2.870 
(2.500) 
 
4th Quintile 
*Competition  
0.269 
(1.360)   
4.380 
(2.800)   
2.050 
(1.500)  
0.968 
(2.700) 
 
Top Quintile 
*Competition  
0.001 
(1.820)   
0.408 
(3.410)   
2.910* 
(1.450)  
-1.120 
(2.890) 
 
2nd Quintile *At-Large 
DB  
0.125 
(0.959) 
0.091 
(0.955)  
0.242 
(1.030) 
-0.214 
(1.040)  
-0.229 
(1.130)  
-0.734 
(1.350) 
-0.863 
(1.350) 
3rd Quintile *At-Large 
DB  
-1.210 
(1.090) 
-1.160 
(1.110)  
-1.470 
(1.150) 
-1.150 
(1.110)  
-1.360 
(1.300)  
-1.770 
(1.500) 
-1.460 
(1.440) 
4th Quintile *At-Large 
DB  
1.650 
(1.090) 
1.670 
(1.100)  
1.110 
(1.120) 
1.510 
(1.100)  
1.990 
(1.130)  
1.550 
(1.360) 
1.640 
(1.300) 
Top Quintile *At-Large 
DB  
0.854 
(1.180) 
0.863 
(1.180)  
0.821 
(1.270) 
0.866 
(1.230)  
-0.173 
(1.090)  
-0.174 
(1.240) 
-0.282 
(1.220) 
2nd Quintile *Ward DB 
 
-2.730* 
(1.120) 
-2.680* 
(1.130)  
-2.500* 
(1.140) 
-2.680* 
(1.180)  
-0.812 
(1.340)  
-1.120 
(1.550) 
-1.090 
(1.590) 
3rd Quintile *Ward DB 
 
-3.940** 
(1.210) 
-3.890** 
(1.220)  
-3.910** 
(1.200) 
-3.760** 
(1.220)  
-2.900 
(1.560)  
-3.190 
(1.730) 
-2.990 
(1.790) 
4th Quintile *Ward 
DB  
-0.481 
(1.130) 
-0.424 
(1.120)  
-0.296 
(1.100) 
-0.186 
(1.130)  
0.066 
(1.270)  
0.085 
(1.440) 
0.212 
(1.510) 
Top Quintile *Ward 
DB  
-0.878 
(1.180) 
-0.838 
(1.160)  
-0.695 
(1.290) 
-0.796 
(1.280)  
-1.370 
(1.320)  
-1.020 
(1.500) 
-1.180 
(1.580) 
2nd Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
0.975 
(1.780) 
1.040 
(1.790)  
0.075 
(1.710) 
0.014 
(1.740)  
-0.399 
(1.470)  
-0.352 
(1.630) 
-0.304 
(1.640) 
3rd Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
-2.330 
(1.520) 
-2.330 
(1.540)  
-3.140* 
(1.470) 
-2.910* 
(1.430)  
-2.230 
(1.470)  
-2.020 
(1.610) 
-1.820 
(1.550) 
4th Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
2.980 
(1.780) 
3.010 
(1.780)  
2.180 
(1.870) 
2.590 
(1.820)  
3.060* 
(1.410)  
3.120* 
(1.500) 
3.230* 
(1.460) 
Top Quintile *Mixed 
DB  
-0.036 
(1.460) 
-0.027 
(1.440)  
-0.209 
(1.510) 
-0.193 
(1.460)  
-0.665 
(1.520)  
-0.151 
(1.560) 
-0.305 
(1.540) 
Intercept 
13.800 
(12.300) 
16.900 
(13.400) 
16.900 
(12.200) 
17.300 
(12.500) 
17.300 
(12.600) 
17.500 
(12.200) 
10.000 
(11.300) 
15.600 
(11.300) 
7.800 
(10.900) 
4.700 
(11.300) 
6.630 
(10.800) 
Log-MSA Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
-0.161 
(0.209) 
-0.155 
(0.206) 
-0.161 
(0.205) 
-0.153 
(0.207) 
-0.195 
(0.217) 
-0.182 
(0.213) 
-0.254 
(0.168) 
-0.273 
(0.179) 
-0.257 
(0.166) 
-0.294 
(0.173) 
-0.262 
(0.164) 
Log-Residual Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
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Chi-Square Statistics 
 
 
17597*** 
 
 
23743*** 
 
 
21780*** 
 
 
18050*** 
 
 
21526*** 
 
 
20926*** 
 
 
29687*** 
 
 
44199*** 
 
 
30432*** 
 
 
43406*** 
 
 
40587*** 
Loglikelihood -24211 -24200 -24201 -24211 -24194 -24198 -22482 -22465 -22481 -22464 -22467 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table 5.4.1: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Boards and School Districts with Different Income 
Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Reading Score (the Model R3 with Herfindahl Index in Table 5.4) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Board Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 4th Qntl*Ward_SB 2.836 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 3rd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.392 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 2nd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.939 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - Lowest Qntl*Ward_SB 3.983 0.000 
4th Qntl*Ward_SB - 2nd Qntl*Ward_SB 2.103 0.010 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 4th Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.433 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.348 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.848 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 5.683 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 1.416 0.032 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.250 0.000 
3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.335 0.000 
2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 1.834 0.001 
Top Qntl*App_SB - 2nd Qntl*App_SB 2.975 0.003 
Top Qntl*App_DB - Lowest Qntl*App_SB 4.816 0.001 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 4.799 0.001 
Lowest Qntl*App_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.625 0.000 
Lowest Qntl*Ward_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.621 0.000 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
Table 5.4.2: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Boards and School Districts with Different Income 
Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Reading Score (the Model R6 with Weighted Count of School District in Table 5.4) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Board Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 4th Qntl*Ward_SB 2.550 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 3rd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.148 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 2nd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.412 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - Lowest Qntl*Ward_SB 3.582 0.000 
4th Qntl*Ward_SB - 2nd Qntl*Ward_SB 1.862 0.039 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - 3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB 4.107 0.006 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 4.711 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 4th Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.395 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.365 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.844 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 5.673 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB – 3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB 0.969 0.075 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 1.449 0.019 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.278 0.000 
3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.308 0.000 
2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 1.829 0.001 
Top Qntl*App_SB - 2nd Qntl*App_SB 2.686 0.082 
Top Qntl*App_DB - Lowest Qntl*App_SB 4.665 0.003 
3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB - 3rd Qntl*App_SB -3.700 0.010 
Lowest Qntl*Ward_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.914 0.006 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
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Table 5.4.3: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Boards and School Districts with 
Different Income Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Math Score (the Model M2 with Herfindahl Index in Table 5.4) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Board Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 4th Qntl*Ward_SB 3.904 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 3rd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.619 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 2nd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.728 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - Lowest Qntl*Ward_SB 6.430 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_SB - 4th Qntl*App_SB 5.117 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_SB – 3rd Qntl*App_SB 2.753 0.057 
Top Qntl*App_SB - 2nd Qntl*App_SB 4.830 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_SB - Lowest Qntl*App_SB 6.375 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_SB - Lowest Qntl*App_SB 5.033 0.027 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 4th Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.164 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB 4.241 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 5.305 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 7.628 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.141 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 4.464 0.000 
3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.387 0.000 
2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.323 0.000 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - 3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB 4.504 0.000 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - 2nd Qntl*Mixed_SB 4.813 0.004 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 7.130 0.000 
4th Qntl*Mixed_SB - 3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB 2.994 0.085 
4th Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 5.620 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 2.626 0.000 
4th Qntl*Mixed_SB - 4th Qntl*App_SB 3.234 0.039 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - 4th Qntl*App_SB 1.650 0.052 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
Table 5.4.4: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Boards and School Districts with 
Different Income Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Math Score (the Model M6 with Weighted Count of School District 
in Table 5.4) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Board Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 4th Qntl*Ward_SB 3.758 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 3rd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.648 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - 2nd Qntl*Ward_SB 4.392 0.000 
Top Qntl*Ward_SB - Lowest Qntl*Ward_SB 6.438 0.000 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - 3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB 4.348 0.000 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB – 2nd Qntl*Mixed_SB 4.481 0.014 
Top Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 7.321 0.000 
4th Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 5.711 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Mixed_SB - Lowest Qntl*Mixed_SB 2.973 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 4th Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.147 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB 4.109 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 5.199 0.000 
Top Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 7.594 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - 2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.052 0.000 
4th Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 4.447 0.000 
3rd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 3.486 0.000 
2nd Qntl*At-Large_SB - Lowest Qntl*At-Large_SB 2.395 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_SB - 4th Qntl*App_SB 4.990 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_SB – 3rdQntl*App_SB 3.049 0.034 
Top Qntl*App_SB - 2nd Qntl*App_SB 4.774 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_DB - Lowest Qntl*App_SB 8.164 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_SB - Lowest Qntl*App_SB 5.116 0.036 
4th Qntl*Mixed_SB - 4th Qntl*App_SB 3.158 0.051 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
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Table 5.5: Results of the Hausman-Taylor Regression Models - Elected / Appointed Superintendent 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
2nd Income 
Quintile 
0.341 
(0.338) 
0.154 
(0.340) 
4.290 
(2.990) 
-0.025 
(0.267) 
-0.035 
(0.269) 
-1.010 
(1.030) 
-0.062 
(0.232) 
-0.048 
(0.233) 
-0.795 
(1.950) 
-0.106 
(0.195) 
-0.097 
(0.195) 
0.631 
(0.749) 
3rd Income 
Quintile 
0.323 
(0.391) 
0.316 
(0.393) 
3.990 
(3.250) 
-0.012 
(0.343) 
-0.012 
(0.344) 
-1.010 
(1.240) 
-0.184 
(0.277) 
-0.188 
(0.279) 
-0.229 
(2.140) 
-0.284 
(0.250) 
-0.280 
(0.250) 
1.280 
(0.906) 
4th Income 
Quintile 
-0.323 
(0.438) 
-0.374 
(0.440) 
4.950 
(3.520) 
-0.607 
(0.420) 
-0.607 
(0.420) 
-1.110 
(1.270) 
-0.286 
(0.310) 
-0.268 
(0.313) 
1.170 
(2.330) 
-0.466 
(0.305) 
-0.470 
(0.306) 
1.040 
(0.925) 
Top Income 
Quintile 
-0.085 
(0.549) 
-0.040 
(0.546) 
5.220 
(3.590) 
-0.420 
(0.529) 
-0.411 
(0.529) 
-0.506 
(1.380) 
-0.292 
(0.379) 
-0.318 
(0.378) 
0.152 
(2.380) 
-0.477 
(0.385) 
-0.486 
(0.385) 
0.831 
(1.000) 
School Dist 
Competition 
3.580 
(2.310) 
2.460 
(2.450) 
7.720 
(4.490) 
-0.896 
(3.180) 
-1.070 
(3.200) 
-3.590 
(4.850) 
0.284 
(1.640) 
0.601 
(1.750) 
-0.438 
(3.000) 
-0.675 
(2.290) 
-0.443 
(2.320) 
3.410 
(3.530) 
Elected 
Superintendent 
1.250 
(0.811) 
-3.140 
(3.860) 
-3.760 
(4.240) 
0.079 
(0.439) 
-0.242 
(0.899) 
-0.275 
(0.958) 
0.593 
(0.602) 
3.860 
(2.660) 
2.070 
(2.890) 
0.493 
(0.322) 
0.887 
(0.653) 
0.448 
(0.697) 
El_Supdt 
*Competition  
8.910 
(7.830) 
9.570 
(8.230)  
6.420 
(15.700) 
7.310 
(16.100)  
-7.110 
(5.380) 
-4.520 
(5.600)  
-7.860 
(11.400) 
-3.910 
(11.700) 
2nd Quintile 
*Competition   
-5.060 
(3.610)   
4.520 
(4.480)   
0.903 
(2.350)   
-2.820 
(3.280) 
3rd Quintile 
*Competition   
-4.500 
(4.000)   
4.430 
(5.520)   
-0.001 
(2.610)   
-7.220 
(4.030) 
4th Quintile 
*Competition   
-6.620 
(4.350)   
1.750 
(5.830)   
-1.800 
(2.870)   
-7.370 
(4.250) 
Top Quintile 
*Competition   
-6.550 
(4.460)   
-1.740 
(7.500)   
-0.485 
(2.940)   
-5.760 
(5.460) 
Intercept 
5.620 
(22.700) 
6.750 
(22.300) 
2.730 
(22.500) 
2.380 
(22.700) 
3.740 
(22.800) 
-1.670 
(25.200) 
15.200 
(15.500) 
16.600 
(15.400) 
19.900 
(15.400) 
6.060 
(16.400) 
4.260 
(16.600) 
4.250 
(18.400) 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
12040*** 9151*** 8351*** 12553*** 12337*** 12460*** 20206*** 16081*** 14650*** 29032*** 29297*** 29218*** 
sigma_u 8.080 10.100 10.8 7.810 7.940 7.860 7.380 8.770 9.380 5.250 5.190 5.180 
sigma_e 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 
Rho 0.791 0.856 0.872 0.779 0.785 0.782 0.882 0.913 0.923 0.79 0.786 0.786 
N 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
Table 5.6: Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 10th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable 10th Grade Reading Score 10th Grade Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index 
Weighted Count of 
SDs 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist 
Competition 
-0.041 
(0.469) 
0.254 
(1.151) 
0.313 
(0.516) 
-0.628 
(1.110) 
-3.651** 
(1.285) 
0.531 
(0.485) 
-0.798 
(1.109) 
0.279 
(0.504) 
0.778 
(0.856) 
-0.429 
(1.316) 
0.629 
(0.845) 
Elected 
Superintendent 
0.240 
(0.498) 
-1.100 
(1.060) 
-1.190 
(1.040) 
0.170 
(0.476) 
-3.590*** 
(0.824) 
0.877** 
(0.329) 
-1.730 
(0.969) 
-1.690 
(0.975) 
0.784* 
(0.328) 
-1.170 
(0.758) 
-0.988 
(0.673) 
2nd Income 
Quintile 
0.130 
(0.303) 
0.153 
(1.100) 
0.110 
(0.301) 
0.110 
(0.292) 
-0.778 
(0.486) 
0.113 
(0.283) 
-0.945 
(0.960) 
0.046 
(0.286) 
0.095 
(0.273) 
-0.249 
(0.494) 
0.042 
(0.276) 
3rd Income 
Quintile 
-0.006 
(0.412) 
-1.440 
(1.240) 
-0.092 
(0.410) 
-0.025 
(0.405) 
-1.230* 
(0.599) 
0.010 
(0.323) 
-0.780 
(1.080) 
0.023 
(0.324) 
-0.011 
(0.314) 
-0.402 
(0.551) 
0.004 
(0.318) 
4th Income 
Quintile 
-0.413 
(0.431) 
-0.017 
(1.090) 
-0.508 
(0.430) 
-0.425 
(0.422) 
-1.150 
(0.607) 
-0.334 
(0.341) 
-1.890 
(0.992) 
-0.408 
(0.342) 
-0.349 
(0.332) 
-0.925 
(0.529) 
-0.439 
(0.338) 
Top Income 
Quintile 
-0.516 
(0.599) 
0.065 
(1.390) 
-0.713 
(0.602) 
-0.518 
(0.590) 
-1.130 
(0.828) 
-0.256 
(0.448) 
-0.773 
(1.050) 
-0.318 
(0.451) 
-0.276 
(0.438) 
-0.501 
(0.693) 
-0.357 
(0.447) 
El_Supdt 
*Competition  
-1.900 
(1.160) 
-1.950 
(1.120)  
5.910 
(5.150)  
1.330 
(0.910) 
1.400 
(0.801)  
3.020 
(3.530) 
4.050 
(3.420) 
2nd Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.069 
(1.360)   
3.790* 
(1.860)  
1.240 
(1.200)   
1.210 
(1.760)  
3rd Quintile 
*Competition  
1.720 
(1.490)   
5.070*** 
(1.530)  
0.997 
(1.340)   
1.700 
(1.610)  
4th Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.593 
(1.290)   
2.640 
(1.810)  
1.850 
(1.190)   
2.400 
(1.560)  
Top Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.923 
(1.530)   
1.310 
(2.330)  
0.633 
(1.290)   
0.132 
(2.270)  
2nd Quintile 
*El_Supdt  
0.738 
(1.430) 
0.885 
(1.360)  
2.620* 
(1.160)  
2.76*** 
(0.812) 
2.60*** 
(0.714)  
2.24** 
(0.779) 
2.02** 
(0.641) 
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Table 5.6 (continued) 
 
3rd Quintile 
*El_Supdt 
 
 
 
2.92** 
(0.907) 
 
 
2.47** 
(0.892) 
 
 
 
3.62*** 
(0.874) 
 
 
 
1.020 
(0.789) 
 
 
0.936 
(0.775) 
 
 
 
0.894 
(0.820) 
 
 
0.529 
(0.707) 
4th Quintile 
*El_Supdt  
1.98** 
(0.690) 
2.26*** 
(0.654)  
3.13*** 
(0.731)  
2.37*** 
(0.590) 
2.06*** 
(0.587)  
2.22** 
(0.677) 
1.83*** 
(0.551) 
Top Quintile 
*El_Supdt  
2.500** 
(0.936) 
3.06*** 
(0.790)  
4.02*** 
(0.888)  
2.020** 
(0.701) 
2.170** 
(0.685)  
1.910* 
(0.830) 
1.81** 
(0.663) 
Intercept 
15.900 
(8.860) 
16.600 
(9.120) 
15.900 
(8.680) 
16.400 
(8.910) 
15.600 
(8.680) 
9.200 
(7.770) 
9.260 
(7.950) 
7.600 
(7.830) 
7.560 
(7.340) 
6.220 
(7.280) 
6.480 
(7.330) 
Log-MSA Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
-0.263 
(0.138) 
-0.309* 
(0.148) 
-0.284 
(0.145) 
-0.273 
(0.142) 
-0.298* 
(0.145) 
-0.502*** 
(0.150) 
-0.573*** 
(0.168) 
-0.549*** 
(0.164) 
-0.500** 
(0.154) 
-0.560** 
(0.172) 
-0.537** 
(0.167) 
Log-Residual 
Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.75*** 
(0.009) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
1.53*** 
(0.012) 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
29568*** 1.2E+5*** 1.3E+5*** 29852*** 1.2E+5*** 29630*** 2.3E+5*** 2.2E+5*** 30368*** 2.3E+5*** 2.2E+5*** 
Loglikelihood -30708 -30701 -30704 -30823 -30699 -28574 -28569 -28570 -28575 -28570 -28571 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
 
Table 5.6.1: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Superintendent and School Districts 
with Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R3 with Herfindahl Index of School 
District in Table 5.6) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Superintendent  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.652 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 3.708 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.293 0.001 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 8.356 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.704 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.648 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 1.928 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 3.334 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 3.437 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 5.262 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.406 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.510 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 3.335 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 1.929 0.000 
2nd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 1.825 0.000 
Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt -2.816 0.005 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6.2: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with Different Income Levels on 
Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R5 with Weighted Count of School Districts in Table 5.7) 
Type of School District Income Levels & Weighted Count 
of School Districts Competition 
Contrast  
Bonferroni P-
Value 
3rd Income Qntl - Lowest Income Qntl 5.067 0.009 
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Table 5.6.3: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Superintendent and School Districts 
with Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R5 with Weighted Count of School 
District in Table 5.6) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Superintendent  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.939 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 3.537 0.001 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.702 0.002 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 8.841 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.902 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.304 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.139 0.015 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt  - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 1.934 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 3.355 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 3.427 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 5.292 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.421 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.493 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 3.358 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 1.937 0.000 
2nd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 1.866 0.000 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
Table 5.6.4: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Superintendent and School Districts 
with Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Math Score (the Model M3 with Herfindahl Index of School 
District in Table 5.6) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Superintendent  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt 3.087 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.716 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.334 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 9.464 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.629 0.002 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 1.247 0.103 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 6.377 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 3.748 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.130 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt  - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 2.914 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.330 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.536 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 7.316 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.416 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.622 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 4.402 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 2.986 0.000 
2nd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 2.780 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 1.449 0.019 
2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.824 0.001 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
Table 5.6.5: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Superintendent and School Districts 
with Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Math Score (the Model M6 with Weighted Count of School 
District in Table 5.6) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Superintendent  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.992 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.469 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.242 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 8.818 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.477 0.004 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.827 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 3.350 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.577 0.000 
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Table 5.6.5 (continued) 
 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt  - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 
 
 
2.925 
 
 
0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.333 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.530 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 7.325 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.408 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.604 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 4.400 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 2.992 0.000 
2nd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 2.795 0.000 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
Table 5.7: Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 12th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable 12th Grade Reading Score 12th Grade Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist 
Competition 
-0.853 
(0.564) 
-0.970 
(1.264) 
-0.862 
(0.644) 
-1.920 
(1.690) 
-4.034 
(2.492) 
-4.050 
(2.442) 
0.498 
(0.638) 
-2.644** 
(0.967) 
2.180 
(1.330) 
1.087 
(2.265) 
1.920 
(1.330) 
Elected 
Superintendent 
-0.123 
(0.461) 
1.510 
(1.460) 
-0.145 
(0.751) 
-0.007 
(0.437) 
0.612 
(1.080) 
0.155 
(0.539) 
0.487 
(0.524) 
-3.310* 
(1.350) 
0.503 
(0.517) 
-1.570 
(1.100) 
-1.580 
(0.952) 
2nd Income 
Quintile 
0.237 
(0.368) 
0.587 
(1.280) 
0.236 
(0.370) 
0.257 
(0.365) 
0.288 
(0.659) 
0.189 
(0.636) 
-0.172 
(0.339) 
-2.490** 
(0.858) 
-0.161 
(0.333) 
-0.066 
(0.669) 
-0.248 
(0.339) 
3rd Income 
Quintile 
-0.075 
(0.461) 
-0.971 
(1.460) 
-0.076 
(0.461) 
-0.037 
(0.457) 
-0.957 
(0.672) 
-0.940 
(0.643) 
-0.250 
(0.443) 
-2.520* 
(1.010) 
-0.262 
(0.435) 
-0.831 
(0.822) 
-0.243 
(0.442) 
4th Income 
Quintile 
-0.189 
(0.478) 
-0.278 
(1.250) 
-0.189 
(0.478) 
-0.174 
(0.479) 
-1.250 
(0.672) 
-1.140 
(0.638) 
-0.717 
(0.537) 
-3.500*** 
(0.936) 
-0.701 
(0.529) 
-1.560 
(0.879) 
-0.917 
(0.542) 
Top Income 
Quintile 
0.272 
(0.598) 
0.153 
(1.550) 
0.272 
(0.598) 
0.295 
(0.599) 
-0.207 
(0.802) 
-0.199 
(0.748) 
-0.387 
(0.625) 
-3.570*** 
(1.040) 
-0.385 
(0.620) 
-0.527 
(0.997) 
-0.501 
(0.633) 
El_Supdt 
*Competition  
-0.716 
(1.340) 
0.044 
(1.200)  
-1.440 
(5.330) 
0.050 
(5.284)  
2.050 
(1.440)  
0.549 
(4.750) 
3.320 
(4.560) 
2nd Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.445 
(1.580)   
-0.532 
(2.590) 
-0.140 
(2.538)  
2.710* 
(1.160)  
-1.230 
(2.450) 
 
3rd Quintile 
*Competition  
1.190 
(1.780)   
4.270 
(2.720) 
4.274 
(2.641)  
2.870* 
(1.340)  
2.680 
(2.650) 
 
4th Quintile 
*Competition  
0.123 
(1.570)   
5.690* 
(2.720) 
5.361* 
(2.622)  
3.300** 
(1.270)  
3.560 
(2.720) 
 
Top Quintile 
*Competition  
0.176 
(1.860)   
1.850 
(3.260) 
1.950 
(3.113)  
3.960** 
(1.430)  
-0.707 
(3.180) 
 
2nd Quintile 
*El_Supdt  
-3.480 
(1.790)   
-2.720 
(1.400)   
3.400** 
(1.090)  
1.870 
(1.100) 
2.170* 
(0.905) 
3rd Quintile 
*El_Supdt  
-1.030 
(1.360)   
-0.312 
(1.240)   
1.120 
(0.841)  
0.645 
(1.070) 
0.149 
(0.847) 
4th Quintile 
*El_Supdt  
-1.160 
(0.969)   
-0.051 
(0.981)   
3.830*** 
(0.829)  
3.160** 
(1.120) 
2.710*
* 
(0.918) 
Top Quintile 
*El_Supdt  
-1.050 
(1.260)   
-0.479 
(1.220)   
3.060** 
(1.060)  
1.730 
(1.310) 
1.850 
(1.070) 
Intercept 
13.600 
(12.300) 
13.800 
(13.600) 
13.500 
(12.300) 
17.200 
(12.300) 
16.500 
(12.600) 
17.006 
(12.610) 
10.300 
(11.500) 
14.000 
(11.300) 
7.220 
(11.000) 
3.750 
(10.900) 
5.990 
(10.900
) 
Log-MSA 
Random 
Effects (Std. 
Dev.) 
-0.173 
(0.211) 
-0.179 
(0.216) 
-0.173 
(0.210) 
-0.164 
(0.207) 
-0.189 
(0.219) 
-0.166 
(0.209) 
-0.255 
(0.167) 
-0.322 
(0.207) 
-0.263 
(0.167) 
-0.395 
(0.215) 
-0.307 
(0.190) 
Log-Residual 
Random Effects 
(Std. Dev.) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.850*** 
(0.012) 
1.860*** 
(0.012) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
17578*** 74788*** 18344*** 18087*** 71739*** 18145*** 29062*** 3.20E+05*** 28440*** 
2.80E+05*
** 
2.90E+0
5*** 
Loglikelihood -24213 -24211 -24213 -24213 -24207 -24213 -22483 -22470 -22481 -22470 -22475 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), Percent of >25 years 
population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of 
median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent 
of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees 
covered under collective bargaining agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for 
student's 8th grade scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
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Table 5.7.1: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with Different Income Levels on 
Student’s 12th Grade Reading Score (the Model R6 with Weighted Count of School Districts in Table 5.7) 
Type of School District Income Levels & Weighted Count of 
School Districts Competition 
Contrast  
Bonferroni P-
Value 
4th Income Qntl - 2nd Income Qntl 5.501 0.034 
 
 
Table 5.7.2: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with Different Income Levels on 
Student’s 12th Grade Math Score (the Model M2 with Herfindahl Index in Table 5.7) 
Type of School District Income Levels & Herfindahl 
Index of School District Competition 
Contrast  
Bonferroni P-
Value 
4th Income Qntl - Lowest Income Qntl 3.305 0.094 
Top Income Qntl - Lowest Income Qntl 3.962 0.055 
 
 
Table 5.7.3: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Superintendent and School Districts 
with Different Income Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Math Score (the Model M2 with Herfindahl Index of School 
District in Table 5.7) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Superintendent  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.883 0.001 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 6.196 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.903 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 10.521 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 3.313 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 7.638 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.326 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.618 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt  - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 3.490 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.025 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.924 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 7.447 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.434 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 3.958 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 0.898 0.026 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 3.422 0.000 
2nd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 2.524 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 2.067 0.007 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
Table 5.7.4: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Superintendent and School Districts 
with Different Income Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Math Score (the Model M6 with Weighted Count of School 
District in Table 5.7) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Superintendent  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.708 0.035 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 5.651 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.492 0.000 
Top Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 9.111 0.000 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt  - 3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt 2.943 0.012 
4th Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 6.404 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 3.461 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Elec_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*Elec_Supdt 4.619 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt  - 4th Qntl*App_Supdt 3.504 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 3rd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.048 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 4.940 0.000 
Top Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 7.501 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 1.436 0.000 
4th Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 3.997 0.000 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - 2nd Qntl*App_Supdt 0.892 0.014 
3rd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 3.453 0.000 
2nd Qntl*App_Supdt - Lowest Qntl*App_Supdt 2.561 0.000 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
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Table 5.8: Results of the Hausman-Taylor Regression Models - Fiscally Dependent School District 
Variable Reading Score Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
2nd Quintile 
0.262 
(0.341) 
0.236 
(0.343) 
4.350 
(3.100) 
-0.119 
(0.275) 
0.027 
(0.310) 
-0.819 
(1.050) 
-0.037 
(0.235) 
-0.030 
(0.235) 
-0.521 
(2.000) 
-0.101 
(0.200) 
-0.153 
(0.225) 
0.550 
(0.763) 
3rd Quintile 
0.290 
(0.426) 
0.288 
(0.423) 
3.200 
(3.310) 
-0.152 
(0.356) 
0.013 
(0.391) 
-0.886 
(1.240) 
-0.115 
(0.296) 
-0.123 
(0.295) 
0.005 
(2.160) 
-0.248 
(0.260) 
-0.307 
(0.284) 
1.180 
(0.900) 
4th Quintile 
-0.367 
(0.482) 
-0.378 
(0.482) 
3.990 
(3.520) 
-0.808 
(0.443) 
-0.622 
(0.479) 
-1.040 
(1.270) 
-0.199 
(0.333) 
-0.166 
(0.333) 
1.570 
(2.320) 
-0.421 
(0.322) 
-0.488 
(0.347) 
0.942 
(0.918) 
Top Quintile 
-0.151 
(0.596) 
-0.137 
(0.593) 
4.150 
(3.590) 
-0.658 
(0.554) 
-0.467 
(0.585) 
-0.265 
(1.410) 
-0.201 
(0.402) 
-0.158 
(0.401) 
0.570 
(2.360) 
-0.431 
(0.403) 
-0.500 
(0.424) 
0.706 
(1.020) 
School Dist 
Competition 
3.260 
(2.130) 
2.180 
(3.780) 
5.760 
(5.390) 
-1.260 
(3.180) 
-3.460 
(3.840) 
-5.910 
(5.150) 
0.475 
(1.520) 
-1.900 
(2.750) 
-2.760 
(3.690) 
-0.624 
(2.290) 
0.163 
(2.780) 
3.760 
(3.730) 
Dependent 
School Districts 
-1.040* 
(0.436) 
-2.780 
(5.380) 
-5.210 
(5.520) 
-1.040* 
(0.437) 
-2.130 
(1.140) 
-2.360* 
(1.200) 
-0.046 
(0.348) 
-3.760 
(3.860) 
-5.000 
(3.960) 
-0.139 
(0.321) 
0.247 
(0.832) 
0.032 
(0.873) 
DepSchdist 
*Competition  
2.470 
(7.630) 
6.030 
(7.830)  
9.930 
(9.700) 
11.800 
(10.000)  
5.260 
(5.410) 
7.110 
(5.560)  
-3.530 
(7.000) 
-2.220 
(7.260) 
2nd Qntl 
*Competition   
-5.020 
(3.730)   
3.980 
(4.500)   
0.653 
(2.400)   
-2.640 
(3.270) 
3rd Qntl 
*Competition   
-3.480 
(4.040)   
4.050 
(5.440)   
-0.209 
(2.620)   
-6.870 
(3.940) 
4th Qntl 
*Competition   
-5.330 
(4.330)   
1.400 
(5.670)   
-2.180 
(2.830)   
-6.980 
(4.110) 
Top Qntl 
*Competition   
-5.220 
(4.440)   
-3.830 
(7.550)   
-0.836 
(2.900)   
-5.150 
(5.470) 
Intercept 
-0.849 
(22.900) 
-1.530 
(22.900) 
-5.450 
(23.000) 
-4.090 
(22.900) 
6.170 
(25.000) 
-1.250 
(26.500) 
15.200 
(15.700) 
15.200 
(15.600) 
19.000 
(15.700) 
4.820 
(16.600) 
1.060 
(18.100) 
2.800 
(19.300) 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
12107*** 10746*** 9750*** 12674*** 12630*** 12707*** 19531*** 17257*** 15527*** 29090*** 29164*** 29246*** 
sigma_u 8.050 8.940 9.650 7.750 7.770 7.720 7.590 8.330 8.970 5.230 5.210 5.170 
sigma_e 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 4.160 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 2.700 
Rho 0.789 0.822 0.843 0.776 0.777 0.775 0.887 0.905 0.917 0.789 0.788 0.786 
N 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17068 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 17037 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
Table 5. 9: Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 10th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable 10th Grade Reading Score 10th Grade Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Counts of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Counts of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist Competition 
-0.163 
(0.436) 
0.081 
(1.544) 
-0.383 
(0.463) 
-0.808 
(1.050) 
-2.889* 
(1.326) 
-3.265* 
(1.324) 
0.166 
(0.438) 
-0.373 
(1.091) 
0.182 
(0.429) 
0.314 
(0.848) 
0.205 
(1.300) 
0.587 
(0.833) 
Dependent School 
Districts 
-0.861 
(0.570) 
-0.485 
(0.986) 
-0.839 
(0.886) 
-0.846 
(0.556) 
-0.675 
(0.808) 
-1.580** 
(0.589) 
-0.466 
(0.385) 
0.178 
(0.815) 
0.222 
(0.844) 
-0.464 
(0.384) 
0.696 
(0.703) 
0.692 
(0.700) 
2nd Quintile 
0.083 
(0.305) 
0.610 
(1.280) 
0.360 
(0.338) 
0.067 
(0.293) 
-0.252 
(0.522) 
-0.492 
(0.485) 
0.088 
(0.280) 
-0.327 
(0.901) 
0.231 
(0.294) 
0.084 
(0.273) 
0.125 
(0.483) 
0.236 
(0.288) 
3rd Quintile 
-0.038 
(0.411) 
-0.485 
(1.350) 
0.210 
(0.453) 
-0.058 
(0.400) 
-0.640 
(0.629) 
-0.848 
(0.570) 
0.053 
(0.320) 
-0.485 
(0.963) 
0.173 
(0.325) 
0.046 
(0.314) 
-0.162 
(0.513) 
0.161 
(0.317) 
4th Quintile 
-0.482 
(0.437) 
0.491 
(1.260) 
-0.177 
(0.454) 
-0.496 
(0.424) 
-0.663 
(0.584) 
-0.923 
(0.562) 
-0.295 
(0.336) 
-0.619 
(0.922) 
0.009 
(0.327) 
-0.301 
(0.330) 
-0.090 
(0.479) 
-0.001 
(0.319) 
Top Quintile 
-0.574 
(0.600) 
0.693 
(1.440) 
-0.328 
(0.603) 
-0.580 
(0.586) 
-0.567 
(0.774) 
-0.737 
(0.763) 
-0.176 
(0.438) 
-0.104 
(0.938) 
-0.001 
(0.436) 
-0.185 
(0.429) 
0.047 
(0.613) 
-0.019 
(0.422) 
DepSchdist *Competition 
 
1.000 
(0.926) 
1.450* 
(0.723)  
4.940* 
(2.170) 
6.200** 
(2.170)  
0.392 
(0.683) 
0.407 
(0.666)  
-1.110 
(2.020) 
-0.847 
(1.980) 
2nd Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.331 
(1.540)   
2.730 
(1.810) 
3.080 
(1.820)  
0.686 
(1.120)   
0.427 
(1.720)  
3rd Quintile 
*Competition  
0.909 
(1.640)   
3.890** 
(1.510) 
4.140** 
(1.530)  
0.819 
(1.210)   
1.430 
(1.500)  
4th Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.877 
(1.520)   
1.950 
(1.720) 
2.400 
(1.720)  
0.771 
(1.100)   
0.230 
(1.460)  
Top Quintile 
*Competition  
-1.360 
(1.750)   
0.358 
(2.210) 
0.441 
(2.200)  
0.123 
(1.180)   
-0.831 
(2.020)  
2nd Quintile *DepSchdist 
 
-1.350 
(0.694) 
-1.330* 
(0.661)  
-1.040 
(0.649)   
-0.782 
(0.626) 
-0.854 
(0.635)  
-1.000 
(0.659) 
-1.040 
(0.645) 
3rd Quintile *DepSchdist 
 
-1.200* -1.210* 
 
-0.876 
  
-0.753 -0.809 
 
-0.767 -0.870 
147 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 (continued) 
 
 
(0.602) 
 
(0.611) 
 
(0.600) 
 
(0.573) 
 
(0.582) 
 
(0.598) 
 
(0.580) 
4th Quintile *DepSchdist 
 
-1.500* 
(0.685) 
-1.460* 
(0.652)  
-1.060 
(0.631)   
-1.830*** 
(0.444) 
-1.900*** 
(0.459)  
-
1.960**
* 
(0.499) 
-1.990*** 
(0.479) 
Top Quintile *DepSchdist 
 
-0.998 
(0.887) 
-1.080 
(0.847)  
-0.754 
(0.844)   
-1.050 
(0.576) 
-1.130* 
(0.573)  
-1.140 
(0.590) 
-1.160* 
(0.585) 
Intercept 
14.600 
(8.790) 
17.600 
(9.290) 
18.200* 
(8.930) 
15.500 
(8.850) 
19.000* 
(8.610) 
17.500* 
(8.410) 
8.110 
(7.780) 
11.100 
(7.810) 
10.200 
(7.560) 
7.540 
(7.450) 
8.130 
(7.180) 
9.010 
(7.220) 
Log-MSA Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
-0.295* 
(0.137) 
-0.306* 
(0.138) 
-0.297* 
(0.137) 
-0.308* 
(0.142) 
-0.319* 
(0.145) 
-0.344* 
(0.147) 
-
0.476*** 
(0.143) 
-0.488*** 
(0.145) 
-0.482*** 
(0.143) 
-
0.475**
* 
(0.144) 
-
0.490**
* 
(0.147) 
-0.483*** 
(0.144) 
Log-Residual Random 
Effects (Std. Dev.) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.750*** 
(0.009) 
1.750*** 
(0.010) 
1.750**
* 
(0.009) 
1.740*** 
(0.010) 
1.750*** 
(0.010) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
1.530**
* 
(0.012) 
1.530**
* 
(0.012) 
1.530*** 
(0.012) 
Chi-Square Statistics 29914*** 35511*** 
33623**
* 
29979**
* 
34759*** 32446*** 
28862**
* 
35055*** 34658*** 
29465**
* 
37581**
* 
34670*** 
Loglikelihood -30707 -30697 -30700 -30822 -30696 -30697 -28577 -28568 -28568 -28577 -28567 -28569 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
Table 5.9.1: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with Different Types of 
School District Fiscal Autonomy on Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R3 with Herfindahl Index in Table 
5.9) 
Type of School District Fiscal Autonomy & Herfindahl 
Index of School District Competition 
Contrast  Bonferroni P-Value 
Fiscally Dependent SD - Fiscally Independent SD 1.452 0.045 
 
 
Table 5.9.2: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Fiscal Autonomy and School Districts 
with Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R3 with Herfindahl Index in Table 
5.9) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Fiscal Autonomy  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 4th Qntl*Ind_SD 1.850 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl*Ind_SD 3.217 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 3.235 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 5.501 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl*Ind_SD 1.367 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 1.385 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 3.651 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 2.284 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 2.266 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl*Dep_SD 2.286 0.003 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 3rd Qntl*Dep_SD 3.501 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 2nd Qntl*Dep_SD 3.718 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 4.393 0.000 
4th Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.107 0.020 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
Table 5.9.3: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with Different Types of School District 
Fiscal Autonomy on Student’s 10th Grade Reading Score (the Model R6 with Weighted Count of School District in Table 5.9) 
Type of School District Fiscal Autonomy & Weighted 
Count of School District Competition 
Contrast  Bonferroni P-Value 
Fiscally Dependent SD - Fiscally Independent SD 6.201 0.004 
 
148 
 
Table 5.9.4: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with 
Different Income Levels on Student’s 10
th
 Grade Reading Score (the Model R6 with Weighted Count of 
School District in Table 5.9) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Weighted Count of 
School District Competition 
Contrast  Bonferroni P-Value 
3rd Quintile Sch_Dist – Lowest Quintile Sch_Dist  4.135 0.068 
 
 
 
Table 5.9.5: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Fiscal Autonomy and 
School Districts with Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Math Score (the Model M3 with 
Herfindahl Index in Table 5.9) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Fiscal Autonomy  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 4th Qntl* Ind_SD 2.709 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 4.433 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 4.566 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 7.564 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 1.724 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 1.857 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 4.855 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 3.131 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 2.998 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl* Dep_SD 3.497 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 3rd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.157 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 2nd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.358 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 6.429 0.000 
4th Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.932 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.272 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.070 0.002 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
 
Table 5.9.6: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Fiscal Autonomy and 
School Districts with Different Income Levels on Student’s 10th Grade Math Score (the Model M6 with 
Weighted Count of School District in Table 5.9) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Fiscal Autonomy  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 4th Qntl* Ind_SD 2.726 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 4.440 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 4.565 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 7.570 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 1.714 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 1.840 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 4.844 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 3.130 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 3.004 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl* Dep_SD 3.542 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 3rd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.180 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 2nd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.463 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 6.476 0.000 
4th Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.933 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.295 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.012 0.007 
4th Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl* Ind_SD -1.414 0.104 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
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Table 5.10: Results of the Multilevel Linear Regression Models, 12th Grade Reading and Math Scores 
Variable 12th Grade Reading Score 12th Grade Math Score 
 
Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs Herfindahl Index Weighted Count of SDs 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
School Dist 
Competition 
-0.781 
(0.523) 
-1.213 
(1.872) 
-0.884 
(0.570) 
-1.950 
(1.660) 
-4.253 
(2.500) 
-4.332 
(2.503) 
0.275 
(0.586) 
-1.223 
(1.331) 
0.637 
(0.589) 
1.880 
(1.260) 
1.926 
(1.917) 
2.070 
(1.250) 
Dependent 
School 
Districts 
-0.460 
(0.468) 
-0.431 
(1.120) 
-0.774 
(0.755) 
-0.517 
(0.470) 
-0.701 
(0.741) 
-0.953 
(0.551) 
0.274 
(0.424) 
1.840 
(0.938) 
2.380** 
(0.893) 
0.306 
(0.419) 
2.040** 
(0.787) 
2.090** 
(0.792) 
2nd Income 
Quintile 
0.210 
(0.373) 
0.212 
(1.560) 
0.217 
(0.376) 
0.224 
(0.369) 
0.235 
(0.704) 
0.245 
(0.648) 
-0.154 
(0.339) 
-1.350 
(1.040) 
-0.010 
(0.343) 
-0.129 
(0.337) 
0.356 
(0.593) 
-0.014 
(0.346) 
3rd Income 
Quintile 
-0.121 
(0.467) 
-0.893 
(1.660) 
-0.119 
(0.468) 
-0.083 
(0.463) 
-0.803 
(0.642) 
-0.891 
(0.656) 
-0.195 
(0.443) 
-2.010* 
(0.999) 
-0.037 
(0.433) 
-0.187 
(0.437) 
-0.642 
(0.687) 
-0.063 
(0.433) 
4th Income 
Quintile 
-0.266 
(0.484) 
-0.226 
(1.510) 
-0.260 
(0.486) 
-0.252 
(0.482) 
-1.050 
(0.648) 
-1.140 
(0.631) 
-0.633 
(0.542) 
-1.170 
(1.150) 
-0.174 
(0.508) 
-0.595 
(0.537) 
-0.207 
(0.718) 
-0.163 
(0.512) 
Top Income 
Quintile 
0.192 
(0.604) 
-0.009 
(1.810) 
0.197 
(0.605) 
0.217 
(0.601) 
-0.165 
(0.752) 
-0.182 
(0.746) 
-0.290 
(0.623) 
-2.180* 
(1.050) 
-0.128 
(0.611) 
-0.265 
(0.622) 
-0.020 
(0.858) 
-0.122 
(0.618) 
DepSchdist 
*Competition  
0.546 
(1.130) 
0.465 
(0.827)  
3.990 
(2.390) 
4.380 
(2.330)  
-0.458 
(0.954) 
-1.030 
(0.847)  
-2.590 
(2.280) 
-2.420 
(2.270) 
2nd Quintile 
*Competition  
-0.032 
(1.830)   
-0.123 
(2.590) 
-0.154 
(2.550)  
1.630 
(1.310)   
-1.870 
(2.180)  
3rd Quintile 
*Competition  
1.150 
(1.970)   
4.030 
(2.630) 
4.220 
(2.690)  
2.510 
(1.340)   
2.760 
(2.200)  
4th Quintile 
*Competition  
0.130 
(1.850)   
5.390* 
(2.690) 
5.660* 
(2.680)  
1.290 
(1.550)   
0.073 
(2.280)  
Top Quintile 
*Competition  
0.339 
(2.220)   
2.050 
(3.170) 
2.080 
(3.150)  
2.680 
(1.550)   
-0.934 
(2.750)  
2nd Quintile 
*DepSchdist  
-0.112 
(0.787)   
-0.054 
(0.761)   
-1.050 
(0.818) 
-1.150 
(0.781)  
-1.300 
(0.841) 
-1.170 
(0.814) 
3rd Quintile 
*DepSchdist  
-0.607 
(0.883)   
-0.340 
(0.832)   
-1.060 
(0.659) 
-1.260 
(0.697)  
-1.070 
(0.738) 
-1.310 
(0.736) 
4th Quintile 
*DepSchdist  
-0.932 
(0.817)   
-0.424 
(0.754)   
-3.21*** 
(0.668) 
-3.38*** 
(0.667)  
-3.43*** 
(0.723) 
-3.490*** 
(0.724) 
Top Quintile 
*DepSchdist  
-0.274 
(0.993)   
-0.148 
(0.930)   
-1.150 
(0.657) 
-1.280 
(0.664)  
-1.460* 
(0.710) 
-1.440* 
(0.703) 
Intercept 
13.000 
(12.40) 
14.600 
(13.60) 
13.200 
(12.40) 
16.500 
(12.50) 
18.000 
(12.70) 
17.600 
(12.60) 
10.300 
(11.30) 
16.800 
(11.000) 
12.400 
(10.900) 
7.990 
(11.00) 
7.440 
(11.000) 
9.630 
(10.700) 
Log-MSA 
Random 
Effects (Std. 
Dev.) 
-0.180 
(0.212) 
-0.178 
(0.218) 
-0.182 
(0.210) 
-0.175 
(0.211) 
-0.205 
(0.236) 
-0.209 
(0.233) 
-0.247 
(0.166) 
-0.304 
(0.176) 
-0.304 
(0.171) 
-0.250 
(0.164) 
-0.368* 
(0.186) 
-0.305 
(0.167) 
Log-Residual 
Random 
Effects (Std. 
Dev.) 
1.860*
** 
(0.012) 
1.850*
** 
(0.012) 
1.860*
** 
(0.012) 
1.860*
** 
(0.012) 
1.850*
** 
(0.012) 
1.850*
** 
(0.012) 
1.620*
** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*
** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
1.620*** 
(0.013) 
Chi-Square 
Statistics 
17745*
** 
20080*
** 
17797*
** 
18136*
** 
20288*
** 
19357*
** 
26830*
** 
39464**
* 
35653**
* 
26949*
** 
40744**
* 
35635*** 
Loglikelihood -24212 -24210 -24212 -24212 -24206 -24207 -22483 -22466 -22468 -22482 -22464 -22468 
Notes:  
a. ***=p<0.001; **=p<0.01; *=p<0.05.  
b. All the models include log of school district population, log of MSA population, Proportion of school age population (5-17 years), 
Percent of >25 years population with at least high school diploma, Percent of foreign born population, Percent of non-white 
population, Racial Diversity Index in MSA, Log of median household income, Poverty, Percent of owner-occupied housing units, 
Median housing value, Percent of total revenue from local sources, Percent of local revenue from property taxes, Log of per pupil 
revenue from state sources, Percent of >65 years population, Percent of public sector employees covered under collective bargaining 
agreements, Percent of non-Whites in School District Board, and Year dummies. The models also control for student's 8th grade 
scores in reading and math, race, sex, and SES. At the school level, the models include student-teacher ratio in 8th grade, percent of 
minority students, percent of free and reduced lunch students, the region to which the school belongs, and whether the school is 
private or public. 
c. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 
 
 
Table 5.10.1: Comparative Marginal Effects of School District Competition in School Districts with Different Income Levels on 
Student’s 12th Grade Reading Score (the Model R6 with Weighted Count of School District in Table 5.10) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Weighted Count of School District 
Competition 
Contrast  Bonferroni P-Value 
4th Quintile Sch_Dist – 2nd Quintile Sch_Dist  5.812 0.017 
 
 
Table 5.10.2: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Fiscal Autonomy and School 
Districts with Different Income Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Math Score (the Model M3 with Herfindahl Index in 
Table 5.10) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Fiscal Autonomy  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
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Table 5.10.2 (continued) 
 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 4th Qntl* Ind_SD 
 
 
3.064 
 
 
0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 4.238 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 5.093 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 7.765 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 1.173 0.001 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 2.028 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 4.700 0.000 
3rd Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 0.855 0.072 
3rd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 3.527 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 2.672 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl* Dep_SD 5.082 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 3rd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.105 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 2nd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.803 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 6.479 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.375 0.005 
4th Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl* Ind_SD -1.771 0.018 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
 
 
Table 5.10.3: Comparative Marginal Effects of Different Types of School District Fiscal Autonomy and School 
Districts with Different Income Levels on Student’s 12th Grade Math Score (the Model M6 with Weighted Count of 
School District in Table 5.10) 
Sch_Dist Income Quintile & Type of School District Fiscal Autonomy  Contrast Bonferroni P-Value 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 4th Qntl* Ind_SD 3.080 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 4.228 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 5.051 0.000 
Top Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 7.753 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 3rd Qntl* Ind_SD 1.148 0.002 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - 2nd Qntl*Ind_SD 1.971 0.000 
4th Qntl* Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 4.673 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 3.525 0.000 
2nd Qntl*Ind_SD - Lowest Qntl*Ind_SD 2.702 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl* Dep_SD 5.086 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 3rd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.170 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - 2nd Qntl*Dep_SD 4.878 0.000 
Top Qntl* Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 6.489 0.000 
3rd Qntl*Dep_SD - Lowest Qntl*Dep_SD 2.319 0.008 
4th Qntl* Dep_SD - 4th Qntl* Ind_SD -1.702 0.040 
Note: All the variables in the model are controlled at their means. 
 
